Mean Reversion in Housing Markets by Nathanson, Charles Gordon
 Mean Reversion in Housing Markets
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Nathanson, Charles Gordon.  2014.  Mean Reversion in HousingMarkets.  Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University.
Accessed April 17, 2018 5:03:12 PM EDT
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12274618
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAA
Mean Reversion in Housing Markets
A dissertation presented
by
Charles Gordon Nathanson
to
The Department of Economics
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the subject of
Economics
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts
April 2014
© 2014 Charles Gordon Nathanson
All rights reserved.
Dissertation Advisor:
Professor Edward L. Glaeser
Author:
Charles Gordon Nathanson
Mean Reversion in Housing Markets
Abstract
Booms in house prices are usually followed by busts. This pattern is called “mean reversion.”
Mean reversion in housing markets has historically coincided with economic recessions
across the world. Chapter 1 establishes mean reversion in U.S. data, and attempts to explain
it using the dynamics of wages in cities. Chapter 2 takes a different approach. It models
mean reversion resulting from speculation and uncertainty. This model explains why strong
mean reversion in prices occurs in cities where it is easy to build houses, a phenomenon
that Chapter 1 cannot explain. Chapter 3 takes the spirit of Chapter 2 and applies it to the
optimal design of the income tax.
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Chapter 1
Housing Dynamics: An Urban
Approach1
1.1 Introduction
Can the dynamics of housing markets be explained by a dynamic, rational expectations
version of the standard urban real estate models of Alonso (1964), Rosen (1979), and Roback
(1982)? In this tradition, housing prices reflect a spatial equilibrium, where prices are
determined by local wages and amenities so that local heterogeneity is natural. Our model
extends the Alonso-Rosen-Roback framework by focusing on high frequency price dynamics
and by incorporating endogenous housing supply.
An urban approach can potentially help address the fact that most variation in housing
price changes is local, not national. Less than eight percent of the variation in price levels
and barely more than one-quarter of the variation in price changes across cities can be
accounted for by national, year-specific fixed effects. Clearly, there is much local variation
that cannot be accounted for by common macroeconomic variables such as interest rates or
national income.
We focus not on the most recent boom and bust, which was extraordinary in many
1This chapter is co-authored with Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko, and Eduardo Morales.
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dimensions, but rather on long-term stylized facts about housing markets. One such fact is
that price changes are predictable (Case and Shiller, 1989; Cutler et al., 1991). Depending
upon the market and specific time period being examined, a $1 increase in real constant
quality house prices in one year is associated with a 60-80 cent increase the next year.
However, a $1 increase in local market prices over the past five years is associated with
strong mean reversion over the next five year period. This raises the question of whether
the high frequency momentum and low frequency mean reversion of price changes can be
reconciled with a rational market.
Another outstanding feature of housing markets is that the strong mean reversion in
price appreciation and strong persistence in housing unit growth across decades shown
in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 is at odds with simple demand-driven models in which prices and
quantities move symmetrically. This raises the question of what else is needed to generate
this pattern.
Third, price changes and construction levels are quite volatile in many markets. The
range of standard deviations of three-year real changes in our sample of metropolitan area
average house prices runs from about $6,500 in sunbelt markets to over $30,000 in coastal
markets. New construction within markets also can be volatile, with its standard deviation
much higher in the sunbelt region. Can this volatility be the result of real shocks to housing
markets or must it reflect bubbles or animal spirits?
Section 2 presents our model and its implications. Naturally, the urban approach
predicts that housing markets are local, not national, in nature. Predictable housing
price changes also are shown to be compatible with a no-arbitrage rational expectations
equilibrium. Mean reversion over the medium and longer term results if construction does
not respond immediately to shocks and if local income shocks themselves mean revert. High
frequency positive serial correlation of housing prices results if there is enough positive
serial correlation of labor demand or amenity shocks. Conceptually, a dynamic rational
expectations urban model is at least consistent with the outstanding features of housing
markets, at least as they existed prior to the financial crisis.
2
Figure 1.1: Real House Price Appreciation in the 1980s and 1990s
However, our calibration exercises yield both successes and failures in trying to match
key moments of the data. We are able to capture the extensive heterogeneity across different
types of markets, especially in our contrast of coastal markets with high inelastic supply
sides with interior markets with very elastic supplies of homes. Different shocks to the
varying local income processes interact with very different supply side conditions to generate
materially different housing market dynamics.
The model also does a reasonably good job of generating high variation in house price
changes based on innovations in our proxy for local incomes, although we cannot match the
extremely high volatility in house prices in the most variable coastal markets. The model
also does a tolerably good job of matching the volatility of new construction, generating
wide divergences across markets based on underlying supply elasticities. However, the
model again cannot match the most volatile construction markets which are off the coasts.
3
Figure 1.2: Housing Unit Growth in the 1980s and 1990s
With respect to the serial correlations of quantities and prices, the model gets the pattern,
but not the magnitude, of the strong high-frequency persistence in construction. Our model
correctly captures the weakening of that persistence over longer horizons, but still cannot
replicate the mean reversion that is evident in the data over five-year periods. The model
fails utterly at explaining the very strong, high frequency positive serial correlation in price
changes. It does a better job at predicting mean reversion over longer five-year horizons,
but still cannot precisely match the magnitude of that pattern, especially in coastal markets.
This suggests that the most important puzzle for housing economists to explain, apart
from the most recent cycle, is the strong persistence in high frequency price changes from
one year to the next. Persistence itself is not enough to reject a rational expectations model,
but the mismatch between the data and model at annual frequencies indicates that Case
4
and Shiller (1989)’s conclusion regarding inefficiency could be right. Other issues deserving
closer examination include whether there really is excess volatility in coastal markets and
the nature of serial correlation in construction over longer time horizons.
1.2 A Dynamic Model of Housing Prices
1.2.1 Housing Supply
Homebuilders are risk neutral firms that operate in a competitive market. Suppressing a
subscript for individual markets for ease of exposition, the marginal cost to this industry of
constructing a house at time t is given by
C + c0t + c1 It + c2Nt,
where It is the amount of construction and Nt is the housing stock at time t. The c0 term
allows unit costs to trend over time. When c1 > 0, the supply curve at time t is upward-
sloping. The coefficient c2 allows unit costs to depend on the city size, reflecting community
opposition to development as density levels increase. We assume that c1 > c2 so that present
construction has a larger effect on costs through the first effect. The supply parameters c0,
c1, and c2 can vary across metropolitan areas.
Housing is completely durable, and new supply is constrained to be non- negative:
It ≥ 0.
Homebuilders also face a time to build. Housing constructed at time t cannot be sold until
time t + 1. Homebuilders also bear the costs of time t construction at time t + 1. Perfect
competition and risk-neutrality deliver the following supply condition:
E(Ht+1) = C + c0t + c1 It + c2Nt (1.1)
when It > 0, where Ht+1 is the house price at time t + 1. In equilibrium, the expected sales
price of a house equals the marginal cost when homebuilders construct new houses.
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1.2.2 Housing Demand
Each person consumes exactly one unit of housing, so that Nt equals both the housing stock
and the population. Consumer utility depends linearly on consumption and city-specific
amenities:
U(Consumptiont, Amenitiest) = Consumptiont +Amenitiest.
Consumers are identical and face a city-specific labor demand curve of
Wagest = Wt − αW Nt
at time t. Amenities also depend linearly on the population:
Amenitiest = At − αANt.
Consumers must own a house to access the city’s labor market and amenities. We exclude
rental contracts from the model to focus on the owner-occupancy market. Consumers are
risk-neutral and can borrow and lend at an interest rate r. Their indirect utility is therefore
Vt = Wt + At − (αW + αA)Nt −
(
Ht − E(Ht+1)1+ r
)
. (1.2)
To pin down this utility level, we turn to the cross-metropolitan area spatial equilibrium
concept introduced by Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982). Consumers are indifferent across
cities at all points in time. This indifference condition is a particularly strong version
of the standard spatial equilibrium assumption that assumes away moving costs. There
is a “reservation” city where housing is completely elastic: c0 = c1 = c2 = 0, so that
housing prices always equal C.2 Wages and amenities do not depend on the reservation
city population: αW = αA = 0. If we let Vt equal Wt + At for the reservation city, then the
2While it is possible that prices will deviate around this value because of temporary over- or under-building,
we simplify and assume that the price of a house always equals C.
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reservation utility level that holds in this city as well as in all cities is
Vt = Vt − rC1+ r . (1.3)
The existence of the reservation city makes our calculations considerably easier, and there
are places within the United States, especially in the growing areas of the sunbelt, that are
marked by elastic labor demand and housing supply Glaeser et al. (2005).3
Putting together equations (1.2) and (1.3) gives the following housing demand equation:
Ht − E(Ht+1)1+ r −
rC
1+ r
= Wt + At − (αW + αA)Nt −Vt. (1.4)
For our estimation, we assume the following functional form:
Wt + At −Vt = x + qt + xt,
where xt is a stochastic term that follows an ARMA(1,1) process:
xt = δxt−1 + et + θet−1,
with 0 < δ < 1 and the et independently and identically distributed with mean 0 and finite
variance σ2. The x term is a city fixed effect and q is a city-specific drift term. We also define
α ≡ αW + αA
to be the slope of the housing demand curve, and we assume that α > 0.
1.2.3 Equilibrium
The supply equation (1.1) and the demand equation (1.4) jointly determine equilibrium
prices, housing stock, and investment. To obtain a unique solution to our model, we impose
a transversality condition
lim
j→∞
Et(Ht+j)
(1+ r)j
= 0 (1.5)
3Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010) present a similar model in their exploration of long run changes in the
distribution of income.
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for all t. The transversality condition limits the possible role of housing bubbles in accounting
for housing dynamics. While we do not discount the possible explanatory power of bubbles,
our focus here allows us to learn what aspects of housing dynamics can already be explained
by a model in which prices equal the discounted sum of current and future expected rents.
The following lemma shows that price, housing stock, and investment converge towards
“trend” levels of these variables when the transversality condition is satisfied.
Lemma 1. When equation (1.5) is satisfied, there exist unique price, stock, and investment functions
Hˆt, Nˆt, and Iˆt such that
lim
j→∞
Et(Ht+j)− Hˆt+j = lim
j→∞
Et(Nt+j)− Nˆt+j = lim
j→∞
Et(It+j)− Iˆt+j = 0
for any Ht, Nt, and It that satisfy the supply and demand equations. Hˆt and Nˆt are linear in t and Iˆt
is constant.
We call Hˆt, Nˆt, and Iˆt trend prices, population, and investment. Closed-form expressions
for these trend variables as well as a proof of the lemma appear in the technical appendix.
If xt = 0 for all t and Nt = Nˆt for some initial period, then the steady state quantities
would fully describe the equilibrium.4 Secular trends in housing prices come from the trend
in housing demand as long as c2 > 0, or the trend in construction costs as long as α > 0. If
c2 = 0, so that construction costs don’t increase with total city size, then trends in wages or
amenities will impact city size but not housing prices. If α = 0 and city size doesn’t decrease
wages or amenities, then trends in construction costs will impact city size but not prices.
Lemma 2 then describes housing prices and investment when there are shocks to demand
and when Nt 6= Nˆt. The proof is in the technical appendix.
Lemma 2. At time t, housing prices equal
Ht = Hˆt + xt +
Et(xt+1)
φ− δ −
α(1+ r)
1+ r− φ (Nt − Nˆt)
4In this case, the assumption that there is always some construction requires that q(1+ r) > rc0.
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and investment equals
It = Iˆ +
1+ r
c1
Et(xt+1)
φ− δ − (1− φ)(Nt − Nˆt)
where φ > 1 > φ > 0 are parameters that depend on α, c1, c2, and r.5
This lemma describes the movement of housing prices and construction around their
trend levels. A temporary shock, e, will increase housing prices by (φ+ θ)/(φ− δ) and
increase construction by (1+ r)(δ+ θ)/(c1(φ− δ)). Higher values of δ (i.e., more permanent
shocks) will make both of these effects stronger. Higher values of c1 mute the construction
response to shocks and increase the price response to a temporary shock (by reducing
the quantity response). These results provide the intuition that places which are quantity
constrained should have less construction volatility and more price volatility.
The following proposition provides implications about expected housing price changes.
Proposition 1. At time t, the expected home price change between time t and t + j is
Hˆt+j − Hˆt + Et(xt+1)
φ− δ
(
1+ r
c1
δj−1((1− δ)c1 − c2)− φj−1((1− φ)c1 − c2)
φ− δ − 1
)
−xt +
(
α(1+ r)
1+ r− φ − φ
j−1((1− φ)c1 − c2)
)
(Nt − Nˆt),
the expected change in the city housing stock between time t and time t + j is
j Iˆ +
1+ r
c1(φ− δ)
φj − δj
φ− δ Et(xt+1)− (1− φ
j)(Nt − Nˆt),
and expected time t + j construction is
Iˆ +
1+ r
c1(φ− δ)
(
δj−1(1− δ)− φj−1(1− φ)
φ− δ
)
Et(xt+1)− φj−1(1− φj)(Nt − Nˆt).
Proposition 1 delivers the implication that a rational expectations model of housing
5The formulas for φ and φ are
φ =
(1+ r)(α+ c1) + c1 − c2 +
√
((1+ r)(α+ c1) + c1 − c2)2 − 4(1+ r)c1(c1 − c2)
2c1
;
φ =
(1+ r)(α+ c1) + c1 − c2 −
√
((1+ r)(α+ c1) + c1 − c2)2 − 4(1+ r)c1(c1 − c2)
2c1
.
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prices is fully compatible with predictability in housing prices. If utility flows in a city are
high today and expected to be low in the future, then housing prices will also be expected
to decline over time. Any predictability of wages and construction means that predictability
in housing price changes will result in our model.
The predictability of construction and prices comes in part from the convergence to
trend values. If xt = et = 0 and initial population is above its trend level, then prices and
investment are expected to converge on their trend levels from above. If initial population is
below its trend level and xt = et = 0, then price and population are expected to converge
to their trend levels from below. The rate of convergence is determined by r, α, c1, and c2.
Higher levels of c1 and c2 cause the rate of convergence to slow by reducing the extent that
new construction responds to changes in demand.
The impact of a one-time shock is explored in the next proposition.
Proposition 2. If Nt = Nˆt, xt−1 = et−1 = 0, c2 = 0, and et > 0, then investment and housing
prices will initially be higher than steady state levels, but there exists a value j∗ such that for all
j > j∗, time t expected values of time t+ j construction and housing prices will lie below steady state
levels. The situation is symmetric when et < 0.
Proposition 2 highlights that this model not only delivers mean reversion, but overshoot-
ing. Figure 1.3 shows the response of population, construction and prices relative to their
steady state levels in response to a one time shock. Construction and prices immediately
shoot up, but both start to decline from that point. At first, population rises slowly over
time, but as the shock wears off, the heightened construction means that the city is too large
relative to its steady state level. Eventually, both construction and prices end up below their
steady state levels because there is too much housing in the city relative to its wages and
amenities. Places with positive shocks will experience mean reversion, with a quick boom
in prices and construction, followed by a bust.6
Finally, we turn to the puzzling empirical fact that there was strong mean reversion of
6Overshooting occurs here with no depreciation in the housing stock. The case with depreciation is
addressed in Glaeser and Gyourko (2005).
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Figure 1.3: Simulated One-Time Shock
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Notes: We use the parameters estimated for the Interior Region using HMDA data in this figure: δ = 0.88,
θ = 0.20, c1 = 3.16, and c2 = 0.12.
prices and strong positive serial correlation in population levels across the 1980s and 1990s.
We address this by looking at the one period covariance of price and population changes.
We focus on one period for simplicity, but we think of this proposition as relating to longer
time periods. Since mean reversion dominates over long time periods, we assume θ = 0 to
avoid the effects of serial correlation:
Proposition 3. If N0 = Nˆ0, θ = 0, x0 = e0, cities differ only in their demand trends q and their
shock terms e0, e1, and e2, and these terms are uncorrelated, then if δ > 1− φ, second period
population growth will always be positively correlated with first period population growth, while
second period price growth will be negatively correlated with first period population growth as long
11
as Var(q)Var(et) is below a bound.
Proposition 3 tells us that, in the model, positive serial correlation of construction levels
is quite compatible with negative serial correlation of price changes. The proposition only
proves that the reversal occurs when persistence of shocks is high, but in the Technical
Appendix, we show that the persistence can occur when the process is less persistent. The
positive correlation of quantities is driven by the heterogeneous trends in demand across
urban areas. As long as the variance of these trends is high enough relative to the variance
of temporary shocks, there will be positive serial correlation in quantities, as in Figure 1.2.
Yet these long trends may have little impact on price changes, since the trends are
completely anticipated. As discussed above, when c2 is low, trends will have little impact
on steady state price growth, although these trends will determine the steady state price
level. Instead, price changes will be driven by the temporary shocks, and if these shocks
mean revert, then so will prices.
This suggests two requirements for the observed positive correlation of quantities and
negative correlation of prices: city-specific trends must differ significantly and the impact of
city size on construction costs must be small. Both conditions appear to occur in reality. The
extensive heterogeneity in city-specific trends is discussed and documented by Gyourko
et al. (2013) and Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010). The literature on housing investment
suggests that the impact of city size on construction costs is quite small (Topel and Rosen,
1988; Gyourko and Saiz, 2006).
1.3 Estimating the Model
We now calibrate the model to see whether certain moments of the data are compatible with
our framework. We focus on movements in prices and construction intensity around steady
state levels. The aim of this exercise is to show how a model which posits that variation in
prices and construction levels is solely driven by exogenous shocks to both amenity levels
and the demand for labor can fit certain moments of the housing data. As we lack data on
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the short term fluctuations in the level of amenities, we will identify the parameters of the
stochastic process governing these shocks to housing demand only from wage data.7 This is
not to claim that there are no other shocks that will affect the volatility of both prices and
construction. There are, but our approach still provides some quantitative measure of how
misspecified our housing models would be if we were to ignore these additional shocks.
To generate predictions from the model, we need to calibrate eight parameters: (r, α,
w, δ, θ, σ, c1, c2). The parameters (δ, θ, σ) govern housing demand. Consistent with the
spirit of the calibration exercise described in the previous paragraph, we estimate these
parameters exclusively using wage data. Identifying the remaining five parameters using
only data on deviations of housing prices and construction of new houses from their steady
state levels turns out to be infeasible.8 Therefore, we borrow estimates of the real interest
rate, r, the slope of the inverse housing demand equation, α, and the slope of labor demand,
w, from other sources. Finally, we use data on housing prices and quantities to estimate the
parameters determining the housing supply, (c1, c2).
We assume that r equals 0.04. This value is higher than standard estimates of the real
interest rate because it is also meant to reflect other aspects of the cost of owning such as
taxes or maintenance expenses that roughly scale up with the cost of the house. Different
values of the real interest rate have little impact on our calibration, as long as it is assumed
to be constant.
The value of α reflects the impact that an increase in the housing stock will have on
the willingness to pay to live in a locale. If population was fixed, equation (2) would
imply that the derivative of steady state housing prices with respect to the number of
homes equals −(1+ r)α/r, which can be interpreted as the slope of the housing demand
curve. Typically, housing demand relationships are estimated as elasticities, so we must
7There can still be long run trends in amenities that differ across metropolitan areas, but these will not
impact the short term housing price and construction dynamics that are the focus of our simulations.
8As will be seen in the next Section, in order to identify the parameters of the model, we derive moment
conditions from the equation in Lemma 2. More moment conditions than parameters we have to identify are
derived. Nevertheless, when we try to simultaneously identify the five parameters (r, α, w, c1, c2), the resulting
objective function is relatively flat and identification is very weak.
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first convert elasticities into the comparable slope in levels and then multiply by r/(1+ r).
Many housing demand elasticity estimates are around one (or slightly below, in absolute
value; see, e.g. Polinsky and Ellwood (1979) or Saiz (2003)), and there is a wide range in the
literature, so we experiment with a range from 0 to 2. To transform the elasticity into slope
in levels, we multiply by an average ratio of price to population, and that produces a range
of estimates for (1+ r)α/r ranging from 0 to 3. Multiplying this range by r/(1+ r) yields a
range from 0 to 0.15. We use a parameter value of 0.1 in our estimation, which implies that
for every 10,000 extra homes sold the marginal purchaser likes living in the area $1,000 less
per year.
Lower values do not significantly change our estimates. Even with α = 0.1, most of
the variation in house prices comes from direct shocks to wages and not from variation in
congestion effects. Lemma 2 shows that we can decompose the variation in house prices
from trend as
Ht − Hˆt = xt + Et(xt+1)
φ− δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
wage shocks
− α(1+ r)
1+ r− φ (Nt − Nˆt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
congestion effects
. (1.6)
Table 1.1 lists the volatility of each term using the parameters we estimate for each of the
three regions of the United States (calculation details are in the technical appendix). In all
three cases, wage shocks are much more important than variation in congestion effects. The
value of α is much more important in determining the steady- state (i.e. trend) size of the
city, but this steady-state is not our focus here.
The parameter α combines the impact that extra population has on wage levels with the
impact that extra population has on amenities, and we also must use a distinct estimate of
the connection between population and wage levels to correct our wage series for the change
in population. Given the absence of compelling evidence on the links between population
size and amenity levels, and the possibility that the link is actually positive (if access to other
people is a consumption amenity), we make the simplifying assumption that the impact of
population on amenities is zero, so that the value of α is the same as the value of αW . While
we do not literally believe this, assuming it has little impact on our estimates since it only
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serves to allow us to infer productivity changes from wage changes by correcting for the
changes in population. As year-to-year population changes are relatively modest, different
means of correcting for population changes have little impact on the inferred productivity
series.
In principle all eight parameters in our model could differ across each metropolitan
area, but data limitations make it impossible for us to precisely estimate distinct values
for each location. Instead, we assume the calibrated parameters (r, α, w) to be identical for
all metropolitan areas and we estimate different values of the parameters (δ, θ, σ, c1, c2)
for three different regions of the U.S.9 Our three regions are coastal, sunbelt and interior.
Metropolitan areas whose centroids are within 50 miles of the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans are
defined as coastal. Metropolitan areas more than 50 miles from either coast and which are
in the broad swath of southern and western states on the southern border of the country
running from Florida through Arizona are defined to be in the sunbelt region. The remainder
of our metropolitan areas are defined as being in the interior region of the country.
9Obtaining different estimates of (r, α, w) for each of these three areas is impossible, as the sources from
which we borrow those estimates do not provide such detail.
Table 1.1: Relative Volatility of Terms in House Price Equation
Coastal Sunbelt Interior
Wage Shocks 44,000 12,000 13,000
Congestion Effects 4,000 5,000 7,000
Notes: The house price equation is decomposed in equation (1.6). The volatilities are computed using the
estimates in Table 1.2. Details on the computation are provided in the technical appendix.
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1.3.1 Data
For our estimation exercise, we need data on housing prices, construction of new houses,
number of households potentially supplying labor, and income per household for a signifi-
cant number of metropolitan areas.
The housing price data is based on Federal Housing Finance Agency repeat sales indices.
Construction data are housing permits reported by the U.S. Census. To estimate annual
changes in the number of households, we impute the housing stock based on decadal
census estimates of the housing stock and annual permits data. Specifically, we estimate the
housing stock at time t + j to be
Nit +
∑
j−1
k=0 Permits
i
t+k
∑9k=0 Permits
i
t+k
(
Nit+10 − Nit
)
,
where Nit and N
i
t+10 are the housing stocks measured during the two closest censuses in
metropolitan area i. Thus, the change in housing stock is partitioned across years based on
the observed permitting activity.
Our primary source of income data comes from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA) files on reported income on mortgage applications. We observe all loan applicants,
not just successful buyers. The HMDA data extend back to 1990. Since HMDA is essentially
a 100 percent sample of everyone who sought a mortgage, the sample sizes are quite large
and we have data for every metropolitan area. Importantly, the HMDA data captures
household level income, which is the appropriate level given our model. The disadvantages
of using HMDA income data are a relatively short time series, the fact that we do not
observe those who searched but did not apply for a mortgage, and that the homebuying
decision is endogenous, which can create biases because the selected sample of people who
decide to apply for a loan can differ across markets or years.
An alternative data source on income is the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) per
capita income measure. It is available beginning in 1980 and for all metropolitan areas.
However, it suffers from a number of drawbacks. First, it is at the individual, not household,
level as its name implies. Households, not individuals, purchase housing units. Hence, in
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our experimentation with this measure, we translate per capita incomes into household-
levels by multiplying by 2.63, which is the average number of people per housing unit
in our sample of areas in 1990. It also captures the incomes of many people who were
not potential buyers. The incomes earned by permanent renters or people who have been
immobile homeowners for many years may not have much to do with the advantage that
a location brings to the marginal purchaser. In addition, the incomes of renters are both
lower and less volatile than those of owners. Hence, the BEA series is likely to understate
the relevant volatility in local incomes, which is critical given our purposes.10
While we experimented with both income measures, we believe the advantages of the
HMDA series far outweighs its negatives. Hence, we report results using this series and
comment on findings with the BEA data where appropriate.
The sample used in the estimation has 21 sunbelt metropolitan areas, 32 coastal metropoli-
tan areas, and 60 interior ones. The data for housing prices, construction, number of
households, and borrower income spans the period 1990-2004.
1.3.2 Methodology
As indicated above, we estimate the parameters (δ, θ, σ, c1, c2) subject to particular values of
(r, α, w). We estimate these five parameters using a sequential two-step Generalized Method
of Moments estimator.11 Our two stage procedure estimates our parameters by first using
10Based on data from the New York City Housing and Vacancy Surveys (NYCHVS) from 1978-2002, the
income of recent homebuyers increases by $1.29 for every dollar increase in BEA-reported per capita income,
while that for renters only rises by $0.47. The NYCHVS only covers one city, but it highlights that the volatility
of BEA per capita income is lowered by its incorporation of renter income.
11The details of this estimation method are provided in the Appendix. Hansen (1982) proves consistency and
asymptotic normality for the standard two-step GMM estimator, in which all parameters are simultaneously
estimated. Newey (1984) expands these results and provides the correct formula for the asymptotic variance
of the two-step GMM estimator of a subvector of parameters, when the moments are a function of previous
GMM estimates of a different subvector of parameters. Finally, Newey and McFadden (1994) show that the
sequential GMM estimators belong to the more general family of extremum estimators. These results guarantee
that the sequential two-step GMM estimator we use is consistent, asymptotically normal and has the asymptotic
variances described in the Appendix. In principle, we could estimate all of our parameters simultaneously, using
information on wages, construction levels and housing prices, but, as indicated above, this would contradict
the spirit of the exercise we want to perform. If we were to use data on deviations of housing prices and
construction levels with respect to their steady state in order to identify the parameters (δ, θ, σ), then our
estimates of the stochastic process governing housing demand would capture not only the income process
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the population-corrected wage series to estimate the housing demand parameters and then
using housing price and construction series to identify the housing supply parameters.
More specifically, the parameters (δ, θ, σ) are estimated from an equilibrium equation in
the labor market using a two-step GMM estimator. Given these estimates, the parameters
(c1, c2) are estimated from the equilibrium equations for the housing market in Lemma 1
using again a two-step GMM estimator.
Description of Moments
The vector of moments used to estimate (δ, θ, σ) is based on the reduced form relationship
between productivity per worker and the equilibrium number of workers: W it = Ŵ
i
t − αW Nit .
The assumption that xit works entirely through the wage process allows us to write: W
i
t =
wi0 + w
a
1t + x
i
t − αW Nit , which allows for a city-specific constant and a region-specific time
trend in labor demand.12 Using this expression for wages as well as the assumed value of w,
we define our productivity variable, which is wages normalized for changes in the number
of workers: W˜ it = W
i
t + αW N
i
t . The resulting equation is: W˜
i
t = w
i
0 + w
a
1t + x
i
t , where x
i
t
follows an ARMA(1,1) process. The stochastic process for the shocks is therefore
xit = δx
i
t−1 + e
i
t + θe
i
t−1,
with eit independently and identically distributed over time with
E[eit|xit, xit−1] = 0, and var[eit|xit, xit−1] = σ2e .
Using these two restrictions on e and data on W˜ it , we identify the parameter vector (δ, θ, σ)
through a vector of moments
E[ f (W˜ i; (δ, θ, σ))] = 0.
(as the model indicates should be the case) but also the stochastic process governing any other unobservable
variable or shock that might affect the equilibrium in the housing market.
12We have tried to allow for city-specific time trends but, given the short length of the time series available
for estimation, this impedes the identification of the remaining parameters of the wage equation.
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The exact functional form of the moment function f (W˜ i; (δ, θ, σ)) is contained in the Ap-
pendix. This moment function is based on different moments of the one- period changes
in our productivity measure, ∆W˜, and relies on the e shocks having mean zero, being
uncorrelated with lagged values of W˜ i, and having constant variance.13
Given the first stage estimates of the housing demand parameters, (δˆ, θˆ, σˆ2), we use the
equilibrium equations in Lemma 1 to build moment conditions that allow us to identify the
vector (c1, c2). Identification of these two parameters is performed through the vector of
moment conditions:
E[v(Hi, Ni, Ii; (c1, c2))] = 0.
The exact functional form of the moment function v(Hi, Ni, Ii; (c1, c2)) also is reported in
the Appendix. This moment function is based on different moments of the deviations
between the vector of housing prices, construction, and number of households and their
steady state levels, (H − Ĥ, I − Î, N − N̂). The moments defined by the moment function
v(Hi, Ni, Ii; (c1, c2)) rely on the e shocks having mean zero, being uncorrelated with lagged
values of Ni, and having constant variance.
In order to build the sample analogues of
E[ f (W˜ i; (δ, θ, σ))] = 0,
E[v(Hi, Ni, Ii; (c1, c2))] = 0,
we use sample moment conditions that pool all the observations across metropolitan areas
and time periods which we assume share the same values of the parameter vector (δ, θ, σ, c1,
c2). Specifically, we build the sample analogue of the moment conditions aggregating across
metropolitan areas within regions and over our entire sample period. We pool observations
across metropolitan areas, instead of splitting them across different moment conditions, to
13As a robustness check, we have also estimated (δ, θ, σ) using a multiple-step estimation procedure. In the
first step, we use the Arellano-Bond estimator to obtain estimates of delta. Given this estimate of δ, we use
a Classical Minimum Distance estimator for θ based on the first and second order temporal autocorrelation.
Finally, using our estimates of (δ, θ), we estimate σ from the residual variance. The results are very similar to
the ones based on the simultaneous estimation of (δ, θ, σ) using the moment function f (W˜i; (δ, θ, σ)) and are
available upon request.
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increase our sample size. After all, GMM estimators have optimal statistical properties only
when the number of observations used in each moment condition goes to infinity, and the
standard errors of our GMM estimates are valid only asymptotically.
1.3.3 Estimation Results
Table 1.2 reports our estimated parameters. The estimates of the labor demand shocks
persistence parameter, δ, are 0.88 in the interior and coastal areas and 0.89 in the sunbelt.
While the similarity of these estimates is striking, they are still somewhat imprecise. We
cannot reject the possibility that income shocks follow a random walk (i.e., the persistence
parameter equals one) and we also cannot reject much more significant mean reversion.
Table 1.2: Estimated Demand and Supply Parameters
HMDA Income Data, 1990- 2004
Coastal Sunbelt Interior
Demand
δ 0.88 0.89 0.88
(0.11) (0.13) (0.10)
θ 0.82 0.13 0.20
(0.62) (0.13) (0.10)
σe $1,700 $1,300 $1,300
(500) (200) (100)
Supply
c1 10.62 1.47 3.16
(0.58) (0.14) (0.25)
c2 4.08 0.34 0.12
(0.77) (0.08) (0.11)
Notes: δ, θ, and σe are the autocorrelation parameter, moving average parameter and residual variance of
an ARMA(1,1) estimated for the component of wages that is not explained by a linear time trend and a
metropolitan area-specific constant. c1 denotes the derivative of expected future housing prices with respect
to current investment in housing construction; and c2 denote the derivative of the physical capital cost of
building a home with respect to the stock of houses. The standard errors for the demand parameters are efficient
two-step GMM standard errors. The ones for the supply parameters account for error coming from the demand
estimates.
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The estimates of the moving average parameter θ are statistically indistinguishable from
zero in the sunbelt and coastal regions. In the interior region, this moving average component
estimate is 0.2 and is marginally significantly different from zero. The productivity shock
estimates range from $1,300 in the sunbelt and interior to $1,700 on the coast. Our estimates
of the housing supply parameters reported in the bottom panel of Table 1.2 indicate a value
for c1 of 10.62 in the coastal region. This implies that a 1,000 unit increase in the number
of building permits in a given year raises the cost of supplying a home by $10,620. We
estimate a value of c2 in that region of 4.08, meaning that as the number of units in a
metropolitan area increases by 10,000 the cost of supplying a home increases by more than
$40,000. The estimates of c1 are much lower in the sunbelt and interior regions, at 1.47 and
3.16, respectively. In these two regions, the estimates of c2 are 0.34 and 0.12, respectively.
Housing supply does appear to be far more elastic in those regions.14
These latter findings can be compared with the housing supply estimates reported by
Topel and Rosen (1988), who use aggregate national data to estimate an elasticity of housing
supply with respect to price that is between 1 and 3. In our model, that supply elasticity
equals Ht/(c1 It). In 1990, average prices were about $130,000. Average construction levels
in a metropolitan area is approximately 8,350 units, as measured by building permits issued.
If we take the Topel and Rosen (1988) elasticity to be 3, then this implies a value of c1 of 5,
which lies in the middle of our estimates.
14As noted above, we generated separate estimates using BEA per capita income data in lieu of HMDA data.
This has the advantage of including years back to 1980, but we also suspect it might grossly underestimate
income volatility, which is critical for our purposes. In fact, estimates of the productivity shocks are much
lower, with the largest estimate of $1,200 for coastal region markets being smaller that that reported above for
sunbelt and interior markets using HMDA data. The moving average parameters are somewhat smaller across
all regions, but they are also imprecisely estimated, as was the case with the estimates based on HMDA. The
BEA data imply greater differences across regions in the demand shock persistence parameter, δ, with estimates
ranging from 0.73 in the interior (and we can reject that coefficient equals one at standard confidence levels) to
0.8 in coastal areas and 0.9 in the sunbelt region. Estimates of supply parameters using BEA per capita income
show a very similar pattern to those reported above, albeit with small point estimates. The coastal c1 is 6.1 and
its c2 is 1.9; those for the interior and sunbelt regions are much closer to zero. See the appendix for the analogue
to Table 1.4 based on using BEA per capita income in lieu of HMDA-based income.
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1.4 Matching the Data and Discussion
The model presented in Section 2 implies a particular stochastic process process for housing
prices and for the construction of new houses. If shocks are known as they occur, then it
is straightforward to show that our model implies the following ARMA(2,3) process for
housing prices, with the parameter vector restricted as outlined in the appendix:
∆Hit = a
i
0 + a1∆H
i
t−1 + a2∆H
i
t−2 + b0e
i
t + b1e
i
t−1 + b2e
i
t−2 + b3e
i
t−3.
Analogously, the model implies the following ARMA(2,1) process for the construction of
new homes, with the parameter vector restricted as shown in the appendix:
Iit = d
i
0 + d1 I
i
t−1 + d2 I
i
t−2 + e0e
i
t−1 + e1e
i
t−2.
We then use these two ARMA processes, together with the estimated values of the
supply and demand parameters, to derive various predictions of the model over different
time horizons. Certain moments directly estimated from the data are compared to those
analytically derived. In doing so, we focus on a particular set of moments of these stochastic
processes: serial correlations and variances at the one, three and five year horizons. We do
not focus on any contemporaneous or lagged correlations between prices and quantities for
the reasons discussed next, even though much research in urban and real estate economics
uses results from regressions of high frequency prices (or price changes) on demand factors
such as income (or income changes).
1.4.1 The Impact of Information on the Predictions of the Model
The model discussed above assumes that shocks are observed as they occur, but we are far
from confident that they are not known ahead of time. And, the results of contemporaneous
correlations are sensitive to what one assumes about the underlying information structure
(i.e., whether information about the change in income becomes known ahead of time or
only contemporaneously with its public release). In contrast, autocorrelations of price and
construction series are much less sensitive to information timing as we now demonstrate by
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comparing the predictions of the model with our assumed information structure and the
predictions if shocks are known one period ahead of time.
For this exercise, we use parameter estimates from the coastal region: r = 0.04, α = 0.1,
c1 = 10.62, c2 = 4.08, θ = 0.82, δ = 0.88, and σ = $1, 700. The first column in Table 1.3
reports our model’s predictions for a number of variables presuming such contemporaneous
knowledge.15 The second column represents our model’s predictions when individuals
learn about the income shock one period before it actually impacts wages.
Advance knowledge slightly increases construction volatility and adds some momentum
to house price changes. Otherwise the autocorrelations are essentially unchanged. Therefore,
the predictions of our model for these moments are robust to a possible misspecification
of the information structure and a potential lag between the time the income shocks are
known to the agents and when they are made public.
In stark contrast, the impact of the information structure on the contemporaneous
correlation between changes in prices and changes in income is enormous. The bottom
panel of Table 1.3 shows that if knowledge is contemporaneous to the shock, then the
correlation of price and income changes over short horizons is 0.80. If individuals acquire
knowledge one year ahead, then the predicted correlation is only 0.08. The correlation is
only somewhat more stable at lower frequencies.
Because these correlations are so sensitive to small changes in the underlying information
conditions, we focus our analysis on the serial correlation properties and volatility of price
changes and construction activity.16
15For any j year interval, these predictions reflect the relationship between what happened between time t
and t− j and what happened between time t and t + j.
16Over longer horizons, a one-year shift in when information becomes known is less important, so it certainly
can make good sense to explore various longer-run relationships with price changes. Because our interest is in
higher frequency changes, we do not do that here.
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1.4.2 Volatility and Serial Correlation in House Prices
Table 1.4 documents how well the model matches the data by comparing the model’s
predictions of short- and long-run volatility and serial correlation in house price changes
Table 1.3: Sensitivity of Predictions to Different Information Structures
Contemporaneous Knowledge One
Horizon Knowledge Year Ahead
Serial Correlation of Construction
1 year 0.51 0.56
3 year 0.18 0.19
5 year -0.04 -0.03
Volatility of Construction (units)
1 year 1,800 2,000
3 year 4,300 4,800
5 year 6,000 6,700
Serial Correlation of House Price Changes
1 year -0.00 0.09
3 year -0.16 -0.10
5 year -0.24 -0.21
Volatility of House Price Changes ($)
1 year 18,000 17,000
3 year 30,000 31,000
5 year 37,000 39,000
Correlation of Income Changes
and House Price Changes
1 year 0.80 0.08
3 year 0.93 0.61
5 year 0.95 0.75
Notes: The parameter values estimated for the coastal region using HMDA wage data are assumed here:
δ = 0.88, θ = 0.82, σe = $1, 700, c1 = 10.62, and c2 = 4.08.
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and new construction with the actual moments from the data. Standard deviations and
serial correlation coefficients from the underlying data over this time period are reported in
columns adjacent to our model predictions.
Table 1.4: Volatility and Serial Correlation in House Prices and Construction: HMDA Income Data,
1990-2004
Coastal Sunbelt Interior
Horizon Model Data Model Data Model Data
Volatility of House Price Changes ($)
1 year 18,000 13,300 5,000 2,000 6,000 3,600
3 year 30,000 34,100 8,000 4,400 10,000 8,400
5 year 37,000 48,300 9,000 5,400 12,000 10,700
Serial Correlation of House Price Changes
1 year -0.00 0.84 -0.12 0.64 -0.07 0.73
3 year -0.16 0.32 -0.28 -0.09 -0.25 0.10
5 year -0.24 -0.80 -0.35 -0.73 -0.36 -0.72
Volatility of Construction (units)
1 year 1,800 1,900 3,600 5,300 2,000 1,600
3 year 4,200 4,600 9,000 12,000 5,700 3,800
5 year 5,900 6,300 12,000 15,500 8,600 5,000
Serial Correlation of Construction
1 year 0.50 0.75 0.56 0.82 0.72 0.74
3 year 0.17 0.18 0.25 0.23 0.47 0.25
5 year -0.04 -0.79 0.03 -0.60 0.25 -0.72
Notes: The moments computed from the data allows the mean of housing price changes and construction to
vary across metropolitan areas. The moments generated from the model use the estimates in Table 1.2.
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Volatility in House Prices
The model generally overpredicts price volatility except in the coastal region at 3- and 5-year
horizons. One explanation for this excess predicted volatility is that the HMDA data may
be overestimating the actual volatility in local labor demand. Predicted volatility is closer to
the data in both absolute and percentage terms over longer horizons in the interior regions.
Those differences are within $2,000. And, the model captures the sharply rising volatility in
price changes over longer horizons in coastal markets,17 but it never matches the very high
price volatility seen in those areas over 3- and 5-year horizons. Except in coastal markets,
there appears to be more than enough volatility in local income processes to account for
house price volatility.18
Serial Correlation in House Prices
Turning now to the model predictions about the serial correlation of house price changes
over 1, 3 and 5 year horizons reported in the second panel of Table 1.4 ,the model predicts
very modest autocorrelation of one- year price changes, ranging from zero in the coastal
region to -0.12 for the sunbelt region. Comparing these predictions with the actual data
reveals a glaring mismatch between the model and reality. In the real world, as Case and
Shiller (1989) documented long ago, there is strong positive serial correlation at one-year
frequencies. A one dollar increase in prices during one year is associated with between a 64
and 84 cent increase in prices during the next period, depending upon region.
There is no reasonable calibration of the model that can match the strong positive serial
correlation of prices at high frequencies. One possible explanation lies in the microfoun-
dations of the housing market. If there is a learning process at work, whereby people
17This is due to the higher underlying volatility in the local income process (σ is 30 percent higher in the
coastal metropolitan areas), as well as higher moving average component θ.
18The results are far different if the BEA income series is used. In that case, the model grossly underpredicts
price change variation, by 50%-75% or more. See the appendix for the analogue to Table 1.4 based on BEA per
capita income. Thus, if one disagrees with our conclusion that the HMDA-based income series is superior and
that per capita income better reflects reality, then local housing markets are far too volatile given their (income)
fundamentals.
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gradually infer the state of demand from prices, then this can generate serial correlation. An
alternative explanation is less rational: people see past price changes and infer future price
growth (as in Glaeser et al. (2008)). Neither idea is captured in our model. In our model,
individuals are fully rational and they know the parameters that govern the stochastic
process for housing prices and construction of new houses.
At three year periods, the model and the data continue to diverge. The model continues
to predict mean reversion in prices, with the implied serial correlation coefficient ranging
from -0.16 for the coastal region to -0.28 for the sunbelt region. The real data shows at least
mild positive serial correlation for all but the sunbelt region. Once again, price changes are
too positively correlated to match the model.
At 5-year time horizons, the model correctly predicts that price changes mean revert,
which is an important stylized fact about local housing markets. However, the point
estimates are well below the amount of mean reversion apparent in the data. This is one
case in which we are skeptical of the data because our procedures for detrending, which
involve subtracting the metro area means, probably induce some spurious mean reversion
given the limited fifteen year time series.
While part of the reason for the magnitude mismatch may be due to this factor, that
does not provide a complete explanation. If we lengthen the price change time series and
include the 1980s, computed mean reversion is lower, but is still higher than our estimates
in Table 1.4 . For example, the serial correlation in five year price changes falls from - 0.80 to
-0.57 in the coastal region. That still is more than double the -0.24 estimate yielded by our
model (Table 1.4). And, using BEA per capita income over the longer time period dating
back to 1980 does not yield a perfect (or close to perfect) match either.19 Hence, the model
should be viewed as successful in capturing the fact that there is mean reversion in price
changes over long horizons, but it fails to match the strength of that pattern.
19Similar patterns are evident in the other regions.
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1.4.3 Volatility and Serial Correlation in Construction
Volatility in Construction
The model matches the volatility of construction activity at all time horizons in the coastal
region quite well, and especially at high frequency (panel 3, Table 1.4 ). The match quality
is less good, but tolerable, in the sunbelt region. The model predicts much greater volatility
over longer horizons, but underpredicts volatility by one- quarter to one-third in this region.
We consistently overpredict construction quantity by at least 25% at each horizon in interior
markets.20
Serial Correlation in Construction
In stark contrast to the model’s complete failure to predict strong persistence in price
changes over one-year horizons, it always correctly predicts positive, high frequency serial
correlation in construction in all regions, with the match being very good for the interior
region. Our estimates are about one-third below what the actual data show for the coastal
and sunbelt regions, so complete success for the model cannot be claimed here. We do better
at 3-year horizons. Our model estimates correctly mimic the lower level of serial correlation
at this longer horizon in all regions. And, our point estimates are very close matches to the
data in the coastal and sunbelt regions.
However, the estimates over 5-year horizons do not match the data. As noted above,
we are skeptical of the value of creating such differences using only 15 years of data. If we
go back and include the 1980s, calculated mean reversion fall by about two-thirds in each
region (e.g., from -0.79 to -0.27 in the coastal region; from -0.60 to -0.20 in the sunbelt region;
and from -0.72 to -0.24 in the interior region). Thus, it certainly looks as if the short time
span over which we have higher quality income data is leading to an upwardly biased level
of mean reversion in construction for the model to match. That said, our model estimates
20As was the case for price change volatility, using per capita income from the BEA in lieu of household-level
income from HMDA leads us to dramatically underpredict construction volatility. To reiterate, if one believes
the BEA series more accurately reflects the true variation of local income processes, then housing markets are
far too volatile relative to their fundamentals.
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still do not match those lower levels of mean reversion.21
1.5 Conclusion
This paper presents a dynamic linear rational expectations model of housing markets based
on cross-city spatial equilibrium conditions. Its aim is to show how well a housing model
that focuses on income shocks may approximate certain features of the housing market.
The model predicts that housing markets will be largely local, which they are, and that
construction persistence is fully compatible with price mean-reversion. The model is also
consistent with price changes being predictable.
The model has notable successes and failures at fitting the real data. It generally captures
important differences across types of markets, especially coastal ones that have inelastic
supply sides to their housing markets. The model also does a decent job of accounting for
variation in price changes. An important implicit assumption underlying that conclusion
is that the HMDA series more accurately reflects the volatility of local income processes
than (say) the BEA’s per capita income measure. More in-depth research on this data issue
seems warranted given its importance in allowing the model to approximate market price
volatility. This conclusion also generally applies to the volatility of quantities as reflected in
construction permits.
That said, we still cannot precisely match the very high volatility of three- and five-year
price changes observed in the inelastically supplied coastal regions. Thus, it also would
be useful for future research to try to pin down whether there is excess volatility in those
markets.
The model does tolerably well at accounting for the strong positive serial correlation of
construction quantities from one year to the next. It also correctly captures the weakening of
this persistence over longer horizons, but fails to match the magnitude of the mean reversion
21This is the one case in which using the BEA data on income and the longer time series including the 1980s
leads to better matches. In this case, the model always predicts at least modest mean reversion in construction
over 5-year horizons, and the match quality is quite good for the interior region.
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in quantities over longer horizons especially. Some of the failure in matching the magnitude
of mean reversion in prices and quantities over longer horizons may be due to data error,
but that is not a complete explanation. This is another avenue for fruitful research.
The model fails utterly at explaining the strong, high frequency positive serial correlation
of price changes. It does a much better job of accounting for the mean reversion over longer,
five-year horizons, especially when one takes into account the likelihood our procedures
overstate true mean reversion over this longer time span.
This suggests that housing economists have one very big puzzle to explain, along with
some other issues. The major puzzle is the strong persistence in high frequency price
changes from one year to the next. This failure must be viewed as stark given that attempt
to match moments for a time period that does not include the recent extraordinary boom
and bust. Other matters that certainly merit closer scrutiny include the extremely high price
change volatility in coast markets over longer time horizons and the inability to match mean
reversion in construction over longer horizons. These empirical misses are significant, but it
remains true that a dynamic urban model can account for many of the important features
of housing markets. We see this model as a starting point for a larger agenda of research
on real estate dynamics that starts with a dynamic spatial equilibrium model. One natural
extension is to include interest rate volatility, and we have sketched such an approach in
an earlier version of this paper. A second extension is to relax the assumption of perfect
rationality for home-buyers, and perhaps builders as well.
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Chapter 2
Arrested Development: Theory and
Evidence of Supply-Side Speculation
in the Housing Market1
2.1 Introduction
How do prices aggregate information? We take up this question in a setting of particular
macroeconomic importance: housing markets. Housing is a key driver of the business
cycle (Leamer, 2007), and the causes of the financial crisis of 2008 and the Great Recession
originated in housing markets (Mian and Sufi, 2009, 2011). An enduring feature of these
markets is booms and busts in prices that coincide with widespread disagreement about
fundamentals (Shiller, 2005). This paper argues that these cycles are caused by how housing
markets aggregate beliefs.
Studying belief aggregation allows us to address some of the most puzzling aspects of
the U.S. housing boom that occurred between 2000 and 2006. According to the standard
model of housing markets, elastic housing supply prevents house price booms by allowing
1This chapter is co-authored with Eric Zwick.
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new construction to absorb rising demand.2 But the episode from 2000 to 2006 witnessed
several major anomalies, in which historically elastic cities experienced house price booms
despite continuing to build housing rapidly. And house prices rose more in many of
these cities—located in Arizona, Nevada, inland California, and Florida—than in cities
where it was difficult to build new housing. Further complicating the puzzle, house prices
remained flat in other elastic cities that were also rapidly building housing. Why was rapid
construction able to hold down house prices in some cities and not others?
We solve this puzzle by adding two ingredients to the standard model. The first is a
friction that makes owner-occupancy more efficient than renting. The second is disagreement
about long-run growth paths. In this framework the way housing markets aggregate beliefs
depends on a city’s land availability. Prices appear more optimistic when land is plentiful
and building houses is easy, reversing the standard model’s intuition for how land supply
influences prices. Crucially, optimism amplifies prices most when a city nears but has not
yet reached a long-run development constraint. This mechanism matches the data. The
anomalous cities are those that, as the boom began, found themselves in just this state of
“arrested development.”
We model a city of developers and residents with a fixed amount of land available for
development. Developers decide how many houses to build and how much land to buy.
Residents decide how much housing to consume and whether to buy or rent. They prefer
owning their houses over renting because of frictions in the rental market.3 Residents can
invest in the equity of developers, which provides exposure to land prices. Short-selling
land and housing is impossible, but residents can short-sell developer equity. Over time,
new residents arrive in the city, leading developers to build houses using their holdings of
undeveloped land. Because of this growth, the city gradually exhausts its land supply. What
today’s investors believe about future inflows determines the price of undeveloped land.
2See, for example, Glaeser et al. (2008), Gyourko (2009), and Saiz (2010).
3Such frictions include the effort spent monitoring tenants to prevent property damage (Henderson and
Ioannides, 1983), tax disadvantages (Poterba, 1984), and difficulty renting properties like single-family homes
that are designed for owners (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2007).
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House construction is instantaneous and developers bear a constant unit cost per house.
As a result, all variations in house prices are caused by movements in land prices and not
construction costs. Data from the U.S. boom support this feature of the model. Rapidly
rising land prices account for most of the house price increases across cities. In contrast,
construction costs remained relatively stable throughout the boom, and cost changes hardly
varied across cities. These aspects of the data distinguish our theory from those that stress
“time-to-build” factors such as input shortages or delivery lags (Mayer and Somerville, 2000;
Gao, 2014).
We study a demand shock that raises the current inflow of new residents and also
creates uncertainty about future inflows. Disagreement about long-run demand leads to
disagreement about future house prices. The most optimistic residents seek to speculate
through buying housing and through buying the equity of optimistic developers who are
buying land.
Our first result is that speculation is crowded out of the housing market and into the
land market. Consider an optimistic resident who wishes to speculate on future house
prices. Buying a house and renting it out is difficult because of the widespread preference
for owner-occupancy. And buying more housing for personal consumption is unappealing
because of diminishing marginal utility. Land however offers a pure, frictionless bet on real
estate. The optimistic resident chooses to invest in land through buying developer equity.
With data from the U.S. housing boom, we confirm several of the model’s predictions
about land speculation. In the model, developers run by optimistic CEOs use resident
financing to amass large land portfolios, buying land from less optimistic developers.
Consistent with this prediction, we find that supply-side speculation figures prominently
in the data. Between 2000 and 2006, the eight largest U.S. public homebuilders tripled
their land investments, an increase far exceeding their additional construction needs. Their
market equity then fell 74%, with most of the losses coming from write-downs on their land
portfolios. The model also predicts that short-selling of developer equity increases during a
boom because pessimistic residents disagree with the high valuations of the developer land
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portfolios. Matching this prediction, the short interest in homebuilder stocks rose from 2%
in 2001 to 12% in 2006. Rising short interest provides evidence of disagreement over the
value of homebuilder land portfolios and thus over future house prices.
Our second result concerns how house prices aggregate beliefs. Speculators are crowded
into the land market, while homeownership remains dispersed among residents of all beliefs.
Therefore, house prices reflect a weighted average of the optimistic belief of speculators
and the average owner-occupant belief. The weight on the optimistic belief equals the share
of the housing market on the margin that consists of the land market. Prices look most
optimistic where land is plentiful and building easy—that is, in cities where the short-run
elasticity of housing supply is large.
This optimism bias affects prices most when the city’s housing supply will become
inelastic soon. This observation, which constitutes our third result, explains why house
price booms occur in some elastic cities and not others. Consider a city in which the land
available for development is large relative to the city’s current size. Here, new construction
fully absorbs the demand shock now and in the foreseeable future, and so beliefs about
future house prices remain unchanged. The shock raises future price expectations only in
cities where construction will be difficult in the near future.
Speculation amplifies house price booms most in cities that exist in a state of arrested
development: they have ample land for construction today, but also face land barriers that
will restrict growth in the near future. This theoretical supply condition characterizes the
anomalous elastic cities during the U.S. housing boom. For instance, Las Vegas faces a
development boundary put in place by Congress in 1998 and depicted in Figure 2.1. During
the 2000-2006 housing boom, many investors believed the city would soon run out of
land.4 Likewise, Phoenix’s long-run development is constrained by Indian reservations and
4Las Vegas provides a particularly clear illustration of our model. The ample raw land available in the
short-run allowed Las Vegas to build more houses per capita than any other large city in the U.S during the
boom. At the same time, speculation in the land markets caused land prices to quadruple between 2000 and
2006, rising from $150,000 per acre to $650,000 per acre, and then lose those gains. This in turn led to a boom and
bust in house prices. The high price of $150,000 for desert land before the boom and after the bust demonstrates
the binding nature of the city’s long-run development constraint. A New York Times article published in 2007
cites investors who believed the remaining land would be fully developed by 2017 (McKinley and Palmer, 2007).
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National Forests that surround the metropolitan area (Land Advisors). In inland California,
much of the farmland around cities is protected by a state law that penalizes real estate
development on these parcels (Onsted, 2009).
When disagreement is strong enough, house prices increase more in these nearly de-
veloped cities than in a fully developed city. In the nearly developed cities, the extreme
optimistic beliefs of land speculators determine house prices, amplifying the house price
boom. Prices remain more stable in the fully developed city because they reflect the average
belief. This result explains the puzzling house price booms in elastic areas that motivate
this paper. Supply conditions in these places—elastic current supply, inelastic long-run
supply—lead disagreement to have the largest possible amplification effect on a house price
boom.
Our theory differs from several other explanations for the strong house price booms
that occurred in elastic areas between 2000 and 2006. One possibility is that these cities
experienced much larger demand shocks than the rest of the United States.5 Our analysis
assumes a constant demand shock across cities; the heterogeneity in city house prices
booms results entirely from differences in supply conditions. An additional possibility
is that uncertainty increased land values due to the embedded option to develop land
with different types of housing (Titman, 1983; Grenadier, 1996), and that this option value
increase was largest in cities with an intermediate amount of land. In our model, all housing
is identical, so this option does not exist. A final explanation is that developers hoarded
land to gain monopoly power, and the incentive to do so was strongest in cities about to
run out of land. This effect does not appear in our model because homebuilding is perfectly
The dramatic rise in land prices during the boom resulted from optimistic developers taking large positions
in the land market. In a striking example of supply-side speculation, a single land development fund, Focus
Property Group, outbid all other firms in every large parcel land auction between 2001 and 2005 conducted by
the federal government in Las Vegas, obtaining a 5% stake in the undeveloped land within the barrier.Focus
Property Group declared bankruptcy in 2009.
5For instance, the expansion of credit described by Mian and Sufi (2009) may have been largest in these
cities. Alternatively, historical increase in house prices in nearby areas may have spread to these cities, either
through behavioral contagion (DeFusco et al., 2013) or long-distance gentrification (Guerrieri et al., 2013).
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Figure 2.1: Long-Run Development Constraints in Las Vegas
51Regional Transportation Plan, 2013-2035
1980 1990
Figure 2-9: Las Vegas Valley Development: 1980-2030
20302008
Notes: This figure comes from Page 51 of the Regional Transportation Commission of Southern Nevada’s Regional
Transportation Plan 2009-2035 (RTCSNV). The first three pictures display the Las Vegas metropolitan area in 1980,
1990, and 2008. The final picture represents the Regional Transportation Commission’s forecast for 2030. The boundary is
the development barrier stipulated by the Southern Nevada Public Land Management Act. The shaded gray region denotes
developed land.
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competitive, as is the case empirically at the metro-area level.6 Unlike these stories, our
approach explores the cross-sectional implications of disagreement, an under-studied aspect
of housing cycles for which we provide direct evidence.
In addition to explaining the city-level cross-section, our model offers new predictions on
the cross-section of neighborhoods within a city. We allow some residents to prefer renting
over owner-occupancy, so that both rental and owner-occupied housing exist in equilibrium.
During periods of disagreement, optimistic speculators hold the rental housing, just as
they hold land. Prices appear more optimistic, and hence house price booms are larger, in
neighborhoods where a greater share of housing is rented. This prediction matches the data:
house prices increased more from 2000 to 2006 in neighborhoods where the share of rental
housing in 2000 was higher.
A long literature in macroeconomics and finance has studied how prices aggregate
information. When markets are complete and investors share a common prior, prices
usually are efficient and reflect the information of all market participants (Fama, 1970;
Grossman, 1976; Hellwig, 1980). Our paper sits among a body of work showing that
prices reflect only a limited and potentially biased subset of information when investors
persistently disagree with each other, and markets are incomplete. Many of these papers
focus on strategic considerations that arise in this setting, and the implications for asset
prices (Harrison and Kreps, 1978; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003). A related literature, starting
with Miller (1977), demonstrates that prices can be biased even in the absence of strategic
considerations because optimists end up holding the asset.7 We show that this optimism
bias is strongest in housing markets when land is plentiful or when much of the housing
6Somerville (1999) demonstrates the high level of homebuilder competition at the metro-area level, although
he points out that construction is less competitive at the neighborhood level. Hoberg and Phillips (2010) argue
that price booms often occur in competitive industries because firms mistakenly believe they will obtain future
monopoly power.
7In these papers, all market participants are fundamental investors who ignore other investors’ beliefs
(Chen et al., 2002; Geanakoplos, 2009; Hong and Sraer, 2012; Simsek, 2013a,b). Pástor and Veronesi (2003, 2009)
also study environments in which investors care only about long-run fundamentals during booms and busts,
but their focus is on learning, and all investors agree as they are all identical. Piazzesi and Schneider (2009)
and Burnside et al. (2013) also apply models of disagreement to the housing market. Papers in which strategic
behavior matters include Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), Allen et al. (2006), and Hong et al. (2006).
37
stock is rented. In contrast, prices aggregate beliefs well in cities where the housing stock is
fixed and owner-occupied. In these areas, house prices reflect the average of all resident
beliefs, even though they are agreeing to disagree and short-selling housing is impossible.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2, we document the puzzling aspects of the
cross-section of the U.S. housing boom, as well as the importance of supply-side speculation
in land markets. Section 2.3 models the housing market environment. Section 2.4 contains
our analysis of how house prices aggregate beliefs. In Section 2.5, we derive implications of
the model to explain the empirical cross-section of housing markets during the U.S. boom.
Section 2.6 contains new predictions on the cross-section of neighborhoods within a city,
and Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Stylized Facts of the U.S. Housing Boom and Bust
2.2.1 The Cross-Section of Cities
The Introduction mentions three puzzles about the cross-section of city experiences during
the boom. First, large house price booms occurred in elastic cities where new construction
historically had kept prices low. Second, the price booms in these elastic areas were as large,
if not larger, than those happening in inelastic cities at the same time. Finally, house prices
remained flat in other elastic cities that were also rapidly building housing.
We document these puzzles using city-level house price and construction data. House
price data come from the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s metropolitan statistical area
quarterly house price indices. We measure the housing stock in each city at an annual
frequency by interpolating the U.S. Census’s decadal housing stock estimates with its annual
housing permit figures. Throughout, we focus on the 115 metropolitan areas for which the
population in 2000 exceeds 500,000. The boom consists of the period between 2000 and 2006,
matching the convention in the literature to use 2006 as the end point (Mian et al., 2013).
Figure 2.2(a) plots construction and house price increases across cities during the boom.
The house price increases vary enormously across cities, ranging from 0% to 125% over this
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Figure 2.2: The U.S. Housing Boom and Bust Across Cities
a) Price Increases and Construction, 2000-2006
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Notes: Anomalous Cities include those in Arizona, Nevada, Florida, and inland California. Inelastic Cities are Boston,
Providence, New York, Philadelphia, and all cities on the west coast of the United States. We measure the housing stock
in each city at an annual frequency by interpolating the U.S. Census’s decadal housing stock estimates with its annual
housing permit figures. House price data come from the second quarter FHFA house price index deflated by the CPI-U. The
figure includes all metropolitan areas with populations over 500,000 in 2000 for which we have data. (a) The cumulative
price increase is the ratio of the house price in 2006 to the house price in 2000. The annual housing stock growth is the log
difference in the housing stock in 2006 and 2000 divided by six. (b), (c) Each series is an average over cities in a group
weighted by the city’s housing stock in 2000. Construction is annual permitting as a fraction of the housing stock. Prices
represent the cumulative returns from 1980 on the housing in each group.
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brief six-year period. The largest price increases occurred in two groups of cities. The first
group, which we call the Anomalous Cities, consists of Arizona, Nevada, Florida, and inland
California. The other large price booms happened in the Inelastic Cities, which comprise
Boston, Providence, New York, Philadelphia, and the west coast of the United States.
The history of construction and house prices in the Anomalous Cities before 2000
constitute the first puzzle. As shown in Figures 2.2(b) and 2.2(c), from 1980 to 2000 these
cities provided clear examples of elastic housing markets in which prices stay low through
rapid construction activity. Construction far outpaced the U.S. average while house prices
remained constant. The standard model of housing cycles would have predicted the surge
in U.S. housing demand between 2000 and 2006 to increase construction in these cities but
not to raise prices. Empirically, the shock did increase construction, as shown in Panel (b).
The puzzle is that house prices rapidly increased as well.
The second puzzle is that the price increases in the Anomalous Cities were as large as
those in the Inelastic Cities. The Inelastic Cities consist of markets where house prices rise
because regulation prohibits construction from absorbing higher demand. We document this
relationship in Panels (b) and (c) of Figure 2.2, which show that construction in these cities
was lower than the U.S. average before 2000 while house price growth greatly exceeded the
U.S. average. The standard housing cycle model would have predicted the Inelastic Cities
to lead the nation in house price growth in the boom after 2000. Although house prices
did sharply rise, the price increases in the Inelastic Cities were no larger than those in the
Anomalous Cities where the boom led to rapid construction.
The final puzzle is that some elastic cities built housing quickly during the boom but,
unlike the Anomalous Cities, experienced stable house prices. These cities appear in the
bottom-right corner of Figure 2.2(a), and are located in the southeastern United States (e.g.
Texas and North Carolina). Their construction during the boom quantitatively matches that
in the Anomalous Cities, but the price changes are significantly smaller. Why was rapid
construction able to hold down house prices in some cities and not others?
One response to these three puzzles is that the Anomalous Cities simply experienced
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much larger demand shocks than the rest of the nation during the boom. Although
differential demand shocks surely explain part of the cross-section, they cannot account for
all aspects of the Anomalous Cities just documented. These cities had been experiencing
abnormally large demand shocks for years before 2000. Figure 2.2(b) shows that they were
some of the fastest growing cities in the United States. Yet the surging demand to live in
these areas did not increase prices. The departure from this pattern after 2000 requires
a more nuanced theory than the hypothesis that housing demand increased particularly
strongly in the Anomalous cities during the boom.
2.2.2 The Central Importance of Land Prices
This paper argues that speculation in land markets explains the variation in the house
price boom across cities just documented. Our model demonstrates that land market
speculation amplifies house price increases by making prices look more optimistic, and that
this amplification is strongest in areas at the same level of development as the Anomalous
Cities. In our framework, all movements in house prices arise from changes in land prices
that reflect optimistic beliefs. Matching this premise, land price increases empirically account
for nearly all of the increase in house prices during the boom, as we now show.
Tracing house price increases to land prices distinguishes our argument from “time-to-
build” theories. According to the time-to-build hypothesis, house prices rise during a boom
because of a temporary failure of homebuilders to expand construction. This delivery lag
derives from obstacles erected by local regulators or from temporary shortages of inputs
such as drywall and skilled labor. Under this theory, the price of undeveloped land should
remain constant during the boom. Because land prices reflect the long-run, temporary
housing shortages have no effect on the price of undeveloped land. These shortages instead
raise construction costs and the shadow price of regulatory building permission.
To assess the importance of land prices, we gather data on land prices and construction
costs at the city level. Data on land prices come from the indices developed by Nichols
et al. (2010) using land parcel transaction data. They run hedonic regressions to control for
41
parcel characteristics and then derive city-level indices from the coefficients on city-specific
time dummies. We measure construction costs using the R.S. Means construction cost
survey. This survey asks homebuilders in each city to report the marginal cost of building a
square foot of housing, including all labor and materials costs. Survey responses reflect real
differences across cities in construction costs. In 2000, the lowest cost is $54 per square foot
and the highest is $95; the mean is $67 per square foot and the standard deviation is $9.
Competition among homebuilders implies that, when construction is positive, house
prices must equal land prices plus construction costs: pht = p
l
t + Kt. Log-differencing this
equation between 2000 and 2006 yields
∆ log ph = α∆ log pl + (1− α)∆ log K,
where ∆ denotes the difference between 2000 and 2006 and α is land’s share of house prices
in 2000. The factor that matters more should vary more closely with house prices across
cities. Because α and 1− α are less than 1, the critical factor should also rise more than
house prices do.
Figure 2.3 plots for each city the real growth in construction costs and land prices
between 2000 and 2006 against the corresponding growth in house prices. Construction
costs rose relatively little during this period, and growth in these costs does not vary in
relation to the size of house price increases. Land prices display the opposite pattern, rising
substantially during the boom and exhibiting a high correlation with house prices. Each
city’s land price increase also exceeds its house price increase. This evidence underscores
the central importance of land prices for understanding the cross-section of house price
booms.
2.2.3 Land Market Speculation by Homebuilders
The land price booms just documented were driven by speculation in land markets. The
term “speculation” refers to the process in which optimists buy up an asset that cannot
be shorted, biasing its price. Our model describes two implications of this behavior. First,
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Figure 2.3: Input Price and House Price Increases Across Cities, 2000-2006
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Notes: We measure construction costs for each city using the R.S. Means survey figures for the marginal cost of a square
foot of an average quality home, deflated by the CPI-U. Gyourko and Saiz (2006) contains further information on the
survey. Land price changes come from the hedonic indices calculated in Nichols et al. (2010) using land parcel transactions,
and house prices come from the second quarter FHFA housing price index deflated by the CPI-U. The figure includes all
metropolitan areas with populations over 500,000 in 2000 for which we have data.
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the owners of the land during the boom increase their positions as they crowd out less
optimistic landowners. Second, when their beliefs are revealed to be more optimistic than
reality, optimists suffer capital losses. We document both of these features among a class
of landowners for whom rich data are publicly available: public homebuilders. We focus
on the eight largest firms and hand-collect landholding data from their annual financial
statements between 2001 and 2010.
Consistent with speculative behavior, these firms nearly tripled their landholdings
between 2001 and 2005, as shown in Figure 2.4(a). These land acquisitions far exceed
additional land needed for new construction. Annual home sales increased by 120,000
between 2001 and 2005, while landholdings increased by 1,100,000 lots. One lot can produce
one house, so landholdings rose more than nine times relative to home sales. In 2005, Pulte
changed the description of its business in its 10-K to say, “We consider land acquisition one
of our core competencies.” This language appeared until 2008, when it was replaced by,
“Homebuilding operations represent our core business.”
Having amassed large land portfolios, these firms subsequently suffered large capital
losses. Figure 2.4(b) documents the dramatic rise and fall in the total market equity of
these homebuilders between 2001 and 2010. Homebuilder stocks rose 430% and then fell
74% over this period. The majority of the losses borne by homebuilders arose from losses
on the land portfolios they accumulated from 2001 to 2005. In 2006, these firms began
reporting write-downs to their land portfolios. At $29 billion, the value of the land losses
between 2006 and 2010 accounts for 73% of the market equity losses over this time period.
The homebuilders bore the entirety of their land portfolio losses. Their land acquisitions
represented their beliefs about long-term land prices, as opposed to a no-downside bets
made with access to free credit.
Further evidence of homebuilder optimism comes from short-selling of their market
equity. If the homebuilders buying land are more optimistic than most investors, then other
investors should bet against them by shorting their stock. Figure 2.4(c) plots monthly short
interest ratios, defined as the ratio of shares currently sold short to total shares outstanding,
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Figure 2.4: Supply-Side Speculation Among U.S. Public Homebuilders, 2001-2010
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Notes: (a), (b) Data come from the 10-K filings of Centex, Pulte, Lennar, D.R. Horton, K.B. Homes, Toll Brothers,
Hovnanian, and Southern Pacific, the eight largest public U.S. homebuilders in 2001. “Lots Controlled” equals the sum of
lots directly owned and those controlled by option contracts. The cumulative writedowns to land holdings between 2006
and 2010 among these homebuilders totals $29 billion. (c) Short interest is computed as the ratio of shares currently sold
short to total shares outstanding. Monthly data series for shares short come from COMPUSTAT and for shares outstanding
come from CRSP. Builder stocks are classified as those with NAICS code 236117.
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for homebuilder stocks and non-homebuilder stocks between 2001 and 2010. Throughout
the boom, short interest of homebuilder stock sharply increased, rising from 2% in 2001
to 12% in 2006. It further increased as homebuilders began to announce their land losses
in 2006. Rising short interest provides direct evidence of disagreement over the value of
homebuilder land portfolios and thus over future house prices.
2.3 A Housing Market with Homeowners and Developers
Housing Supply. The city we study has a fixed amount of space S. This space can either
be used for housing, or it remains as undeveloped land. The total housing stock in the city
at time t is Ht and the remaining undeveloped land is Lt, so S = Ht + Lt for all t.
A continuum of real estate developers invest in land and construct housing from the land
at a cost of K per unit of housing. The aggregate supply of new housing is ∆Ht. Construction
is instantaneous, and housing does not depreciate: Ht = ∆Ht + Ht−1. Construction is also
irreversible: ∆Ht ≥ 0. Both housing and land are continuous variables, and one unit of
housing requires one unit of land.
The developers rent out land on spot markets at a price of rlt. Rental demand for
undeveloped land comes from firms, such as farms, that use the city’s land as an input.
These firms buy their inputs and sell their products on the global market. Therefore, their
aggregate demand for land depends only on rlt and not on any other local market conditions.
This aggregate rental demand curve is Dl(rlt), where D
l(·) is decreasing positive function
such that Dl(0) ≥ S.
The profit flow of a developer j at time t is
pij,t = rltLj,t + p
l
t(Lj,t−1 − Lj,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
development profit
+ (pht − plt − K)∆Hj,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
homebuilding profit
, (2.1)
where pht is the price of housing and p
l
t is the price of land. The real estate development
industry faces no entry costs, so the industry is perfectly competitive. Because homebuilding
is instantaneous and does not depend on prior land investments, profits from this line of
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business must be zero due to perfect competition. We denote the aggregate homebuilding
profit by pihbt = (p
h
t − plt − K)∆Ht.
Each developer begins with a land endowment and issues equity to finance its land
investments. It maximizes its expected net present value of profits Ej ∑∞t=0 βtpij,t. The
operator Ej reflects firm j’s expectation of future land prices. Firm-specific beliefs represent
the beliefs of the firm’s CEO, who owns equity, cannot be fired, and decides the firm’s
land investments. The number of each developer’s equity shares equals the amount of
land it holds, and each developer pays out its land rents as dividends. The market price of
developer equity therefore equals the market price plt of land.
Individual Housing Demand. A population of residents live in the city and hold its
housing. These residents receive direct utility from consuming housing. Lower-case
h denotes the flow consumption of housing, whereas upper-case H denotes the asset
holding. Flow utility from housing depends on whether housing is consumed through
owner-occupancy or under a rental contract. Residents also derive utility from non-local
consumption c. Each resident i maximizes the expected present value of utility, given by
Ei
∞
∑
t=0
βtui(ct, hownt , h
rent
t ),
where β is the common discount factor.
Flow utility ui(·, ·, ·) has three properties. First, it is separable and linear in non-real
estate consumption c. This quasi-linearity eliminates risk aversion and hedging motives.
Second, owner-occupied and rented housing are substitutes, and residents vary in which
type of contract they prefer and to what degree. Substitutability of owner-occupied and
rented housing fully sorts residents between the two types of contracts; no resident consumes
both types of housing simultaneously. Finally, residents face diminishing marginal utility
of owner-occupied housing. This property leads homeownership to be dispersed among
residents in equilibrium.
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The utility specification we adopt that features these three properties is
ui(c, hown, hrent) = c + v(aihown + hrent) (2.2)
where ai > 0 is resident i’s preference for owner-occupancy, and v(·) is an increasing,
concave function for which limh→0 v′(h) = ∞. The distribution of the owner-occupancy
preference parameter ai across residents is given by a continuously differentiable cumulative
distribution function Fa, which is stable over time. Owner-occupancy utility is unbounded:
dFa has full support on R+. The functional form of the owner-occupancy preference in (2.2)
results from a moral hazard problem we describe in the Appendix.
Resident Optimization. Residents hold three assets classes: bonds B, housing H, and
developer equity Q. Global capital markets external to the city determine the gross interest
rate on bonds, which is Rt = 1/β, where β is the common discount factor. Residents may
borrow or lend at this rate by buying or selling these bonds in unlimited quantities.
In contrast, housing and developer equity are traded within the city, and equilibrium
conditions determine their prices plt and p
h
t . Homeowners earn income by renting out the
housing they own in excess of what they consume. The spot rental price for housing is rht ;
landlord revenue is therefore rht (Hi,t − howni,t − hrenti,t ). Shorting housing is impossible, but
residents can short developer equity. Doing so is costly. Residents incur a convex cost ks(Q)
to short Q units of developer stock, where ks(0) = 0 and k′s, k′′s > 0. These costs reflect fees
paid to borrow stock, as well as time spent locating available stock (D’Avolio, 2002).
Short-sale constraints in the housing market result from a lack of asset interchangeability.
Although housing is homogeneous in the model, empirical housing markets involve large
variation in characteristics across houses. This variation in characteristics makes it essentially
impossible to cover a short. Unlike in the housing market, asset interchangeability holds in
the equity market, where all of a firm’s shares are equivalent.
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The Bellman equation representing the resident optimization problem is
V(Bi,t−1, Hi,t−1, Qi,t−1) = max
Bi,t,Hi,t,Qi,t
ci,t,howni,t ,h
rent
i,t
ci,t + v(aihowni,t + h
rent
i,t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
flow utility
+ βEi,tV(Bi,t, Hi,t, Qi,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
continuation value
, (2.3)
where the maximization is subject to the short-sale constraint
0 ≤ Hi,t,
the ownership constraint
howni,t ≤ Hi,t,
and the budget constraint
RtBi,t−1 − Bi,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
borrowing costs
+ ci,t︸︷︷︸
consumption
≤ pht (Hi,t−1 − Hi,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
housing returns
+ rht (Hi,t − howni,t − hrenti,t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
housing rental income
+ plt(Qi,t−1 −Qi,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
equity returns
+ rltQi,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
dividends
− max(0, ks(−Qi,t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
shorting costs
.
Aggregate Demand and Beliefs. Aggregate demand to live in the city equals the number
of residents Nt. This aggregate demand consists of a shock and a trend:
log Nt︸ ︷︷ ︸
demand
= zt︸︷︷︸
shock
+ log Nt︸ ︷︷ ︸
trend
.
The trend component grows at a constant positive rate g: for all t > 0,
log Nt = g + log Nt−1.
The shocks zt have a common factor x. The dependence of the time-t shock on the common
factor x is µt, so that
zt = µtx.
Without loss of generality, µ0 = 1: the time 0 shock z0 equals the common factor x. We
denote µ = {µt}t≥0.
At time 0, residents observe the following information: the current and future values of
49
trend demand Nt, the trend growth rate g, the current demand N0, the current shock z0,
and the common factor x of the future shocks. They do not observe µ, the data needed to
extrapolate the factor x to future shocks. Residents learn the true value of the entire vector
µ at time t = 1. The resolution of uncertainty at time t = 1 is common knowledge at t = 0.
Residents agree to disagree about the true value of µ. At time 0, resident i’s subjective
prior of µ is given by Fi, an integrable probability measure on the compact space M of all
possible values of µ. These priors vary across residents. The resulting subjective expected
value of each µt is µi,t =
∫
M µtdFi, and the vector of resident i’s subjective expected values
of each µt is µi = {µi,t}t≥0. The subjective expected value µi uniquely determines the prior
Fi. The distribution of µi itself across residents admits an integrable probability distribution
Fµ on M, which is independent from the distribution Fa of owner-occupancy preferences.
The CEOs of the development firms are city residents, so their beliefs are drawn from the
same distribution Fµ.
Resident disagreement reflects the unprecedented nature of the demand shock z. As
argued by Morris (1996), this heterogeneous prior assumption is most appropriate when
investors face an unprecedented situation in which they have not yet had a chance to collect
information and engage in rational updating. The events surrounding housing booms are
precisely these types of situations. Glaeser (2013) meticulously shows that in each of the
historical booms he analyzes, reasonable investors could agree to disagree about future real
estate prices. In the case of the U.S. housing boom between 2000 and 2006, we follow Mian
and Sufi (2009) in thinking of the shock as the arrival of new securitization technologies that
expanded credit to low-income borrowers. The initial shock to housing demand is x, and µ
represents the degree to which this expansion of credit in 2000-2006 persists after 2006.
Equilibrium. Equilibrium consists of time-series vectors of prices pL(µ), pH(µ), rl(µ),
rh(µ) and quantities L(µ), H(µ) that depend on the realized value of µ. These pricing and
quantity functions constitute an equilibrium when housing, land, and equity markets clear
while residents and developers maximize utility and profits:
Consider pricing functions ph(µ), pl(µ), rh(µ), rl(µ) and quantity functions H(µ), L(µ). Let
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H∗i,t, Q
∗
i,t, (h
own
i,t )
∗, and (hrenti,t )
∗ be resident i’s solutions to the Bellman equation (2.3) given his
owner-occupancy preference ai, his beliefs µi, and these pricing functions. Let L∗j,t be developer j’s
land holdings that maximize expected net present value of profits in equation (2.1), given the pricing
functions; L∗t is the sum of these land holdings across developers. The pricing and quantity functions
constitute a recursive competitive equilibrium if at each time t:
1. The sum of undeveloped land and housing equals the city’s endowment of open space:
S = Lt(µ) + Ht(µ).
2. Flow demand for land equals investment demand from developers, which equals the resident
demand for their equity:
Lt(µ) = L∗t = Dl(rlt(µ)) =
∫ ∞
0
∫
M
Q∗i,tdFµdFa.
3. Resident stock and flow demand for housing clear:
Ht(µ) = Nt(µ)
∫ ∞
0
∫
M
H∗i,tdFµdFa = Nt(µ)
∫ ∞
0
∫
M
((howni,t )
∗ + (hrenti,t )
∗)dFµdFa.
4. Construction maximizes developer profits:
Ht(µ)− Ht−1(µ) ∈ arg max
∆Ht
pihbt .
5. Developer profit from homebuilding is zero:
max
∆Ht
pihbt = 0.
Elasticity of Housing Supply. The housing supply curve is the city’s open space S less
the rental demand for land Dl(rlt). We denote the elasticity of this supply curve with respect
to housing rents rht by e
S
t . The supply elasticity determines the construction response to the
shocks {zt}. It will also serve as a sufficient statistic for the extent to which land speculation
affects house prices. This section describes the supply elasticity eSt along the city’s trend
growth path, which obtains when x = 0.
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The relationship between land rents rlt and house rents r
h
t allows us to calculate this
elasticity. Because trend growth g > 0, new residents perpetually arrive to the city, and
developers build new houses each period. Perpetual construction ties together land and
house prices. In particular, as developers must be indifferent between building today or
tomorrow, house rents equal land rents plus flow construction costs:
rht = r
l
t + (1− β)K.
The supply of housing is open space net of flow land demand: S− Dl(rht − (1− β)K). The
elasticity of housing supply is thus eSt ≡ −rht (Dl)′/(S− Dl). When the flow land demand
Dl features a constant elasticity el , the elasticity of housing supply takes on the simple form
eSt =
rht
rht − (1− β)K
(
S
Ht
− 1
)
el , (2.4)
where Ht is the housing stock at time t. The arrival of new residents increases both rents rht
and the level of development Ht/S. The supply elasticity given in (2.4) unambiguously falls
(see Appendix for proof):
Lemma 3. Define housing supply to be the residual of the city’s open space S minus the flow
demand for land: S − Dl . The elasticity eSt of housing supply with respect to housing rents rht
decreases with the level of city development Ht/S along the city’s trend growth path.
2.4 Supply-Side Speculation
At time 0, residents disagree about the future path of housing demand. Speculative trading
behavior results from this disagreement. This section describes how owner-occupancy
frictions crowd speculators out of owner-occupied housing and into rental housing and land.
Demand and supply elasticities determine how prices aggregate the beliefs owner-occupants
and of optimistic speculators holding rental housing and land.
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2.4.1 Land Speculation and Dispersed Homeownership
We first consider the developer decision to hold land at time 0. Developer j’s first-order
condition on its land-holding Lj,0 is
1/β︸︷︷︸
risk-free rate
≥ Ej pl1/(pl0 − rl0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected land return
,
with equality if and only if Lj,0 > 0. A developer invests in land if and only if it expects land
to return the risk-free rate. At time 0, developers disagree about this expected return on
land because they disagree about the future path of housing demand. The developers that
expect the highest returns invest in land, while all other developers sell to these optimistic
firms and exit the market. We denote the optimistic belief of the developers who invest in
land by E˜pl1 ≡ maxµj E(pl1 | µj).
Optimistic residents finance developer investments in land through purchasing their
equity. Less optimistic residents choose to short-sell developer stock. Developer stock allows
residents to hold land indirectly: its price is pl0 and it pays a dividend of r
l
0. Resident i holds
this equity only if he agrees with the land valuation of the optimistic developers, in which
case Ei pl1 = E˜p
l
1. Otherwise, he shorts the equity, and his first-order condition is
k′s(−Q∗i,0) = β(E˜pl1 − Ei pl1).
Disagreement increases the short interest in the equity of the developers holding the land.
Without disagreement, E˜pl1 = Ei p
l
1 for all residents, so no one shorts.
Only the most optimistic residents hold housing as landlords. A resident is a landlord
if he owns more housing than he consumes through owner-occupancy: Hi > howni . The
first-order condition of the Bellman equation (2.3) with respect to Hi,0 when it is in excess of
howni,0 is
1/β︸︷︷︸
risk-free rate
≥ Ei ph1/(ph0 − rh0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected housing return
, (2.5)
with equality if and only if Hi,0 > howni,0 . Only the most optimistic residents invest in
rental housing, just as only the most optimistic developers invest in land. Land and rental
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housing share this fundamental property. During periods of uncertainty, the most optimistic
investors are the sole holders of these asset classes.
Owner-occupancy utility crowds these optimistic investors out of owner-occupied hous-
ing, which remains dispersed among residents of all beliefs. The decision to own or rent
emerges from the first-order conditions of the Bellman equation (2.3) with respect to howni,0
and hrenti,0 . We express these equations jointly as
v′(ai(howni,0 )
∗ + (hrenti,0 )
∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal utility of housing
= min
a−1i (ph0 − βEi ph1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
owning
, rh0︸︷︷︸
renting
 . (2.6)
The left term in the parentheses denotes the expected flow price of marginal utility v′ from
owning a house; the right term denotes the flow price of renting. A resident owns when
the owner-occupancy price is less than the rental price. As long as the owner-occupancy
preference ai is large enough, resident i decides to own even if his belief Ei ph1 is quite
pessimistic. Homeownership remains dispersed among residents of all beliefs.
We gain additional intuition about the own-rent margin by substituting (2.5) into (2.6).
We denote the most optimistic belief about future house prices, the one held by landlords
investing in rental housing, by E˜ph1 ≡ maxµi E(ph1 | µi). The decision to own rather than rent
reduces to
ai ≥ 1+ β(E˜p
h
1 − Ei ph1)
rh0
. (2.7)
Without disagreement, a resident owns exactly when he intrinsically prefers owning to
renting, so that ai ≥ 1. Disagreement sets the bar higher. Some pessimists for whom ai ≥ 1
choose to rent because they expect capital losses on owning a home. Other pessimists
continue to own because their owner-occupancy utility is high enough to offset the fear of
capital losses. Proposition 4 summarizes these results.
Proposition 4. Owner-occupancy utility crowds speculators out of the owner-occupied housing
market and into the land and rental markets. The most optimistic residents—those holding the highest
value of Ei ph1—buy up all rental housing and finance optimistic developers who purchase all the land.
In contrast, owner-occupied housing remains dispersed among residents of all beliefs.
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Proposition 4 yields two corollaries that match stylized facts presented in Section 2.2.
The most optimistic developers buy up all the land. Unless they start out owning all the
land, these optimistic developers increase their land positions following the demand shock.
They hold this land as an investment rather than for immediate construction.
Implication 1. The developers who hold land at time 0 increase their aggregate land holdings at
time 0. They buy land in excess of their immediate construction needs.
This implication explains the land-buying activities of large public U.S. homebuilders
documented in Figure 2.4(a).
The second corollary concerns short-selling. Residents who disagree with the optimistic
valuations of developers short their equity.
Implication 2. Disagreement increases the short interest of developer equity at time 0.
Figure 2.4(c) documents the rising short interest in the stocks of U.S. public homebuilders
who were taking on large land positions during the boom. This short interest provides
direct evidence of disagreement during the boom.
2.4.2 Belief Aggregation
Prices aggregate the heterogeneous beliefs of residents and developers holding housing
and land. The real estate market consists of three components: land, rental housing, and
owner-occupied housing. The most optimistic residents hold the first two, while the third
remains dispersed among owner-occupants. House prices reflect a weighted average of the
optimistic belief and the average belief of all owner-occupants. The weight on the optimistic
belief is the share of the real estate market consisting of land and rental housing; the weight
on the average owner-occupant belief is owner-occupied housing’s share of the market.
To derive these results, we take a comparative static of the form ∂ph0/∂x. The shock
z = µx scales with the common factor x. We differentiate with respect to x at x = 0 to
explore how prices change as the shocks, and hence the ensuing disagreement, increase.
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Our partial derivative holds current demand N0 constant to isolate the aggregation of future
beliefs.
We first use (2.5) to write ph0 = r
h
0 + βE˜p
h
1. The shock increases the optimistic belief βE˜p
h
1,
directly increasing prices. It also changes the market rent rh0 . This rent is determined by the
intersection of housing supply and housing demand:
S− Dl
(
rh0 − (1− β)K
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
housing supply
= Dh0(r
h
0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
housing demand
, (2.8)
where
Dh0(r
h
0) = N0
∫
M
∫ 1+β(E˜ph1−Ei ph1)/rh0
0
(v′)−1(rh0)dFadFµ︸ ︷︷ ︸
rental housing
(2.9)
+ N0
∫
M
∫ ∞
1+β(E˜ph1−Ei ph1)/rh0
a−1i (v
′)−1
(
a−1i (r
h
0 + β(E˜p
h
1 − Ei ph1))
)
dFadFµ︸ ︷︷ ︸
owner-occupied housing
.
The housing demand equation follows from (2.6) and (2.7). We determine the shock’s
effect on rents by totally differentiating (2.8) with respect to x at x = 0, keeping current
demand N0 constant. When the elasticity of housing demand eD is constant, the resulting
comparative static ∂ph0/∂x adopts the simple form given in the following proposition, which
we prove in the Appendix.
Proposition 5. Consider the partial effect of the shock in which current demand N0 stays constant
but future house price expectations Ei ph1 change. The change in house prices averages the changes in
the optimistic resident belief and the average belief:
∂ph0
∂x
=
eS0 + (1− χ)eD
eS0 + e
D
∂βE˜ph1
∂x
+
χeD
eS0 + e
D
∂βEph1
∂x
, (2.10)
where E˜ph1 = maxi Ei p
h
1 is the most optimistic belief, Ep
h
1 =
∫
M Ei p
h
1dFµ is the average belief,
eS0 is the elasticity of housing supply at time 0, e
D is the elasticity of housing demand, and χ =∫ ∞
0 (h
own
i,0 )
∗dFa/H0 is the share of housing that is owner-occupied when x = 0.
The weight on the optimistic belief in Proposition 5 represents the share, on the margin,
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of the real estate market owned by speculators. The supply elasticity eS0 represents land, and
(1− χ)eD represents rental housing. The remaining χeD represents owner-occupied housing
and is the weight on the average owner-occupant belief. The average owner-occupant belief
coincides with the unconditional average belief because at x = 0, beliefs and tenure choice
are independent.
Proposition 5 yields four corollaries on the difference in belief aggregation across cities
and neighborhoods. Prices look more optimistic when the weight (eS0 +(1−χ)eD)/(eS0 + eD)
is higher. This ratio is greater when the supply elasticity eS0 is higher:
Implication 3. Prices look more optimistic when the housing supply elasticity is higher, i.e. in less
developed cities.
Disagreement reverses the common intuition relating housing supply elasticity and move-
ments in house prices. Elastic supply keeps prices low by allowing construction to respond
to demand shocks. But land constitutes a larger share of the real estate market when supply
is elastic. Speculators are drawn to the land markets, so elastic supply amplifies the role of
speculators in determining prices during periods of disagreement. When supply is perfectly
elastic, eS0 = ∞ and prices reflect only the beliefs of these optimistic speculators:
Implication 4. When housing supply is perfectly elastic, house prices incorporate only the most
optimistic beliefs; they reflect the beliefs of developers and not of owner-occupants.
Recent research has measured owner-occupant beliefs about the future evolution of house
prices.8 In cities with elastic housing supply, such as the cities motivating this paper,
developer rather than owner-occupant beliefs determine prices. Data on the expectations of
homebuilders would supplement the research on owner-occupant beliefs to explain prices
in these elastic areas.
Prices aggregate beliefs much better when housing supply is perfectly inelastic (eS0 = 0)
and all housing is owner-occupied (χ = 1). In this case, the price change depends only on
the average belief Eph1:
8See Landvoigt (2011), Case et al. (2012), Burnside et al. (2013), Soo (2013), Suher (2013), and Cheng et al.
(2014).
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Implication 5. When the housing stock is fixed and all housing is owner-occupied, prices reflect the
average belief about long-run growth.
In many settings, such as when investor information equals a signal plus mean zero noise,
prices reflect all information when they incorporate the average private belief of all investors.
Owner-occupied housing markets with a fixed housing stock display this property, even
though short-selling is impossible and residents persistently disagree. These frictions fail to
bias prices because homeownership remains dispersed among residents of all beliefs, due to
the utility flows that residents derive from housing.
The weight (eS0 + (1− χ)eD)/(eS0 + eD) on optimistic beliefs is also higher when χ is
lower:
Implication 6. Prices look more optimistic when a greater share of housing is rented.
Speculators own a greater share of the real estate market when the rental share 1− χ is
higher. Prices bias towards optimistic beliefs in market segments where more of the housing
stock is rented.
2.5 The Cross-Section of City Experiences During the Boom
This section explains three puzzling aspects of the U.S. housing boom that occurred be-
tween 2000 and 2006. First, large house price booms occurred in elastic cities where new
construction historically had kept prices low. Second, the price booms in these elastic areas
were as large, if not larger, than those happening in inelastic cities at the same time. Finally,
house prices remained flat in other elastic cities that were also rapidly building housing.
To explain these cross-sectional facts, we derive a formula for the total effect of the shock
z on house prices. This formula expresses the house price boom as a function of the city’s
level of development when the shock occurs. Our analysis up to this point has explored the
partial effect of how prices aggregate beliefs Ei ph1, without specifying how these beliefs are
formed. To derive the total effect of the shock, we express the changes in these beliefs in
terms of city characteristics and the exogenous demand process. Specifically, we calculate
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the partial derivative ∂ log ph0/∂x holding all beliefs fixed at µi = µ, and then use Proposition
5 to derive the total effect of the shock x on house prices. As before, we evaluate derivatives
at x = 0.9
At time 0, each resident expects the shock zt to raise log-demand at time t by µtx. The
resulting expected change in rents rht depends on the elasticities of supply and demand at
time t:
∂ log E0rht
∂x
=
µt
eSt + e
D
.
This equation follows from price theory. When a demand curve shifts up, a good’s price
increases by the inverse of the total elasticity of supply and demand. The total effects of
the shocks {zt} on the current house price ph0 follows from aggregating the above equation
across all time periods, using the relation p0 = E0 ∑∞t=0 βtrht :
∂ log ph0
∂x
=
µ
e˜S + eD
. (2.11)
The mean persistence of the shock is µ = ∑∞t=0 µtβtrht (e
S
t + e
D)−1/∑∞t=0 βtrht (eSt + eD)−1, and
e˜S is the long-run supply elasticity given by the weighted harmonic mean of future supply
elasticities in the city:
e˜S ≡ −eD + ∑
∞
t=0 βtrht
∑∞t=0 βtrht (e
S
t + e
D)−1
.
The higher this long-run supply elasticity, the smaller the shock’s impact on current house
prices, holding µ fixed.
We now put together the two channels through which the shock changes prices. Equation
(2.11) expresses the price change that results when µ is known, and (2.10) describes how
prices aggregate residents’ heterogeneous beliefs about µ. Proposition 6 states the total
effect d log ph0/dx, which we formally calculate in the Appendix.
9Evaluating derivatives at x = 0 describes the model when construction occurs in each period. When x is
large enough and the shock z might mean-revert, a construction stop at t = 1 is possible and anticipated by
residents at t = 0. This feature of housing cycles, while important, distracts from our focus on housing booms
and how they vary across cities.
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Proposition 6. The total effect of the shock x on current house prices is
d log ph0
dx
=
(
eS0 + (1− χ)eD
eS0 + e
D
µ˜+
χeD
eS0 + e
D
µ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
aggregate belief
1
e˜S + eD︸ ︷︷ ︸
pass-through
, (2.12)
where eS0 is the current elasticity of housing supply, e˜
S is the long-run supply elasticity, eD is
the elasticity of housing demand, χ is the share of housing that is owner-occupied, µ˜ is the mean
persistence of the most optimistic belief about µ, and µ is the mean persistence of the average belief.
The first puzzle (2.12) explains is how a city with perfeclty elastic housing supply can
experience a house price boom. Housing supply is perfectly elastic when eS0 = ∞. In this
case, the house price boom is µ˜x/(e˜S + eD). This price increase is positive as long as the
long-run supply elasticity e˜S is not also infinite.
Implication 7. A house price boom occurs in a city where current housing supply is completely
elastic, construction costs are constant, and construction is instantaneous. Supply must be inelastic
in the future for such a price boom to occur.
In the Appendix, we prove that a limiting case exists in which eS0 = ∞ while e˜
S < ∞.
A house price boom results from a shock to current demand accompanied by news of
future shocks. When supply is inelastic in the long-run, these future shocks raise future
rents, and prices rise today to reflect this fact. This price change occurs even if supply is
perfectly elastic today, because residents anticipate the near future in which supply will not
able to adjust as easily.
This supply condition—elastic short-run supply, inelastic long-run supply—occurs in
cities at an intermediate level of development. Figure 2.5(a) demonstrates the possible
combinations of short-run and long-run supply elasticities in a city. We plot the pass-
through 1/(eS + eD); a higher pass-through corresponds to a lower elasticity. Lightly
developed cities have highly elastic short-run and long-run supply, and heavily developed
cities have inelastic short-run and long-run supply. In the intermediate case, current supply
is elastic while long-run supply is inelastic, reflecting the near future of constrained supply.
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Figure 2.5: Model Simulations For Different Cities
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Notes: The parameters we use are µ˜ = 1, µ = 1, x = 0.06, g = 0.013, eD = 1, β = 0.936, and el = 1. We hold the
amount of space S fixed and vary the initial trend demand N0. The x-axis reports annualized trend demand given by
log N0/g. (a) Short-run pass-through is 1/(eS0 + e
D); long-run pass-through is 1/(e˜S + eD). We calculate the rent and
housing stock at each level of development using (B.1) in the Appendix, and then calculate the supply elasticities using
(2.4). (b) Each curve reports the derivative in (2.12) times x, which we calculate using the elasticities shown in panel (a).
The “without disagreement” counterfactual uses µ˜ = µ = 0.2 instead of µ˜ = 1 > µ = 0.2. (c) We plot the construction
equation (B.2) using the elasticities shown in panel (a), as well as rents at each stage of development from (B.1) and prices
at each development stage from p0 = ∑∞t=0 β
trht , which we calculate at x = 0.
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As we discussed in the Introduction, this theoretical supply condition describes the
elastic markets that experienced large house price booms between 2000 and 2006. These
cities found themselves in a state of arrested development as the boom began in 2000.
Although ample land existed for current construction, long-run barriers constrain their
future growth.
The second puzzle (2.12) explains is why the price booms in these elastic cities were as
large as those happening in inelastic cities at the same time. Disagreement amplifies the
house price boom the most in exactly these nearly developed elastic cities. The amplification
effect of disagreement equals the extent to which optimists bias the price increase given
in (2.12). When owner-occupancy frictions are present (χ = 1), the difference between the
price boom under disagreement and under the counterfactual in which all residents hold
the average belief µ is
eS0
eS0 + e
D
µ˜− µ
e˜S + eD
.
This amplification is largest in nearly developed elastic cities, where eS0 is large and e˜
S is
small. Because this amplification increases in eS0 and decreases in e˜
S, nearly developed
elastic cities provide the ideal condition for disagreement to amplify a house price boom.
Implication 8, which we prove in the Appendix, states this result formally.
Implication 8. Disagreement amplifies house price booms most in cities at an intermediate level
of development, as long as owner-occupancy frictions are large enough. Define ∆ to be difference
between the price boom given in (2.12) and the counterfactual in which all residents hold the average
belief µ. Then there exists χ∗ < 1 such that for χ∗ ≤ χ ≤ 1, ∆ is strictly largest at an intermediate
level of initial development N∗0 < ∞.
Figure 2.5(b) plots the house price boom given by (2.12) across different levels of city
development, for both the case of disagreement and the case in which all residents hold
the average belief. The amplification effect of disagreement is the difference between the
two curves. Optimistic speculators amplify the price boom the most in the intermediate city.
Highly elastic short-run supply facilitates speculation in land markets, biasing prices towards
their optimistic belief. This bias significantly increases house prices because housing supply
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is constrained in the near future. The optimism bias is smaller in the highly developed city.
As a result, price increases in intermediate cities are as large as the price boom in the highly
developed areas.
In fact, the price boom in some intermediate cities can exceed that in the highly developed
cities. The parameters we use in Figure 2.5(b) generate an example of this phenomenon.
This surprising result reverses the conclusion of standard models of housing cycles, in
which the most constrained areas always experience the largest price increases. This reversal
occurs as long as owner-occupancy frictions are high and the extent of disagreement is
sufficiently large:
Implication 9. If disagreement and owner-occupancy frictions are large enough, then the largest
house price boom occurs in a city at an intermediate level of development. There exists χ∗ < 1 and
δ > 0 such that for χ∗ ≤ χ ≤ 1 and µ˜− µ ≥ δ, the price boom d log ph0/dx is strictly largest at an
intermediate level of development N∗0 < ∞.
Our model has succeeded in explaining the large house price booms in the elastic cities
without arguing that these cities experienced abnormally large housing demand shocks.
These markets experienced some of the largest house price booms in the country because of
their supply conditions, not in spite of them.
The final puzzle explained by (2.12) is why large house price booms occurred in some
elastic cities but not in others. Elastic cities are those for which eS0 ≈ ∞. As shown in Figure
2.5(a), these cities differ in their long-run supply elasticity e˜S. When e˜S = ∞, the house
price boom d log ph0/dx = 0. Prices remain flat because construction can freely respond to
demand shocks now and for the foreseeable future. House prices increase in elastic cities if
and only the development constraint will make construction difficult in the near future.
The elastic American cities which experienced stable house prices between 2000 and
2006 possess characteristics that lead long-run supply to be elastic. These cities, located in
Texas and other central American areas, are characterized by flat geography, a lack of future
regulation, and homogeneous sprawl (Glaeser and Kahn, 2004; Glaeser and Kohlhase, 2004;
Burchfield et al., 2006; Glaeser et al., 2008; Saiz, 2010). These conditions allow the cities to
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expand indefinitely, leading S to be infinite or very high. Unlimited land leads the elasticity
of supply to remain infinite forever, according to (2.4).
The level of house prices before the shock identifies the difference between the elastic
cities that can expand indefinitely and elastic cities that face constraints in the near future.
House prices increase with development. Therefore, the elastic cities nearing their develop-
ment constraints should have higher house prices before the shock than the other elastic
cities. The following implication summarizes these results.
Implication 10. Consider two cities that experience the same demand shock and in which current
housing supply is perfectly elastic (eS0 = ∞). House prices rise more in the city in which the long-run
supply elasticity e˜S is lower. Before the shock occurs, a greater share of the land in this city is already
developed, and the level of house prices is higher.
In practice, calculating a metro-area house price level is difficult because characteristics such
as construction costs vary widely within and across metro areas, although valiant attempts
have been made (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005; Davis and Heathcote, 2007; Nichols et al.,
2010). With the appropriate data, we would be able to distinguish the low-developed from
the medium-developed cities.
We have used (2.12) to explain the large house price increases in certain elastic housing
markets in the U.S. between 2000 and 2006. An additional salient feature of these booms
is that they coincided with rapid construction. As we document in Section 2.2, these
cities experienced some of the most intense permitting activity in the nation during this
period. Our model captures this phenomenon. Figure 2.5(c) plots the construction response
to the shock in different cities. In cities where current housing supply is elastic , new
construction accommodates the shock. The elastic cities include both the lightly developed
and intermediate developed areas.
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2.6 Variation in House Price Booms Within Cities
The model also makes predictions on the variation in house price increases within a given
city. Optimistic speculators hold rental housing, just as they hold land. Prices appear more
optimistic, and hence house price booms are larger, in market segments where a greater
share of housing is rented.
This result emerges from (2.12). Recall that χ is the share of the housing stock that is
owner-occupied rather than rented when x = 0. It is a sufficient statistic for the distribution
Fa of owner-occupancy utility. When χ is larger, the price increase d log ph0/dx is smaller:
∂
∂χ
d log ph0
dx
= − e
D
eS0 + e
D
µ˜− µ
e˜S + eD
< 0.
This derivative is negative because the optimistic belief µ˜ exceeds the average belief µ.
A city’s housing market consists of a number of market segments, which are subsets of
the housing market that attract distinct populations of residents. Because they attract distinct
populations, we can analyze them using (2.12), which was formulated at the city-level. All
else equal, housing submarkets in which χ is higher experience smaller house price booms:
Implication 11. Suppose market segments within a city differ only in χ, the relative share of renters
versus owner-occupants they attract: the shock x and the short-run and long-run supply elasticities
eS0 and e˜
S are constant within a city. Then house price booms are smaller in market segments where
χ is larger.
2.6.1 Location
We first consider variation in χ across neighborhoods. Neighborhoods provide an example
of market segments because they differ in the amenities they offer. For instance, some
areas offer proximity to restaurants and nightlife; others are characterized by access to good
public schools. These amenities appeal differentially to different populations of residents.
Variation in amenities hence leads χ to vary across space. Neighborhoods whose amenities
appeal relatively more to owner-occupants (high a residents) than to renters (low a residents)
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are characterized by a higher value of χ.
Consistent with Implication 11, house prices increased more between 2000 and 2006 in
neighborhoods where χ was higher in 2000. We obtain ZIP-level data on χ from the U.S.
Census, which reports the share of occupied housing that is owner-occupied, as opposed
to rented, in each ZIP code in 2000. The fraction χ varies considerably within cities. Its
national mean is 0.71 and standard deviation is 0.17, while the R2 of regressing χ on city
fixed-effects is only 0.12. We calculate the real increase in house prices from 2000 to 2006
using Zillow.com’s ZIP-level house price indices. We regress this price increase on χ and
city fixed-effects, and find a negative and highly significant coefficient of -0.10 (0.026), where
the standard error is clustered at the city level.
However, this negative relationship between χ and price increases may not be causal.
Housing demand shocks in this boom were larger in neighborhoods with a lower value of χ.
The housing boom resulted from an expansion of credit to low-income households (Mian
and Sufi, 2009; Landvoigt et al., 2013), and ZIP-level income strongly covaries with χ.10
The appeal of χ is that it predicts price increases in any housing boom in which there is
disagreement about future fundamentals. In general, χ predicts price increases because it
is negatively correlated with speculation, not because it is correlated with demand shocks.
Empirical work can test Implication 11 by examining housing booms in which the shocks
are independent from χ.
2.6.2 Structure Type
The second approach to measuring χ is to exploit variation across different types of housing
structures. According to the U.S. Census, 87% of occupied detached single-family houses in
2000 were owner-occupied rather than rented. In contrast, only 14% of occupied multifamily
housing was owner-occupied. According to Implication 11, the enormous difference in χ
between these two types of housing causes a larger price boom in multifamily housing, all
10The IRS reports the median adjusted gross income at the ZIP level. We take out city-level means, and the
resulting correlation with χ is 0.40.
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else equal.
This result squares with accounts of heightened investment activity in multifamily
housing during the boom.11 For instance, a consortium of investors—including the Church
of England and California’s pension fund CalPERS—purchased Stuyvesant Town & Peter
Cooper Village, Manhattan’s largest apartment complex, for a record price of $5.4 billion in
2006. Their investment went into foreclosure in 2010 as the price of this complex sharply
fell (Segel et al., 2011). Multifamily housing attracts speculators because it is easier to rent
out than single-family housing. Optimistic speculators bid up multifamily house prices and
cause large price booms in this market segment during periods of uncertainty.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that speculation explains an important part of housing cycles.
Speculation amplifies house price booms by biasing prices toward optimistic valuations. We
document the central importance of land price increases for explaining the U.S. house price
boom between 2000 and 2006. These land price increases resulted from speculation directly
in the land market. Consistent with this theory, homebuilders significantly increased their
land investments during the boom and then suffered large capital losses during the bust.
Many investors disagreed with this optimistic behavior and short-sold homebuilder equity
as the homebuilders were purchasing land.
Our emphasis on speculation allows us to explain aspects of the boom that are at odds
with existing theories of house prices. Many of the largest price increases occurred in cities
that were able to build new houses quickly. This fact poses a problem for theories that stress
inelastic housing supply as the source of house price booms. But it sits well with our theory,
which instead emphasizes speculation. Undeveloped land facilitates speculation due to
rental frictions in the housing market. In our model, large price booms occur in elastic cities
facing a development barrier in the near future—cities in arrested development.
11Bayer et al. (2013) develop a method to identify speculators in the data. A relevant extension of their work
would be to look at the types of housing speculators invest in.
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Our approach also makes some new predictions. Price booms are larger in submarkets
within a city where a greater share of housing is rented. Although we presented some
evidence for this prediction, further empirical work is needed to test it more carefully.
In all, we have presented a different but complementary story of the sources of housing
cycles than the literature has offered. Our explanation explains several puzzles and suggests
new directions for empirical research.
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Chapter 3
Taxation and the Allocation of Talent1
If we don’t have an economy built on bubbles and financial speculation, our best and
brightest won’t all gravitate towards careers in banking and finance. Because if we
want an economy that’s built to last, we need more of those young people in science and
engineering. This country should not be known for bad debt and phony profits. We
should be known for creating and selling products all around the world...
- President Barack Obama, Speech at Osawatomie High School, December 6, 2011
3.1 Introduction
The allocation of talented individuals across professions varies widely across time and
space. For example, according to data collected by Goldin et al. (2013), more than twice as
many male Harvard alumni from the 1969-1972 cohorts pursued careers in both academia
and non-financial management as pursued careers in finance. Twenty years later, careers
in finance were fifty percent more common than in academia and comparable with those
in non-financial management. If private product is anywhere near social product, these
talented individuals constitute a large fraction of many societies’ human capital: in the
United States, for example, just under half of all income is generated by the top 10%
of income earners and nearly a fifth is generated by the top 1% (Atkinson et al., 2011).
1This chapter is co-authored with Benjamin B. Lockwood and E. Glen Weyl.
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Furthermore if, as Baumol (1990) and Murphy et al. (1991) argue, different professions have
different ratios of social to private product (viz. some have negative and others positive
externalities) then these differences in talent allocation across societies may have important
implications for aggregate welfare. Recent evidence strongly suggests that these externalities
not only exist but are large (Murphy and Topel, 2006; Chetty et al., 2013a,b; French, 2008;
Piketty et al., 2014). In this paper we argue that non-linear income taxation is a powerful tool
affecting the allocation of talent and therefore an important benefit of progressive taxation
is increasing aggregate income rather than simply redistributing it.
Our argument is that in selecting an industry, talented individuals face a trade-off
between pursuing a “calling” that offers them high non-pecuniary benefits and choosing a
career that offers better remuneration. Higher marginal tax rates between the income earned
in the lower-paying and higher-paying career make the latter relatively less attractive by
narrowing the material sacrifice associated with following passion and prestige. Further-
more, the large shifts of individuals across professions in response to relative wage changes,
as well as other evidence from the literature (Lavy and Abramitzky, Forthcoming), suggest
(Section 3.3) that the elasticity of such career switches across professions is much larger (1-6)
than the intensive elasticity of work within a profession. To the extent that, as suggested
by the evidence discussed above, better-paying professions are also more likely to generate
negative (less likely to generate positive) externalities, raising marginal tax rates thus has an
important pure efficiency benefit.
This framework contrasts with the classical approach pioneered by Vickrey (1945) and
Mirrlees (1971), in which labor supply elasticities are the central determinant of optimal tax
progressivity. In this respect our approach may be better suited to address contemporary
political debates over taxation, which focus more on whether the rich are job creators or
“robber barons” than on empirical elasticity estimates. Indeed, we show that externalities
calibrated to reflect the views of groups at opposite ends of this debate—the Tea Party and
Occupy Wall Street movement—generate optimal income tax schedules that resemble the
policies advocated by each group.
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In the interest of informing these debates, we turn to the economics literature for esti-
mates of industry-specific externalities. In fact the literature suggests that these externalities
are huge and hugely heterogeneous: for each dollar earned privately in research, Murphy
and Topel (2006)’s estimates suggest that at least $5 of positive spill-overs are generated
and possibly many more, while French (2008) and Philippon (2013)’s estimates of waste in
the financial sector suggest every dollar earned there is accompanied by a 60 cent negative
spill-over. As a result our baseline calibration suggests that the allocation of talent has an
enormous impact on social welfare and thus on optimal taxation:
• The reallocation of talent between the early 70’s and early 90’s in the Goldin et al.
data is sufficient to account for all of the increase in the top 5% income share from its
trough mid-century to its peak in 2007 or for almost half of the reduction in growth
between the 1948-1973 and the 1982-2007 periods.
• The Reagan (1980 to 1990) tax reforms led to a 3-4 percentage point reallocation
of talented individuals from academia, engineering and teaching to finance and
management. As a result, these reforms account for a fifth of the change in top incomes
in our data and reduce total income (inclusive of externalities) by three-quarters of a
percent. The reforms reduced social welfare by one to two percent.
• In a simple model with no intensive elasticity or redistributive motive, efficiency alone
justifies nearly confiscatory (80-90%) tax rates and subsidies of more than 100% for
joining the middle class, while in our richest calibration, which includes realistic
intensive margin elasticities and a redistributive motive, optimal top marginal rates
are 70-80%.
While some of these calibrated magnitudes strike us as implausibly large, they follow
from a conservative, if inevitably partial, reading of the literature and a simple but natural
model. Even if, as we suspect, future research shows that the existing literature overestimates
externalities and thus our magnitudes, our analysis emphasizes the importance of refining
such estimates and incorporating them into the analysis of optimal income taxation, to
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which limited attention has been devoted in existing research. Because the externalities that
are our central parameters are so uncertain, we have developed an applet, written jointly
with Joshua Bosshardt (http://taxapplet.appspot.com), that allows the reader to input her
desired parameter values and reads off optimal tax rates for any given views she has about
externalities.
Income taxation is admittedly a blunt tool in addressing differences in externalities across
professions, as our results show in Subsection 3.5.4. In fact only 5-20% of the first-best welfare
gains possible under profession-specific taxation are possible under non-discriminatory
income taxation. Nevertheless we believe that analyzing the effects of non-discriminatory
income taxation is useful for policy for several reasons. First, occupations are easy to
conceal or misrepresent, so a tax code that directly rewards or penalizes specific professions
would be difficult to enforce, and externalities measurements would be difficult to update.
Under an income tax, however, agents have no incentive to misrepresent their profession,
and thus the continued measurement of externalities is incentive compatible. Second, the
political economy consequences of allowing profession-specific taxation could be dangerous,
unleashing a range of special interest lobbying and propaganda that is unlikely to lead to
an efficiency-enhancing equilibrium. Third, considerations of horizontal equity may make
differential taxation of different occupations ethically or politically unpalatable. Fourth,
profession-specific taxation is simply not on the public agenda, while income tax reform
is; thus, given the current second-best situation, we believe economists’ views of optimal
taxation should be influenced by their goals in allocating talent, not just their views about
redistribution. Many of these concerns are analogous to those that led Mirrlees (1971)
to focus attention on non-linear income taxation and assume that wages as such were
non-contractible even though they seem to be at least partially observable in practice.
Rothschild and Scheuer (2014a,b), and to a lesser extent Philippon (2010), employ
theoretical models to explore the effects of the economy on optimal income taxation; we
discuss the relationship between these papers more extensively in Subsection 3.4.4. Partly as
a result, our goal is not only to highlight the use of income taxation to address externalities
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created by professions, but additionally to provide a simple and rigorous framework that
addresses the quantitative relevance of such factors and contrast them with the classical
insurance-incentives trade-off on which most of the optimal tax literature is based.
Following this introduction, the paper is divided into five sections. Section 3.2 devel-
ops our ideas in a simple theoretical model that makes a strong (and likely unrealistic)
assumption about substitution patterns across professions which renders the formula for
optimal taxation particularly transparent. Section 3.3 uses data on income distributions and
findings from the economics literature about professions’ externalities to calibrate this model.
Section 3.4 discusses some of the implications of these results and their relationship to the
literature. Section 3.5 presents a structural model based on a more realistic assumption
about substitution patterns at the cost of imposing other assumptions that make the results
either more special or less transparent. We show in several ways that these more realistic
substitution patterns further strengthen our results from the simple case in Section 3.3 and
use the model to quantitatively evaluate the importance of our mechanism. Section 3.6
concludes. Details of our empirical procedures and less instructive proofs are in appendices
following the main text.
3.2 Theory
In this section we construct the simplest and most intuitive version of our theory by ruling
out any redistributive motive and considering the optimization of a non-linear income tax
to sort talent across professions to maximize aggregate income-equivalents in the spirit
of Kaldor (1939) and Hicks (1939). We consider a static model intended to capture the
long-term, steady-state choices of a population. Because career choices are very sticky, they
should be interpreted as being made once and for all, likely at an early stage of life. Thus
the “career-switching” we refer to is primarily an elasticity of changes in choices likely made
by college students, not changes mid-career for adults.
73
3.2.1 General model
There are N professions, p = 1, . . . N and a mass 1 of talented individuals. Each individual i
is characterized by a 2N-dimensional vector θi = (wi,ψi), where wip represents the money
wage individual i would earn if she chose profession p and ψip represents a parameter
characterizing the non-pecuniary or psychic income she would receive from working in this
profession. These characteristics of individuals are distributed in the population according
to a non-atomic and differentiable distribution function f with full support on a convex and
open Θ ⊆ R2N++. Each individual can choose how many hours to work, h, at a utility cost
φ
(
h;ψip
)
where ∂φ∂h > 0 (work is costly),
∂2φ
∂h2 > 0 (the costs of work are convex) and
∂φ
∂ψ ≤ 0
(ψ shifts down the costs of working/up the non-pecuniary benefits of work). Wages are
assumed linear, so the individual i’s income in profession p given that she works h hours is
wiph. We do not constrain hours to lie in a finite range as we interpret hours more broadly
as effort and we do not assume φ need be positive (work may be enjoyable, on net, but the
marginal cost of hours is also positive).
The government must finance a net expenditure of I (which we typically assume to be 0)
through the use of a non-linear income tax under which an individual earning total income
y = wh, regardless of the profession in which she earns this wage, pays a total tax T(y).
Thus, just as in Mirrlees (1971), we effectively assume that neither wage nor profession
can be verified or that, as suggested by Diamond and Saez (2011), some horizontal equity
concern prevents greater discrimination.2 Each individual’s utility is just the sum of her
money and psychic incomes.
Each individual is assumed to have quasi-linear utility in money income and thus to
earn net utility
wph− T
(
wph
)− φ (h;ψip)+ E
when she works h hours in profession p, where E is the net externalities she receives from
other individuals, as discussed below, which is uniform across the population and thus
2See our discussion in the introduction for a more detailed justification.
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independent of her actions. Given the assumed convexity of φ, so long as T is also convex
(or not “too concave”—see Mirrlees and Saez (2001) for details) each individual has a unique
optimal h?p
(
wp,ψp
)
to work conditional on being in profession p and will only move h?p
locally in response to small marginal tax changes.3 We let u?p
(
wp,ψp
)
be the value of utility
at this optimum. Sometimes we write h?p (θ), and similarly for u?p, which is interpreted as
extracting the relevant components. Individual i chooses to work in the profession where her
after-tax income plus her psychic income is highest, at her optimal profession-conditional
hours level:
p? (θ) ≡ argmaxp∈1,...Nwph?p
(
wp,ψp
)− T (wph?p (wp,ψp))− φ (h?p (wp,ψp) ;ψp) .4 (3.1)
Each profession has an externality share, ep with the interpretation that an individual
i working in profession p and earning wage wip generates a net externality on the rest of
society, evenly distributed across individuals, of epwip for each hour she works. We thus
assume a linear technology here and assume away all general equilibrium effects on wages.
While this is consistent with the standard Mirrlees approach, it may cause interpretative
problems in industries with non-linear technologies as the ratio of marginal and average
products can be mistaken for externalities. While a model with non-linear technology would
be needed to disentangle such issues rigorously, we believe that our externality shares
should be identified with the share of marginal output in the industry that is external and
conjecture that this could be shown, at least in first-order conditions, in a broader model.5
3We do not constrain T to be convex and some of our optimal schedules have non-convex regions of T. In
these cases, when we allow the hours margin to be flexible, we make explicit our assumptions about hours
elasticities, which always rule out non-local movements. Given our focus on non-local income movements
driven by career switches we view this as a reasonable simplification. Such simplifications are standard in the
literature (Saez, 2001).
4When the best profession for an individual is not unique, the tie may be broken in any manner as our
assumptions on the distribution of wages and psychic incomes assure that the set of individuals facing such
indifferences is of measure 0.
5Under this view, it is important to distinguish between the marginal and average externalities of a profession.
For example, it may be that inframarginal members of a profession generate large positive externalities while
marginal individuals may have zero or negative externalities. Similarly it may be that a profession is governed
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The value E received by all individuals is thus the average value of ep?(θ)wp?(θ)h?p?(θ)(θ).
The planner seeks to maximize total income (money net of externalities and psychic income)
in her choice of the tax. In particular, she solves
max
T(·)
∫
Θ
[(
1+ ep?(θ)
)
wp?(θ)h
?
p?(θ) (θ)− φ
(
h?p?(θ) (θ) ;ψp?(θ)
)]
f (θ) ,
subject to the definition of h?p and p? above. To derive optimal taxes, we follow the intuitive
perturbation approach to the calculus of variations problem pioneered in economics by
Wilson (1993) and in optimal income taxation by Saez (2001). Suppose the planner raises
slightly the marginal tax rate at income y, returning the raised revenue uniformly to the
population so as to continue to satisfy her budget constraint and otherwise leaving fixed all
other parts of the tax system. The redistribution thus induced has no net social value, as
the planner seeks only to maximize total social wealth. Thus we can focus entirely on the
behavioral responses to the tax rise.
One component of this is the local, intensive elasticity through the number of hours
individuals choose to work. Given convexity of φ, so long as T is not too concave the optimal
choice of h will always move locally in response to small changes in the optimal tax rate. In
particular, if marginal taxes at income y, T′(y), rises we can trace the impact on the optimal
hours for an individual of type θ who is earning income y (because wp?(θ)h?p?(θ) (θ) = y),
assuming she stays in the same profession, by the implicit function theorem. The first-order
condition for h?p?(θ) is
wp?(θ)
[
1− T′
(
wp?(θ)h
?
p?(θ)
)]
= φ′
(
h?p?(θ);ψp?(θ)
)
. (3.2)
We can now determine the effect of increasing T′(y) by a small amount using the implicit
function theorem, letting ehp (θ) be the (negative) intensive labor supply elasticity of h with
by a restrictive cartel (e.g. medicine and law) so that marginal entry into the profession mostly crowds others
out of the profession, even though overall the profession generates positive or negative externalities.
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respect to the post-tax wage w (1− T′):
−wp
(
1− e
h
p (θ) h?p (θ) T′′ (y)
1− T′ (y)
)
= −
ehp (θ) h?p (θ) φ′′
(
h?p (θ) ;ψp
)
wp [1− T′ (y)] =⇒
ehp (θ) =
w2p [1− T′ (y)]
h?p (θ)
[
φ′′
(
h?p (θ) ;ψp
)
+ w2pT′′ (y)
] . (3.3)
On the other hand, the marginal social value created by an individual working an additional
hour is (
1+ ep?(θ)
)
wp?(θ) − φ′
(
h?p?(θ) (θ) ;ψp?(θ)
)
=
[
ep?(θ) + T
′ (y)
]
wp?(θ),
where the equality follows by substituting in the first-order condition for hours, equation
(3.2). Intuitively, by the envelope theorem, the net social value created by an additional
hour of work is proportional to the private product (wage) multiplied by total externality
associated with wages earned, both through the tax externality and the direct externality e.
If marginal tax rates rise at y, an individual of type θ currently earning income y will
change her hours by
ehp?(θ)(θ)h
?
p?(θ)(θ)
1−T′(y) and thus will change social welfare by[
ep?(θ) + T′ (y)
]
yehp?(θ) (θ)
1− T′ (y) .
The set of all individuals earning income y is
Θ (y; T) ≡
{
θ ∈ Θ : wp?(θ)h?p?(θ) (θ) = y
}
.
Where it does not create ambiguity below, we drop the dependence on T. Applying the
multidimensional Leibniz rule of Veiga and Weyl (2013), the density (normalizing for the
representation in the type-space) of such consumers is
f (y) ≡
∫
S∈Θ(y)
f (θ (S))
− ∂φ∂ψp?(θ(S)) (θ (S))
dS,
where S is a 2T − 1-dimensional parameterization of the set Θ(y). As short hand, we can
abbreviate this notation as
∫
Θ(y) f (θ) dθ. Under this notation, the total impact on welfare
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through these local changes is then
∫
Θ(y)
[
ep?(θ) + T′ (y)
]
ehp?(θ) (θ)
1− T′ (y) f (θ) dθ =
f (y)
([
E
[
ep?(θ)|Θ(y)
]
+ T′(y)
]
E
[
ehp?(θ) (θ) |Θ(y)
]
+Cov
(
ep?(θ), ehp?(θ) (θ) |Θ(y)
))
1− T′(y) ,
where the expectation and covariance operators are defined as usual, conditional on the
relevant sets in the short-hand notation; see Veiga and Weyl (2013) for greater details.
The second component of the behavioral response follows a similar normative logic, but
is driven by changes in professions. In particular, let
∂Θ(y; T) ≡
{
θ ∈ Θ : ∃p, q ∈ 1, . . . N :
(
wph?p (θ) < y < wqh?q (θ)
)
∧
(
u?p (θ) = u?q (θ)
)}
be the set of y-career switching individuals who, under tax system T, are just indifferent
between two professions, one of which has an optimal (for that individual) income level
above and the other of which has an optimal income level below y. Let fS(y) ≡
∫
∂Θ(y) f (θ) dθ
be the density of such individuals. Raising T′(y) causes all of these individuals to switch
from profession q to profession p.6 How does this change social wealth created?
In profession q, the individual i generates social wealth
(
1+ eiq
)
wiqh?q (θi)−
φ
(
h?q (θi) ,ψiq
)
while in profession p she generates social wealth
(
1+ eip
)
wiph?p (θi) −
φ
(
h?p (θi) ,ψip
)
. From the fact that she is indifferent between the two professions, we know
that
wiph?p (θi)− T
(
wiph?p (θi)
)
− φ
(
h?p (θi) ,ψip
)
=
wiqh?q (θi)− T
(
wiqh?q (θi)
)
− φ
(
h?q (θi) ,ψiq
)
.
Thus the change in social wealth created by her switching professions is
(
1+ eip
)
wiph?p (θi)− φ
(
h?p (θi) ,ψip
)
−
[(
1+ eiq
)
wiqh?q (θi)− φ
(
h?q (θi) ,ψiq
)]
=
6Note we can ignore individuals who are triply indifferent between professions as they are of measure zero
even within the career switchers.
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eipwiph?p (θi) + T
(
wiph?p (θi)
)
− eiqwiqh?q (θi)− T
(
wiqh?q (θi)
)
≡ ∆T (θi) + ∆E (θi) ,
that is the change in the sum of her tax payments and externalities. This is exactly the dis-
crete, career-switching analog of the intensive margin change in hours. The total change in so-
cial wealth from an increase in the marginal tax rate at y is E [∆T (θ) + ∆E (θ) |∂Θ(y)] fS(y).
Socially optimal taxation calls for equating the sum of the intensive and career-switching
effects to 0:
Proposition 7. Assuming all movements in hours are local, optimal taxation requires that for all
y : fS(w) or f (y), E
[
ehp? |Θ(y)
]
> 0,
([
E
[
ep? |Θ(y)
]
+ T′(y)
]
E
[
ehp? |Θ(y)
]
+ Cov
(
ep? , ehp? |Θ(y)
))
f (y)
1− T′(y)
+ E [∆T + ∆E|∂Θ(y)] fS(y) = 0.
While this intuitive result applies quite generally, it provides relatively little guidance on
how to map information about distribution of incomes and externality shares to optimal
tax rates in the absence of detailed information on which individuals are likeliest to switch
professions. To clarify the analysis further, we now consider additional assumptions that
may be added to yield an especially simple formula.
3.2.2 A simple case
The first such assumption is that there is no correlation between propensity to switch careers,
conditional on an income level, and the externalities generated by an individual earning that
income nor between the propensity to switch into a career and the externalities, conditional
on the income level switched into.
Assumption 1. For an individual in a switching set, ∂Θ(y) for some y, let p (θ) be the lower-paying
of the two professions she is indifferent between and q (θ) be the higher-paying of the two professions
she is indifferent between. For all y, y′
E
[
ep? |Θ(y)
]
= E
[
ep|∂Θ(y′), wph?p = y
]
= E
[
eq|∂Θ(y′), wqh?q = y
]
.
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That is, the average individual considering (in response to a marginal change in the tax rate at y′)
switching either down to a lower-paying profession or up to a higher-paying profession but currently
earning income y on average generates the same externality as the average individual earning that
income.
The second assumption is analogous, but for the intensive margin: elasticities are
uncorrelated with externalities, conditional on income.
Assumption 2. For every y,
Cov
(
ep?(θ), e
h
p?(θ)|Θ(y)
)
= 0.
A simple example in which these assumptions would be satisfied is the case where those
exiting and entering any income level are chosen randomly and representatively from the
skilled professions at that income level. Alternatively, to illustrate that Assumptions 1 and 2
can be consistent with micro-foundations, consider the following more stylized example:
Example 1. Suppose that the equilibrium incomes of different professions have disjoint supports.7
Then at any income Assumptions 1 and 2 are automatically satisfied as the only individuals earning
any given income all have the same externality share. Conditions on primitives generating this would
be that all individuals find hours below a certain range to have no cost and above a certain range
to be infinitely expensive; call this range
[
h, h
]
. The range of incomes generated by individuals in
profession p are then
[
wph, hwp
]
where wp is the lowest value wp may take on and wp is the highest
value it may take on. If
[
wph, hwp
]
are disjoint for different p then so will income be.
Although the conditions in this example are not satisfied in the data presented in Section
3.3.1, which has overlap at many levels of the distribution, the example does show that the
assumptions can be satisfied and that they may be approximately satisfied if professions
are highly segregated by income. In Section 3.5 we provide stylized but natural alternative
models in which the results are even more extreme, in terms of the responsiveness of optimal
taxation to externality shares, than the results we derive in this section.
7We are grateful to Florian Scheuer for suggesting this example.
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Under Assumptions 1 and 2, optimal taxation takes a very simple form in both the case
of pure career-switching (ehp?(θ) (θ) ≡ 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ) and in the case of pure intensive reactions
and no career switching ( fS(y) = 0∀y):
Proposition 8. Suppose that, for every tax policy T, Assumption 1 holds and that hours are rigid
(every individual must work an exogenous number of hours in each profession). Then
T?(y) = −E [ep? |Θ (y; T)] y + T0,
where T0 is a constant across income levels. That is, up to a lump sum transfer, average tax rates are
set at each income to offset the average externality created by individuals earning that income level.
This is true if the average externalities are defined at the current equilibrium or at the optimal policy,
as the average externalities at each income level remain the same in this case.
Alternatively suppose that, for every tax policy, Assumption 2 holds, careers are rigid and all
movement in hours is local. Then
T?
′
(y) = −E [ep? |Θ (y; T?)] .
That is, marginal tax rates at each income level are set to offset the average externality created by
individuals earning that income level given the optimal tax policy.
Intuitively, when there is pure career switching the average externality of each profession
must offset the average cost of each profession because when switching across professions
it is the average income rather than the marginal earnings that are relevant. On the other
hand, when making marginal decisions about work, it is marginal tax rates that are relevant
and thus marginal tax rates should be equated to the average externality at a given income
level. This intuition is formalized in the proof of this result in Appendix C.8. As we discuss
in the next section, the distinction between policies generated by these two regimes is fairly
small in many contexts.
Proof. See Appendix C.8.
We refer to the optimal policy under pure career-switching as “average tax externality
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matching” (ATEM) and the optimal policy under pure intensive hours choice “marginal
tax externality matching” (MTEM). To see the distinction between these policies, note that
under ATEM
T?
′
= −E [ep? |Θ (y; T?)]− y∂E [ep? |Θ (y; T)]
∂y
. (3.4)
Suppose that externalities are becoming larger in absolute magnitude as income rises. Then
marginal tax rates are more extreme under ATEM than MTEM: if average income-conditional
externalities are negative and increasing in size with income and thus marginal tax rates are
positive under MTEM they will be even larger under ATEM. If average income-conditional
externalities are positive and increasing with income and thus marginal tax rates are negative
under MTEM they will be even more negative under ATEM.
Proposition 2 dramatically simplifies the data requirements for determining optimal
tax policy. However, it still presents two challenges. First, in the case when there are both
career-switching and intensive elasticities, optimal policy is a mix of these two extremes, the
mix depending on details of how large the two elasticities are over in the distribution of
income. Second, with no career switching, it is the average income-conditional externality at
the optimal policy rather than at the current equilibrium that is relevant to determine marginal
tax rates. This is harder to observe from available data for obvious reasons, though this
same challenge appears, and is treated as we do below, in much standard optimal tax work
(such as Saez (2001)).
3.3 Calibration
In what follows, we focus primarily on the case of ATEM because we believe that career-
switching elasticities are much larger than hours elasticities, at least for the most talented
individuals. For example while Saez et al. (2012) argue that elasticities of intensive margin
labor supply are very low (0 to 0.1 for high incomes), Goldin et al.’s evidence suggests
career-switching elasticities are much higher. The share of male Harvard alumni who
pursued a career in finance, for example, more than tripled from 5% in the 1969-72 cohort
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to 15.7% in 1989-92 cohort. Throughout all of the analysis that follows we restrict attention
within the Harvard data to males, though the IRS data does not distinguish by gender.
Suppose that there have been no changes in inherent preferences for different careers
(no labor supply shift) and thus that all of this change arises from shifts in relative wages.
Philippon and Reshef (2012) suggests that post-tax wages in the financial sector have
increased, from the 1980s to the late 1990s, by somewhere between 50% and 200% depending
on how one adjusts for education and expectations; see Appendix C.4 for details. Thus
elasticities are somewhere between 1 and 6. Given that these increased wages were likely
not fully anticipated and mostly accrued in the 1990s and 2000s and that finance’s share
of graduates appears, anecdotally, to have greatly increased further since the 89-92 cohort,
these elastidmay be underestimates. Even Keane and Rogerson (2012), who favor higher
hours elasticities, argue that longer-term elasticities (along dimensions like career choice),
are likely to be much larger than intensive hour elasticities. We also show that our results
are qualitatively robust to calibrating MTEM.
Computing ATEM and MTEM requires data on two things: income distributions for
different industries, and estimates of the externalities (positive or negative) created by each
industry. The first is relatively straightforward; in Section 3.3.1 we describe how we use data
from IRS tax returns and the salary distributions of Harvard graduates for this estimation.
To calibrate externalities, we adopt two approaches. First, we present estimates of
profession-specific externalities from the economics literature. Second, we include two
sets of externality assumptions intended to reflect the poles of contemporary debates over
income tax progressivity in the United States: the Tea Party and the Occupy Wall Street
movement, both to show the sensitivity of the optimal tax schedule to a range of externality
assumptions, and to demonstrate the usefulness of this model in formalizing observed
political debates.
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3.3.1 Income distributions
Due to the thick upper tail of the US income distribution, welfare and optimal taxes
depend critically on the allocation of talent among high-earning professions. We therefore
restrict out attention to 10 professions which account for nearly all of the top incomes and
occupational choices of talented individuals in the United States: law, finance, management,
medicine, academia/science, computers/engineering, sales, consulting, teaching (primary
and secondary), and arts/entertainment. As our data will show, 88% of the top 1% incomes
reported to the IRS come from these professions, and 93% of male students who graduated
Harvard College in 1990 work in these occupations in 2005.
We jointly estimate the income distribution within each profession and the share of
skilled workers in profession p (denoted Fp(·) and sp, respectively) using data from two
sources. First, we use results reported in Bakija et al. (2012), based on IRS tax returns, where
we observe the share of the top 1% and 0.1% of the population income distribution (i.e.,
with earnings greater than $295,000 and $1,246,000, respectively) employed in each of our
skilled professions (except Teaching, see below) in 2005. We denote these shares b1p and b2p
respectively, where p represents profession. Second, we use data from Goldin et al. (2013) to
construct the empirical CDF of earnings for the Harvard class of 1990 in each all 10 skilled
professions. Specifically, we observe a list of incomes yh0 < y
h
1 < ... < y
h
m where yh0 = 0 and
yhm = ∞ and an m× 10 matrix (a)ip such that aip is the observed share of the Harvard cohort
in occupation p that is earning between yhi−1 and y
h
i .
Our parametric assumption is that incomes within each profession follow a Pareto-
lognormal distribution. This distribution resembles a lognormal distribution for low values
and a Pareto distribution for high values, and was introduced by Colombi (1990) to model
income distributions. Unlike other distributions, it does a good job matching both the top
tail and the central mass of the income distribution. The Pareto-lognormal distribution
is characterized by three parameters, which we estimate within each profession using
maximum likelihood as follows.
Because the IRS data from Bakija et al. represent the entire population (whereas the
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Harvard data in Goldin et al. represent a subset and we focus attention on males even
within this subset), we regard the former as more reliable. Yet because it contains only
two data points for each profession, that data is insufficient to calibrate the 3 parameters
of Pareto-lognormal distribution, so we select parameters to maximize the likelihood of
observing the Harvard data, conditional on matching the IRS data points exactly. Formally,
we use F(·; z) to denote the Pareto-lognormal distribution with 3-dimensional parameter z,
and zp to denote the true parameter vector characterizing the Pareto-lognormal in profession
p. We let sp denote the share of the skilled population employed in profession p. Thus we
select our parameter estimates (zˆp, sˆp) to solve
(zˆp, sˆp) = arg max
zp,sp
m
∑
i=1
aip log
(
F(yhi ; zp)− F(yhi−1; zp)
)
such that sp
(
1− F(295000; zp)
)
= 0.01b1p and sp
(
1− F(1246000; zp)
)
= 0.001b2p.
The IRS does not provide data on Teaching (instead lumping teaching in with govern-
ment). For teaching, we therefore estimate zteaching directly from the Harvard data:
zˆteaching = arg maxzteaching
m
∑
i=1
ai,teaching log
(
F(yhi ; zteaching)− F(yhi−1; zteaching)
)
.
We estimate the fraction steaching of talented individuals entering teaching by equating this
fraction to the fraction of Harvard graduates in teaching, which is stable across cohorts
(1970, 1980, and 1990 graduates) and is approximately 3%.
Figure 3.1 shows the IRS and Harvard data for each profession except finance, as well
as the fitted Pareto log-normal distribution. (Note that the IRS data points depend on
the shares sˆp, which are estimated jointly with the Pareto-lognormal parameters.) The fit
appears quite quite good.
In Finance, the IRS data and the Harvard data are in direct conflict; the Harvard data
shows a far richer upper tail of the income distribution than does the IRS data. This raises
some concern that our calibration may underestimate the representation of Finance at very
high incomes, a hypothesis consistent with the strong representation of finance that Kaplan
and Rauh (2010) find at high incomes. To account for this possibility, we also compute
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Figure 3.1: Income distributions fitted to IRS and Harvard data in 9 industries
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Figure 3.2: Baseline and alternative income calibrations in Finance
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results under an alternative calibration for Finance, based solely on the Harvard data; these
results are presented in full in Appendix C.1. The fit for both the baseline and alternative
calibrations in Finance is shown in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.3 shows our estimated distributions of talented individuals across professions,
which is generated by normalizing the number of individuals at each income in each
profession by the total number of talented individuals at that income, for the baseline
and alternative calibrations. This distribution exhibits some salient and fairly intuitive
features. At low incomes, most talented individuals are in Arts/Entertainment. This is
resonant with the popular story of the “starving artist”. In, and only in, the lower middle
class does Teaching has a significant representation. In the heart of middle income ($25k
to $75k) the largest groups are Academia/Science and Computes/Engineering. In the
upper middle class ($75k to $200k) Sales has a strong representation. Law and Doctor have
significant representation among the the modestly wealthy (those earning roughly between
$200k and $500k). Most of the highest income groups (those earning above $500k) are in
Arts/Entertainment, Sales or, especially, Finance and Management.
87
Figure 3.3: The allocation of talent condition on income level
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Notes: The representation of talented individuals in skilled professions conditional on different income levels
under the baseline calibration (left) and the alternative Finance calibration (right).
88
Table 3.1: Sources of externality estimates from the economics literature
Primary Source Method
Law Murphy et al. (1991) Cross-country regression ofGDP on lawyers per capita
Finance French (2008) Aggregate fees for active vs.passive investing
Management Gabaix and Landier (2008) (pro mgmt);Piketty et al. (2014) (anti mgmt)
Calibrated model indicating
CEO pay captures managerial
skill and firm characteristics
(pro mgmt); Cross-country
evidence that CEO pay is lower
and covaries more with firm
performance when taxes are
higher (anti mgmt)
Doctor — —
Academia/ Murphy and Topel (2006) Willingness-to-pay for longevityScience gains of medical research
Computers/ Murphy et al. (1991) Cross-country regression ofEngineering GDP on engineers per capita
Sales — —
Consulting Bloom et al. (2013)
Randomized experiment
measuring effect of consultants
on plant productivity
Arts/ — —Entertainment
Teaching Chetty et al. (2013a,b) Future earnings of students ofhigher value-added teachers
3.3.2 Externality shares
To calibrate the externalities of each of these professions we drew on the fairly limited
literature that tries to estimate economy-wide spill-overs from various sectors separately in
different areas of the economy. We now briefly discuss our calibrations for each profession;
details for selected calculations appear in Appendix C.2 and they are summarized in Table
3.1.
• Law: The only study we found of externalities from law was a cross-sectional ordinary-
least-squares regression by Murphy et al. (1991). They investigate the impact of the
allocation of talent on GDP growth rates rather on GDP levels. To be conservative and
fit within our static framework, we interpreted these as one-time effects on the level
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of output rather than impacts on growth rates. Attributing the effect they estimate
to externalities from the talented lawyers in our sample yields −.21 as an externality
share.
• Finance: French (2008) estimates the cost of resources expended to “beat the market”
and Bai et al. (2013) argue that the dramatic increase in such expenditures has not
made markets more informationally efficient. Viewing all of this waste as a negative
externality of our talented individuals yields an externality share of −.6. A very
similar estimate is obtained by assuming that all of the increase in the financial sector’s
share of GDP (Philippon, 2013) from its trough mid-century is waste.
• Management: There is sharp disagreement in the literature over the externalities
generated by managers. Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Edmans and Gabaix (2009)
argue that CEO compensation is largely efficient and few externalities exist as a result,
while Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Malmendier and Tate (2009) argue for
significant overcompensation of top managers. Following the latter, Piketty et al. (2014)
find a −.6 externality share for CEOs. Because of this sharp disagreement, we consider
calibrations with both −.6 and 0 for the externality share of Management. We denote
these two calibrations by “anti mgmt” and “pro mgmt” respectively.
• Doctor: We could find no literature estimating the externality share of (non-research)
medicine and so set the externality to 0 to be conservative.
• Academia/Science: Murphy and Topel (2006) estimate that medical innovation alone
has generated a staggering $3.2 trillion gain in welfare each year from 1970-2000. Even
if this were the only benefit of academic research, it would translate into an externality
share of 48. Any direct use of such a number generates such a large positive externality
share that it swamps everything else in our analysis. By contrast Jaffe (1989) more
narrowly measures the spillover of academic research onto firm profits through excess
patents in firms near universities, which leads to a much smaller 2.6 value. We settled
on an intermediate value of 5 to be conservative.
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Table 3.2: Externality profiles in each of four calibrations
Literature Literature Tea Occupy
(pro mgmt) (anti mgmt) Party Wall Street
Law -.21 -.21 -.8 .3
Finance -.6 -.6 .2 -.8
Management 0 -.6 .3 -.6
Doctor 0 0 .1 .2
Academia/ 5 5 -.3 .6Science
Computers/ .75 .75 0 .1Engineering
Sales 0 0 -.2 -.9
Consulting 0 0 .3 -.2
Arts/ 0 0 -.5 .8Entertainment
Teaching .71 .71 .3 2
• Computers/Engineering: Here again we used the analysis of Murphy et al. (1991),
using the same methodology as in Law, and got a positive spill-over of .75.
• Sales: There is an extensive theoretical literature arguing that the welfare effects of
advertising can be positive or negative, depending on whether the advertising is
informative or persuasive in nature (Bagwell, 2007). The former theories imply that
advertising will tend to be under-supplied in most cases (Becker and Murphy, 1993),
while the latter theories suggest it will be over-supplied (Dixit and Norman, 1978). But
while there have been empirical efforts to quantify the welfare effects of advertising in
particular markets, such as pharmaceuticals (Rizzo, 1999) and subprime mortgages
(Gurun et al., 2013), we are not aware of any work attempting a comprehensive,
industry-wide estimate of spill-overs, and therefore as with Doctor we assessed the
externality share to be 0.
• Consulting: Bloom et al. (2013) conducted a field experiment to determine the causal
impact of management consulting on profits. They interpreted their results as consis-
tent with the view that consultants earn approximately their marginal product and
thus we assume no externality for Consulting.
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• Arts/Entertainment: While there is some evidence, and a number of good theoretical
arguments, that there are some positive spillovers from the arts, we were unable to
find any plausible basis for estimating the magnitude of these spillovers and they had
little impact on our results (they tended to make optimal taxes slightly higher and
more progressive). As a consequence, we assumed 0 to be conservative.
• Teaching: Chetty et al. (2013a,b) estimate the value to lifetime productivity brought by
teachers of varying quality. Clark et al. (2013) discuss the performance of “talented”
students as teachers, mostly through fellowship programs like Teach for America.
Assuming that average teachers are paid their marginal product and that all additional
value of high-quality teachers come through their impact on lifetime earnings, we can
calculate the marginal product of an average talented teacher and divide this by their
average earnings. This yields an externality share of .71.
In addition to our two literature-derived profiles of externality shares, we also want to
use our model to examine positively how views about the value of various professions’ ex-
ternalities can explain different views about taxation. To do so we followed two approaches.
First, through discussions with with an expert on the Tea Party, Vanessa Williamson (coau-
thor of The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism) and several members of the
Occupy Wall Street movement, we constructed externality profiles intended to represent the
views of each group. In the first case the numbers assigned reflect the enthusiasm in this
movement for private enterprise, skepticism of the contribution of cultural and intellectual
elites and hostility to lawyers. The second position represents fierce hostility to finance and
other aspects of private markets typically denigrated by the left, sympathy for legal and
cultural elites’ value and enthusiasm for education. All of these calibrations are represented
in Table 3.2 and in Figure 3.4, which shows what the per capita social product of various
industries (from talented individuals) are under different calibrations. The latter provides a
sense for the implications of these profiles for which sectors of the economy contribute most
to aggregate output.
92
Figure 3.4: Social Product in Different Professions
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Notes: Per capita annual social product (private product times one plus externality share) from a skilled worker
in each profession, under different externality share assumptions.
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Our second approach was to make an applet available online at taxapplet.appspot.com
that allows readers to input their own views and receive a calibrated optimal tax policy
for these views. Once sufficient data have accumulated we will attempt to analyze these
patterns and their implications.
3.3.3 Results
Employing the results from Section 3.2.2, the optimal marginal tax rate at income y under
ATEM is
(T?)′(y) = −e(y)− ye′(y). (3.5)
and under MTEM is
(T?)′(y) = −∑p sp fp(y)ep
∑p sp fp(y)
≡ −e(y). (3.6)
To correctly compute MTEM would require elasticities of labor supply at each income
because rises in marginal tax rates will compress downwards and falls in marginal tax rates
will stretch upwards the incomes earned by individuals with various average externalities.
While this would not change rate schedules ordinally, it would compress the MTEM schedule
across the income distribution. In the interest of comparability with ATEM, here we present
the limiting case as the intensive labor supply elasticity becomes small. In this case MTEM
can be computed analogously to ATEM by simply calculating the average externality at
each income level and matching this to the marginal tax rate. This may also be interpreted
as the direction rates should move locally beginning at current the income tax structure that
induces the current by-profession income distribution. We therefore focus on this limiting
case here and defer allowing a more serious consideration of labor supply elasticity until
the structural model in Section 3.5.
The ATEM and MTEM policies calculated in this manner under the externality shares in
Table 3.2 are shown in Figure 3.5. The first thing to note is that ATEM yields qualitatively
and often quantitatively similar results to MTEM except that 1) ATEM tends to be more
extreme in both directions than is MTEM for the reasons discussed above and 2) ATEM
“leads” MTEM in the sense that if MTEM rates are rising (falling) in income ATEM rises first.
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Figure 3.5: ATEM and MTEM marginal tax rates
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Notes: ATEM and MTEM marginal tax rates as a function of income plotted on a logarithmic scale for our
four externality share profile calibrations.
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Recall that under our assumptions MTEM is also (up to an additive constant) equal to the
average tax rates under ATEM. The other properties depend critically on the assumptions
about externality shares employed, and thus the ATEM and MTEM policies, while looking
similar given an externality profile, look radically different under the various profiles
discussed above.
We begin by discussing the externality profiles from the literature. The resulting tax
schedules are effectively identical up until upper middle incomes of about $100k. Until that
point, both call for massive subsidies on reaching the middle class, as the middle class hosts
very positive externality professions such as Academia/Science, Computers/Engineering
and Teaching while neutral or negative professions (Arts/Entertainment and Management)
predominate below this. To undo these subsidies marginal rates are significantly positive
(up to 50-60%) in the upper middle income range ($50-150k). Above upper middle incomes
the two schedules diverge. If Management has significant negative externalities as in the
anti mgmt profile on the top right, these marginal rates of about 40% persist at high incomes,
as in the Occupy Wall Street profile. If Management has no externalities, as in the pro
mgmt profile on the top left, marginal rates decline to 0-5% at high incomes. Under the
alternative Finance calibration, in which Finance accounts for a much larger share of top
earners, marginal tax rates are close to 40% at the top even under the pro mgmt externality
profile (see Appendix C.1).
Now we consider the profiles that match public views as they have intuitive (perhaps
even predictable) consequences for optimal policy. First, consider the Tea Party profile.
Marginal rates are slightly negative under both MTEM and ATEM after about $200k. ATEM
marginal rates dip negative, to a maximum of about -.1, between $150k and $300k, but are
otherwise very close to zero. This is driven by the fact that we assume Tea Partiers perceive
positive externalities from business and finance which account for most of upper incomes
and that their presence at lower incomes is offset by the presence of academics and lawyers.
Second, consider the Occupy Wall Street profile. Under ATEM marginal rates are fairly
negative (ranging from 0 to -.6) for lower and middle class individuals. They then become
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and stay quite high, peaking around .5, for upper-middle and upper income individuals
earning above approximately $75k. MTEM is a less dramatic version of a similar story. Rates
are modestly negative until roughly $75k and then rise at a more moderate pace to level
out around .45 for incomes in the top .1%. This is driven overwhelmingly by the negative
externalities we assume Occupiers perceive managers and financiers.
3.4 Discussion
For clarity and brevity above we developed our theory with limited reference to external
concepts. However, our theory is closely related to, and has implications for, several other
literatures that we now discuss.
3.4.1 Allocation of talent
Baumol (1990) and Murphy et al. (1991) emphasize the importance of the allocation of talent
for long-run growth and provide arguments and data that are the basis of some of our
calibrations of externality shares. While a considerable literature builds on this analysis,
little work has discussed policy tools that might be used to improve the allocation of talent.
For example, Acemoglu (1995) discusses long-term cultural factors and the possibility of
multiple equilibria and path dependency, but does not highlight policy tools that may be
used to shift equilibria.
To get a rough sense of the importance of the allocation of talent that our taxes aim
to address, consider the Goldin et al. data. Using our pro mgmt externality shares,
we computed the (2005) income-weighted average externality share in the subset of the
Goldin et al. data (about 80-85% depending on cohorts) who pursued careers in one of
our professions.8 This average externality share fell from .31 to -.07 between the 1969-
8We only have average income data for this calculation in all professions for the later cohort. For the earlier
cohort we have only Academia/Science, Management, Finance, Doctor and Law. For all of these fields except
for Finance (where incomes were almost twice as high for the later cohort) incomes were very similar between
the two cohorts, which is unsurprising given that they were measured in the same year. As a result, for the
other professions that we did not have earlier-cohort earnings data we assumed the earlier cohort had the same
earnings as the later cohort.
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1972 cohorts and the 1989-92 cohorts. Suppose that this shift took place for all of our
talented individuals, who capture about 43% of income.9 This shift would then imply a
.38 · .43 · 100 ≈ 16.3% of GDP shift in national income in some combination of reducing
aggregate production and increasing the private returns of those at the top. If all were the
latter (private returns rose and aggregate production stayed constant) this would account for
all of the increase in the share of national income earned by the top 5% between its trough
in the late 1960s and 1970s and its peak in 2008. If all were reduction in social product, it
would account for around a .69% reduction in GDP growth each year for 25 years, nearly
half of the 1.5 percentage point approximate reduction in US GDP growth between between
the period 1948-1973 and 1982-2007. Thus, even adopting the conservative stance of ignoring
the continuing shift of talent during the period 1992-2005, it is plausible that a large fraction
of increased inequality and decreased growth is attributable to shifts in the allocation of
talent. Of course not all of the reduction in aggregate product would necessarily have shown
up in GDP, as much was a reduction in academic research and innovation (such as medical
innovation) that is poorly-counted in GDP figures, as Murphy and Topel (2006) highlight.
Nonetheless, it seems plausible that the changes in the allocation of talent during this period
alone had large aggregate and distributive consequences for welfare, on the same order of
magnitude as the widely discussed shifts observed in aggregate statistics.
3.4.2 Labor supply elasticity debate
An important recent controversy in public finance concerns the elasticity of labor supply.
One literature, surveyed by Saez et al. (2012), highlights that the short-term elasticities of
labor supply and taxable income that can be measured through natural experiments are low
(on the order of .1− .5 for high income earners) and largely driven by welfare-irrelevant
evasion or inter-temporal substitution. A second literature, surveyed by Keane (2011) and
9It seems likely that that the shift among Harvard alumni was more extreme than in the rest of the
population. However, it also seems likely that the shift among these students was greater by the mid-2000’s
than it was by 1989-92, and greater from the mid-1950’s than it was since the late 60’s. Here we assume that
these two effects balance.
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Keane and Rogerson (2012), argues that this evidence is consistent with large long-term
elasticities of labor supply that would not appear in short-term estimates and that such large
long-term elasticities also help rationalize international data. The first literature concludes
that the deadweight loss from taxation is small due to low labor supply elasticities and
argues for highly redistributive tax policy; the second literature argues that taxes are highly
distortionary.
Our work offers a third view. On the one hand, our calibration of career-switching
elasticities is largely consistent with Keane and Rogerson arguments for high (perhaps even
higher than they claim) long-term labor-supply elasticities among talented and wealthy
individuals. On the other, it suggests that high long-term elasticities (interpreted as career-
switching elasticities) need not imply lower optimal marginal tax rates. In fact, they
may make optimal marginal rates higher over many ranges if high marginal rates are
implemented for efficiency rather than equity reasons.
Thus it emphasizes that the externalities of various professions, rather than the elasticities
of labor supply, may be the primary determinants of optimal income taxation. If external-
ities are small or more positive at higher incomes, given our calibrated career-switching
elasticities, optimal tax rates are likely to be low even with a standard redistributive motive
as we discuss further in Subsection 3.5.3. On the other hand, if externalities are large and
more negative at higher incomes, optimal tax rates on the wealthy are likely to be very high,
increasing in the long-term elasticity and not very sensitive to redistributive motives.
The relative empirical attention these two sets of parameters have received seems
disproportionately-weighted towards labor supply elasticities. Thousands of papers, a
few hundred of which are surveyed in the papers discussed above, have been devoted to
measuring the elasticity of labor supply and of taxable income more broadly. On the other
hand, the few papers we use to generate our literature-based externality profiles represent,
to our knowledge, the extent of research on industry-specific externalities. Our theory
suggests this topic deserves more attention in future research.
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3.4.3 Debates on taxation outside neoclassical economics
Public debate over tax policy rarely focuses on the parameters emphasized in optimal tax
theory (viz. the degree of inequality or the responsiveness of work to taxes). Instead, as
Mankiw (2010) notes, much rhetoric instead focuses on whether the rich “deserve” the
wealth they have accumulated. The left attempts to delegitimize the wealth of the rich
(claiming it is misbegotten or crooked) and of the right to hold the wealthy up as job creators
and entrepreneurs. Some simple public opinion data (Parker, 2012) is suggestive here. While
55% of Republicans believed the rich were more likely than others to be hardworking and
18% believed they were more likely to be honest, only 33% and 8% of Democrats agreed on
each count respectively. On the other hand only 42% of Republicans believe the rich are
more likely than others to be greedy, while 65% of Democrats do. According to a Quinnipiac
University poll (Brown, 2011), Republicans believe 59% to 28% that public sector workers
are overpaid while Democrats believe 38% to 31% that they are underpaid. A CNN poll
CNN/ORC (2011) found that while an equal number of Tea Party supporters had “a great
deal” or “some” confidence that Wall Street Bankers acted in the interests of the overall
economy as had no confidence at all, 73% of opponents of the Tea Party had no confidence
while only 13% had some or a great deal of confidence. Similarly while Tea Party supporters
only believe 58% to 40% that these bankers are overpaid and believe 50% to 47% that the
bankers are not dishonest, Tea Party opponents believe 89% to 10% that they are overpaid
and 75% to 23% that they are dishonest.
These opinion patterns are not new: in the nineteenth century reformers accused
the wealthy of being “robber barons” and Marx (1867) accused the wealthy not of being
unresponsive to tax rates but of being unproductive exploiters of the truly productive
working class. Literature on the political right, such as Rand (1957), provide hagiographic
representations of the social contributions of the wealthy rather than depictions of their
willingness to shirk if taxes rise. In fact that book is largely devoted to the unwillingness
of the rich to shirk even when they are nearly enslaved, a setting that would under the
Mirrlees theory be ripe for a high tax rate.
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Our theory provides a natural, formal, quantitative language for these debates which fit
only unnaturally with the Mirrlees framework. In so doing, data can be brought more easily
to bear; disputes become questions of which professions exactly are claimed by different
sides to have different degrees of externalities and which professions in fact earn which
incomes. Such questions should be easier to settle empirically than are broad and vague
claims about the moral worth of different social groups. At the very least it suggests that
if economics wants to speak to these public debates it should focus more attention on the
extent and degree of these externalities.
3.4.4 Closely related literature
The work most closely related to ours is that of Philippon (2010), Rothschild and Scheuer
(2014a) and Rothschild and Scheuer (2014b).10 All three papers investigate public policies
aimed at reallocating talent. Philippon considers the use of taxation to affect the allocation
of talent between a financial and entrepreneurial sector in a model where financiers serve as
conduits for funding of research and entrepreneurship. By contrast, externalities are directly
imputed (rather than arising endogenously) in our framework and we consider many
professions simultaneously. Furthermore Philippon focuses on sector-specific instruments
rather than horizontally equitable policies.
Rothschild and Scheuer are closer to our work in this dimension, considering horizontally
equitable optimal tax policy. Our papers focus on different aspects and approaches to this
problem. In Rothschild and Scheuer (2014a) they restrict attention to two professions (one
with negative externalities and one with none), but in both papers allow for richer targeting
of externalities: in their model, rather than externalities accruing uniformly across the
population they may be targeted either at individuals within the “rent-seeking” sector or
towards individuals in the productive sector. In that paper, like Philippon, they emphasize
the perhaps counter-intuitive theoretical finding that it may be theoretically optimal for
10The original version of the paper that this draft was based on, “Psychic Income, Taxation and the Allocation
of Talent”, was written prior to the publication of the first paper and a draft of the second. However we have no
reason to believe the authors of either paper were aware of that work.
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policy to (implicitly or explicitly) subsidize the unproductive wealthy, in their case because
the negative externalities within the unproductive sector discourages further wasteful entry
into this sector. In Rothschild and Scheuer (2014b), they consider a far more general case
that nests our analysis as a special case and provide general formulae for optimal taxation,
as well as qualitative, directional results and uncalibrated empirical sufficient statistics in
some special cases that do not nest our model, such as a model with only one profession
generating an externality.
By contrast our emphasis is quantitative: our goal is to determine how the magnitude of
optimal taxes varies with assumptions about externalities, allowing for the many professions
that make up real-world top income distributions and for positive as well as negative exter-
nalities.11 Given the lack of empirical information we have on the targeting of externalities,
this requires us, among other restrictions, to either ignore the effects highlighted by Philip-
pon and Rothschild and Scheuer or to treat targeting as another subjective input. We chose
the former course because we believe that assuming externalities are born evenly across the
economy is a reasonable benchmark. For example, while it is true that arbitrage activity
may reduce the returns to some financiers, more high speed traders require other investors
to make greater investments to avoid being front-run, thereby hiring more financiers. The
legal profession hosts similar arms races. Most of the positive externalities of academic work
and teaching are born broadly by the public and not by any particular sector. Furthermore,
the dramatic rise of the financial sector in the United States over the last thirty years as
documented by Philippon and Reshef (2012), Goldin et al. (2013) and Philippon (2013) seems
to belie the equilibrating forces Philippon (2010), Rothschild and Scheuer emphasize. Thus
we adopt what Rothschild and Scheuer call the “naïvely Pigouvian” perspective that wages,
externalities and entry into professions are independent. An interesting extension of our
work and theirs would be to incorporate the targeting emphasized by their work into a
11As a result of these contrasting goals, we take a very different methodological approach to Rothschild and
Scheuer as well. For example, we use the taxation principle in the spirit of Saez (2001) rather than the revelation
principle of Mirrlees (1971). Similarly we make assumptions (about substitution patterns across professions)
that are convenient for calibration to the data we have available, rather than for illustrating possibilities.
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quantitative, calibrated framework such as ours.
3.5 Structural Model with General Ability
In Section 3.2 we developed an intuitive characterization of optimal implicit Pigouvian
taxation of income under a stark set of assumptions. In this section we discuss the robustness
of the results to adding realistic features to the model using a combination of analytical
and computational techniques. While our characterization is less clean in these cases,
our qualitative results are actually strengthened, and we are able to evaluate our analysis
quantitatively in greater depth.
The model in Subsections 3.2.2 and 3.3.3 assumes a strong form of orthogonality between
elasticities and externalities conditional on income level. One natural scenario in which
this would be violated (along the career-switching margin) is if each individual possesses a
general level of ability which determines her wage in all professions. In this case, individuals
systematically shift from professions with high average earnings to those with low average
earnings when taxes rise. For example, an academic making a million dollars a year—near
the top of the distribution in that industry—would earn far more in finance; she is just
exceptionally talented. A marginal tax rate increase at any point between these two salaries
would only reduce the relative attractiveness of finance (and a marginal tax rate increase
outside of this range would not change the relative attractiveness of the professions at all).
On the other hand, a financier earning a million dollars a year—much lower in the finance
salary distribution—is not so exceptionally talented, and would face a much lower income
in academia. Therefore a marginal tax rate increase between between these two salary levels
would render academia relatively more attractive—potentially inducing the financier to
become a professor. Intuitively, both individuals face the same ranking of wages in the
two professions, and thus marginal tax rates are likely to cause only switches down from
generally high-paying to generally low-paying professions, not the reverse.12
12The same scenario is also likely to imply differential intensive elasticities of hours supply conditional on
income. An academic making a million dollars a year is likely to be working many more effective hours than is
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While few simple analytical results may be obtained in general when we depart from this
story, under a stark simplification of the general ability model a natural result is possible. In
particular, suppose that ability is fully portable across careers in the sense that individuals
switch between the same quantile of an underlying “reference distribution” of profession-
conditional income when they switch, that there are exactly two professions and that
the profession-contingent income in these two are strictly ranked by first-order stochastic
dominance. Then marginal tax rates will always be more sensitive to externalities than those
given by ATEM in the sense that, starting at ATEM tax rates, there is a first-order welfare
gain from raising marginal tax rates at every point if the high-paying profession has more
negative externalities and a first-order gain from lowering them if the high-paying profession
has more positive externalities. We state and prove this result formally in Appendix C.3
and focus here on a computational structural model of many professions incorporating this
feature.
3.5.1 Calibration
To formalize the general ability idea, suppose that every individual i is endowed with a
uniformly distributed general ability ai ∈ [0, 1]. She also receives a vector of non-pecuniary
total costs of work in each profession φi forming a type θi = (ai,φi). Individual i earns
wage G−1p (ai) in profession p, where Gp is a “reference distribution” of wages in profession
p. Additionally, in order to calibrate a full structural model we
1. Assume away or impose a uniform value from the literature for intensive elasticities,
2. Impose the common logistic functional form on non-pecuniary utilities,
an financier earning that salary both because her wage in finance is likely to be lower (and thus, to be earning
the same income, she must be working harder) and because her non-pecuniary cost of work is likely to be
lower. She is therefore likely to be pressing herself to the limit of her exertions and thus to be much less elastic
to an increase in her monetary compensation than is the financier. Thus one should expect individuals in a
high-paying profession to be more elastic, conditional on income, to compensation than are those earning the
same income in a generally low-paying profession. In a previous draft of the paper we had a formal result to
this effect. However, because our focus is not on the intensive margin we have omitted this result.
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3. Calibrate the free parameter of this distribution to the career-switching elasticity
estimated in Section 3.3 above,
4. Then jointly estimate the mean utilities of different professions and a non-parametric
reference income distribution to match the shares choosing professions and the profes-
sion specific income distributions as estimated in Section 3.3.1.
We then show, as suggested by the results above, that the results of our simple model in
Section 3.3.3 are generally strengthened in this more realistic setting. We now discuss these
steps; they are described in technical detail in Appendices C.3 and C.4.
Each individual is endowed with a fully-portable, general ability ai ∈ (0, 1) that would
entitle her to pecuniary income from that quantile of the reference income distribution in
each profession. Each profession has a mean non-pecuniary income and each individual
has, in addition to this an independently and identically distributed (across professions and
individuals) Type I Extreme Value component of her non-pecuniary income in each profes-
sion. The scale parameter of these idiosyncratic draws, β(ai), determines how responsive
individuals are to changes in the attractiveness of different professions. β(ai) is assumed to
be proportional to the mean income that an individual of ability ai would earn under, before
taxes, across all professions she might choose. This assumption loosely reflects the fact that
individuals who earn higher incomes are likely to put relatively more (dollar) value on the
non-pecuniary benefits of their professional choice, as otherwise we would systematically
conclude that high-ability individuals uniformly sort into the highest paying professions
while lower-ability individuals make more diverse choices. In any case we have checked that
our results are not quantitatively significantly sensitive to several alternative specifications
of β(ai), including it being constant.
To calibrate the β, we need a measure of mobility across professions in response to
relative income shocks. Intuitively, if β is large, allocation across professions is primarily
driven by individual idiosyncrasies and thus there will be little individual response to
changes in the relative wages of different professions and conversely if β is small. To
estimate β, we use the elasticity of individuals entering the finance profession in response
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to changes in relative wages discussed at the end of Subsection 3.2.2 above; see Appendix
C.4 for details. As a baseline we use the assumption that the migration of individuals into
finance between the 69-72 and 89-92 Harvard cohorts respectively was driven by a $150k
change in relative wages in 2005 dollars. This is sufficient to calculate the value of β as it is
a scalar. We then check robustness to using an increase of either $75k or $300k in Appendix
C.6. We show that our qualitative results are robust to this assumption, but the larger the
elasticity (i.e., the lower the assumed income change that induced the migration), the larger
are the welfare impacts and the importance of externalities.
Finally, we jointly recover the mean psychic income and reference income distributions
so as to exactly rationalize a discrete grid of the observed distribution of individuals across
professions and of income conditional on professions estimated in Subsection 3.3.1. We do
this using a numerical non-linear equation solver as described in Appendix C.4.
The resulting reference income distributions are shown in Figure 3.6. These indicate
the salary that an individual from a given quantile of the ability distribution would earn
in each profession, and correspond closely to intuition. Above median ability, Finance and
Management are essentially tied for the most lucrative career. Below median ability Doctors,
and at the very bottom Sales, do better. This corresponds to the common intuition that
being a doctor or “mad man” is a less risky career path than finance and management
are. Arts/Entertainment is the worst paying profession except at the top, where it is quite
lucrative, exhibiting the well-known superstar structure of that profession (Rosen, 1981).
Teaching and, to a lesser extent, Academia are also quite low-paying, while Law and Sales
are on the more lucrative side, with Law having greater inequality than Sales. Interestingly
Consulting is the most unequal profession, scoring near the top among the very able
but second to last at the bottom of the income distribution. Given that these results are
qualitatively similar to the equilibrium, observed income distributions of Subsection 3.3.1 to
which they are matched, we found in a previous draft very similar results if the empirical
distributions are simply used directly.
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Figure 3.6: Reference Income Distributions
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Notes: Reference income distributions by percentile in the various professions, the income that an individual in
that quantile of the ability distribution would earn if she worked in the relevant profession.
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We also estimate the income distribution of the US working population outside of the
talented individuals considered above. We denote this group “unskilled”. Because we will
assume that the externality of this group is 0, its income distribution was not necessary to
compute the optimal tax schedule given by equations 3.5 and 3.6. We compute its population
share as the residual of the other shares, and we calibrate its Pareto-lognormal parameters
so that the total income distribution (across all professions) matches three moments: the
mean population income, and the 99th and 99.9th income quantiles.13
3.5.2 Optimal tax rates
This model obviously has many limitations: ability is fully portable, disallowing comparative
advantage which empirical evidence suggests is clearly important (Kirkebøen et al., 2014);
substitution patterns across professions obey the implausible independence of irrelevant
alternatives assumption; there are no intensive elasticities, etc. Perhaps worst of all, exactly
how these assumptions impact our results is far from transparent. A more realistic model of
any of these features would require much more detailed data than we have access to. Here
our goal is to provide an example model with more than two professions where under the
general ability assumption we obtain a result in the spirit of that demonstrated in general
in the simpler case: that optimal marginal rates tend to be more responsive to externality
profile assumptions than in our baseline ATEM analysis.
To do this, we searched computationally for optimal piecewise-constant marginal rates
with a zero marginal rate applying on income from $0 to $25k and optimal rates estimated
for $25k-$50k, $50k-$100k, $100k-200k, $200k-500k and $500k and above brackets.14 We
focused on these piecewise structures both because they are realistic and because they
13In principle, we could non-parametrically estimate the “unskilled” income distribution by subtracting the
estimated CDFs of the skilled occupations from the the IRS empirical distribution of income. The problem is
that “unskilled” is not constrained to look like a Pareto log-normal at the while the other occupations are. As a
result, “unskilled” picks up all the mass at the (above $10,000,000), which seems implausible. Thus we also
estimate “unskilled” as a Pareto log-normal.
14Given the minuscule share of skilled agents earning less than $25k, the marginal tax rate between $0 and
$25k is approximately collinear with the budget balancing demogrant and generating a multiplicity of optima;
we avoid this issue by constraining the lowest marginal tax rate to zero.
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Figure 3.7: Optimal Tax Rates in Structural Model
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Notes: Computational optimal piece-wise-constant marginal tax rates for a six-bracket tax system ([0, 25k),
[25k, 50k), [50k, 100k), [100k, 200k), [200k, 500k) and [500k,∞)) in our computational general ability model
for the listed externality profiles.
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significantly reduce the computational costs of searching for an optimum compared with
a fully non-linear setting given the absence of a closed-form expression for the optimum.
To avoid incentives for money burning we introduced a very small, uniform intensive
labor-supply elasticity of .01. Instead simply bounding rates between -100% and 100% yield
similar results, but ones that commonly hit the boundary.
These are pictured in Figure 3.7. The results are qualitatively similar to those we obtain
in Subsection 3.3.3, but with smaller subsidies to the middle class in the Literature and
Occupy Wall Street profiles, and more extreme marginal tax rates at high incomes. The Tea
Party profile in the bottom-left panel of Figure 3.7 as in Subsection 3.3.3 lead to negative
marginal rates (except on the lower middle class), but here they are much more negative
than before, reaching around -75% rather than -10% for the top bracket and being nearly
-50% starting as low as $100k.
Occupy Wall Street and both Literature profiles call for extremely progressive tax regimes.
Occupy, in the bottom-right panel, calls quite high marginal tax rates beginning at $50k at
around 40% and rising to near confiscatory levels at $100k and above.
The literature-based calibrations, in the top row are similar except being even more
confiscatory for the wealthy and supporting a subsidy for the middle class. However these
are modest compared to those called for under ATEM in Section 3.3.3, since such subsidies
are only useful in inducing employees in lower paying professions (which tend neutral
externalities, such as art) to switch to middle-class incomes. Since these potential switchers
do not create substantial negative externalities, and would not be terribly productive in
the positive-externality producing professions in the middle class, large subsidies are not
worth even the very small distortion under a labor supply elasticity of 0.01. This provides
suggestive evidence that the effects discussed analytically at the beginning of this section
above may be quantitatively important and thus that our main results from Subsection
3.3.3 may significantly understate how widely optimal marginal rates vary as a function of
externality shares, except in the case of marginal subsidies to join the middle class.
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3.5.3 Quantitative importance of elasticities vs. externalities
We now seek to compare the quantitative importance of externalities relative to the labor
supply elasticity, which has been the focus of the traditional optimal tax literature following
Mirrlees (1971). To do this, we introduce a redistributive motive and intensive margin
labor supply elasticity into our model. We select a particular baseline case: a labor supply
elasticity of 0.25 and zero externalities, then we ask which of two variations around this
baseline causes a greater change in the optimal tax code: varying the labor supply elasticity
across a reasonable range of estimates drawn from the extensive literature estimating that
parameter, or introducing our various externality profiles. Our results suggest externalities
are at least as important as are labor supply elasticities to optimal marginal tax rates, at
least given the current plausible range of uncertainty on these.
For these results, we begin with our computational model developed in the previous
subsection. To add a redistributive motive, we follow the strategy of Diamond (1998) by
placing different social marginal welfare weights on individuals while continuing to model
their utility as quasi-linear in income. Also following Diamond, we generate these marginal
social welfare weights based on their quasi-linear utility, assuming a constant relative risk-
aversion of .95 so the marginal social welfare weights are approximately the inverse of the
relevant income.15 To introduce an intensive-margin labor supply elasticity, we set φ to take
a power form with exponent that is homogeneous across individuals so that all individuals,
regardless of hours worked, have a constant labor supply elasticity as in Saez (2001).
We then run a “horserace” over the importance of labor supply elasticity as compared
to externalities in determining optimal taxes.16 To do this, we first take a baseline model
with log-utility-based redistributive preferences, a uniform intensive labor supply elasticity
of .25 (as seems roughly consistent with the literature as surveyed by Saez et al. (2012)),
our calibrated career-switching elasticities and no externalities. Rates below $25k are again
constrained to 0%. The results for optimal taxes in this calibration are pictured in the
15For computational reasons this is more convenient than a literally logarithmic, inverse-weights analysis.
16We are grateful to Matthew Weinzierl for suggesting this analysis.
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far upper right panel of Figure 3.8. A few features of this baseline are prominent. First,
marginal rates are moderately high throughout the income distribution, ranging from a bit
under 35% to 65%. However, marginal rates decline at the top of the income distribution,
despite the fact that our calibration shares with Saez (2001) Pareto tails on the income
distribution, which usually leads to monotonically increasing marginal rates at the top. The
reason is that career-switching becomes very important at high income levels and, when it
occurs, generates a discrete drop in tax revenues, unlike the intensive margin adjustments
considered by Saez. This is qualitatively consistent with the intuitions of Keane (2011) and
Keane and Rogerson (2012) discussed in Subsection 3.4.2. Veiga and Weyl (2013) show that,
in spite of Pareto tails to income distributions, if the fraction of current income individuals
can earn by an outside option (such as career switching) is affiliated (Milgrom and Weber,
1982) to income then optimal tax rates are regressive.
We then consider two ways of varying parameters about this baseline. First, in the left
collection of panels, we add to this model the externality views of our calibrations from
Subsection 3.3.2. The combination of redistributive preferences and a moderate intensive
labor supply elasticity significantly moderate the extremity of optimal tax rates across
calibrations. However, comparing the two extremes, the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street,
optimal tax rates still differ quite dramatically. Rates under the Tea Party profile are
moderate and decline at the very top. Marginal rates run from approximately 40% on the
lower middle class up to nearly 60% on the wealthy but then fall back down to 50% on the
very wealthy. By contrast, desired taxes of the Occupy movement movement are highly
progressive up to the wealthy and plateau for the very wealthy. The optimal rates based
on the Literature profiles are quite similar to Occupy Wall Street, except that they are even
flatter at the very top under anti mgmt and decline slightly under pro mgmt. Under the
alternative finance calibration, marginal rates are monotonically increasing even for pro
mgmt (see Appendix C.1). The differences across profiles are even more striking in terms of
average tax rates, which are not shown here.
The second way we vary about the baseline model is by changing the intensive labor
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supply elasticity, between .1 and 1, a range that seems to span reasonable beliefs for the
intensive margin according to both Saez et al. (2012) and Keane (2011). At .1, rates are higher
(ranging from 50% to above 80%), but drop significantly at the top, falling from over 80% to
about 70% for the very wealthy. For an intensive elasticity of 1, rates for the middle class
are quite low (10%) and rise to around 40% at high incomes.
Which affects optimal tax rates rates more, a reasonable range of labor supply elasticities
or a plausible range of externality views given current public debates? While the average
rates move more with intensive labor supply elasticity than they do under the externality cal-
ibrations, the qualitative nonlinear structure of optimal taxes moves more with externalities
than with labor supply elasticities. In particular, marginal tax rates decline notably at the
top under Tea Party views and plateau under the Literature and Occupy Wall Street profiles,
while they decline moderately for each of the intensive labor supply elasticities. Therefore,
over reasonable ranges of public debate, externalities may have approximately as large an
impact on the level and perhaps an even larger impact on the structure of optimal taxes as
plausible views about labor supply elasticities. This reinforces our argument in Subsection
3.4.2 that these externalities merit much closer attention in empirical work relative to the
large literature devoted to labor supply elasticities.
3.5.4 Quantitative welfare gains
For our final computational exercise, we analyze the welfare gains from optimal policy as
compared to the laissez-faire regime with zero marginal tax rates everywhere under various
externality calibrations and compare these to the welfare gains that could be achieved if
profession-specific optimal taxation were possible. We consider this question under the
model of Subsection 3.5.2 above which features no intensive elasticity or redistributive
motive. In addition to reporting the impact on social welfare we also consider the impact on
aggregate pecuniary income (viz. GDP), which excludes changes in psychic income.
As with all other results, our results here, which appear in Table 3.3, differ markedly
depending on the externality profile used. Welfare gains relative to laissez-faire from the first-
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Table 3.3: Welfare Gains
Gains from 1st best in
Social Welfare (GDP)
Gains from
2nd best
Share of potential
from 2nd best
Literature (pro mgmt) 17% (32%) 1.5% (-.15%) 8.8% (-.45%)
Literature (anti mgmt) 21% (39%) 3.3% (1.8%) 16% (4.8%)
Tea Party 1.1% (4.3%) .56% (3.7%) 49% (85%)
Occupy Wall Street 4.1% (5.3%) 1.7% (-.071%) 42% (-1.3%)
Notes: Quantitative welfare gain, compared to laissez-faire (zero marginal tax rates everywhere) in our
baseline computational model from optimal non-linear taxation (2nd best) and optimal profession-specific
taxation under various calibrations.
best, profession-specific taxation optimum are largest under the profiles from the literature
as the externalities are most extreme there; they are smallest under the Tea Party’s views
because these have the smallest externalities. The first thing to note is that the numbers are
quite large. Gains from moving to the first-best are around 20% of social welfare and 30-40%
of GDP under the literature calibrations.
Furthermore, we have restricted this model so all gains come only from career switches,
which occur among the less than 4% of the population we label talented. The private
product of these individuals is 43% of GDP. Thus, under these views, the reallocation of
these individuals across professions induced by first-best, profession-specific taxation could
nearly double the output from these individuals. Theses gains are one to two orders of
magnitude larger than those accruing from capital taxation in a dynamic optimal income
taxation model according to the baseline calibration of Farhi and Werning (2012), a topic that
has attracted far greater attention in the literature than have the externalities we consider.
Gains under the Occupy views are still large, but more modest; they are fairly small
under the Tea Party views.
The fraction of the first-best gains from optimal, profession-specific taxation achieved
by the second-best optimal horizontally equitable non-linear tax is quite small under the
literature views. 9-16% of welfare gains are achieved and GDP actually falls under the
pro mgmt views because individuals migrate towards more rewarding careers at the cost
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of reduced output, even including externalities. Under the anti mgmt literature views,
GDP increases by about 2% in the second-best, which is about 5% of the GDP gains under
the first-best. These gains are a very low fraction of the first-best because there is so
much heterogeneity of externalities conditional on income for these externality profiles. In
Appendix C.7 we show that while under the first-best 95% of talented individuals go into
Academia/Science under the second-best they increase their presence in Academia/Science
only moderately (from 10.6% to 15.6%), while distributing themselves more uniformly
among less lucrative careers than under laissez-faire. For example, the not-especially-
productive field of Arts & Entertainment more than doubles in size under second-best
policy. Under Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street profiles, by contrast, there is a much-closer
alignment between income and externalities and thus a greater fraction (40-50%) of social
welfare gains from the first-best are achieved at the second-best.
3.5.5 Effects of the Reagan tax reforms
In the previous section we considered the impact of optimal (first- or second-best) tax
reforms relative to laissez-faire. These are abstract exercises in the sense that they do not
correspond to plausible ranges of policy reforms enacted or considered in the United States.
Therefore, in this section, we consider in the context of our model the impact of a policy
reform that actually occurred: the Reagan tax reforms that transformed the US income tax
system from 1980-1990.
To do so we use The Tax Foundation (2013)’s history of US federal income tax brackets.
While these are obviously an imperfect approximation to the full wedge faced by each
income, we believe they provide a reasonable sense of the change in these wedges over the
1980-1990 period. We compare results predicted by our model under these two tax regimes
along four dimensions: the allocation of talent, social welfare, GDP and top income shares.
First consider the impact of the reforms on the allocation of talent, as shown in Ta-
ble 3.4. In relative terms the largest impacts were to move talented individuals out of
Arts/Entertainment, Teaching, Consulting and Academia/Science into Finance and Man-
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Figure 3.8: Horserace between elasticities and externalities
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Notes: A “horserace” between the importance of labor supply elasticities and externalities in determining
optimal taxes. The left set of panels hold fixed redistributive motives at log-utility with an intensive labor
supply elasticity of .25 and our calibrated career-switching patters, but allow externalities to vary across
our calibrations. The right set of panels hold externalities fixed at 0 and other features fixed as in the other
calibrations, but allow the intensive margin of labor supply elasticity to vary from .1 to 1.
Table 3.4: Reallocation of Talent from Reagan Tax Reforms
Pre-Reagan Post-Reagan Absolute Change Relative Change
Law 6.6% 6.4% -.2% - 3.2%
Finance 5.1% 6.0% .9% 18%
Management 22% 25% 3.0% 14%
Doctor 16% 17% 1.4% 6.3%
Academia/Science 14% 12% -1.5% -11%
Computers/Engineering 12% 11% -.9% -3.2%
Sales 13% 13% -.2% -1.7%
Consulting 2.4% 2.0% -.4% -17%
Arts/Entertainment 3.9% 3.0% -.9% -23%
Teaching 5.8% 4.7% -1.1% -19%
Notes: Estimates from our baseline calibrated structural model of the effects of the Reagan tax reforms and the
allocation of talent.
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agement by 10-25% of the pre-reform magnitudes in these fields. In absolute terms the
largest reallocations were from Academia/Science and Teaching into Management, Doctor
and Finance.
Thus in our model the Reagan tax reforms significantly shift individuals from low-paying
towards high-paying occupations. Under our calibrations based on the literature, especially
the anti mgmt calibration, this causes a significant reduction in welfare. Under pro mgmt
welfare falls by .56% and GDP rises by .083% while under the anti mgmt calibration welfare
falls by 1.3% and GDP by .77%. In either case these “supply side” tax cuts leave GDP
essentially unchanged or lower it, compared to the results under the Tea Party calibration
where GDP rises by 2.1% as a result of the reforms.
Perhaps most interesting is the impact of the reforms on top income shares. As Hacker
and Pierson (2010) summarize, many economists have argued that, while the Reagan reforms
may have increased post-tax income inequality, it is unclear how they could have been
responsible for the large rises in pre-tax income inequality in the past 35 years documented
by Piketty and Saez (2003). Our analysis provides a clear mechanism for this: lower taxes
cause substitution between psychic and pecuniary income, leading both to an increase in
the earnings of the very talented and, at least under the calibrations from the literature, a
reduction in net positive spillovers to other income groups. Both factors tend to increase the
relative pecuniary income of the very wealthy.
To measure the size of this effect, we compute the increase in income share accruing
to the top 1% of the population in our model, before and after the Reagan reforms. We
compare this to the corresponding increase in income for skilled professions in Bakija
et al. (2012), which is broadly consistent with the patterns documented by Piketty and
Saez, though muted by the exclusion of capital gains and earnings in other professions.
According to Bakija et al, the share of total income received by members of our skilled
professions in the top 1% of the population income distribution rose 3.9 percentage points
from 1979 to 1993 and 1.4 more percentage points by 1998. In our model the Reagan reforms
cause a .8 percentage point rise in the same figure. Thus, according to our model, the
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Reagan reforms would account for 21% of the rise in the pre-tax share of the top 1% among
talented individuals from 1979 to 1993 and 15% of the rise through 1998. As with our other
quantitative findings, these results are far stronger (about 2-2.5 times as large) under our
alternative calibration of the share of talented individuals in Finance, based on fitting more
closely the Harvard data, as discussed in Appendix C.1.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper proposes an alternative framework for the optimal taxation of top incomes to the
standard redistributive theory of Vickrey (1945) and Mirrlees (1971). Income taxation acts as
an implicit Pigouvian tax that is used to reallocate talented individuals from professions
that cause negative externalities to those that cause positive externalities. Optimal tax rates
are highly sensitive to these externalities. If they are as large as our reading of the literature
suggests, the worsening allocation of talent in the United States is large enough to account
for all of the increase in inequality or nearly half of the fall in growth between the 1948-1973
period and the 1982-2007 period.
Our results and the assumptions driving them naturally suggest several directions for
future research.
First, we assumed that externalities are homogeneous within a profession. However, in
reality, externalities are highly heterogeneous within professions. As Mankiw and Whinston
(1986) emphasize, entrepreneurial firm formation may be excessively supplied if firms are
simply imitating the products of existing firms just as Hirshleifer (1971) emphasized that
high-speed trading is over-supplied, while Posner and Weyl (2013) show that long-term
price discovery of large bubbles is just as likely to be undersupplied as are innovative
breakthroughs. Thus many of the largest gains may come from reallocations within a
profession between productive and unproductive activities. Uniform income taxation is
unlikely to be a sufficient tool to achieve this reallocation. Mechanisms that do are an
exciting direction for future research.
Second, while the optimality of softening incentives to promote efficient allocation of
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labor is, to our knowledge, largely unexplored in optimal tax theory, it is widely under-
stood in corporate finance and agency theory.17 In particular, Holmström and Milgrom
(1991) argue that strong material incentives for one, observable dimension of work effort
may reduce effort along unobservable dimensions to the extent that effort along the two
dimensions is substitutable. Our theory is similar, except that the substitutability arises
from the (un-modeled and empirically calibrated) correlation between income levels and the
externalities of professions. This alternative micro-foundation of their model also acts as a
basis for calibrating it empirically in a taxation context; we are not aware of any analogous
calibration of the optimal contract schedule in the original agency context in which they
proposed their model.18 If the productivity, the private payoff from and the allocation of
time to tasks could be identified within firms, the theory could be applied with data on the
allocation of time to these tasks.19
Finally, we assumed that profession-specific taxation was, for a variety of reasons, infea-
sible. However we found that, under the calibrations from the literature, the overwhelming
majority of gains possible from first-best, profession-specific taxation could not be achieved
by non-discriminatory taxation. This suggests significant welfare could be gained through
more targeted instruments and that these merit further investigation. Some of these may
even be politically plausible, such as differential subsidies to different types of education,
sector-specific output taxation or grants to support work in certain sectors such as research
and development.
17A notable exception is the work of Piketty et al. (2014), who argue that taxation may reduce effort expended
bargaining for higher compensation. While we agree with the spirit of this result and are motivated by the
macroeconomic evidence the authors present, we believe that compensation bargaining has a small elasticity
compared to career choice and a career-based theory offers a more useful basis for calibration.
18Slade (1996) tests directional comparative statics of the Holmström and Milgrom model, but does not
structurally calibrate an optimal contract As far as we know the only other paper to exploit the equivalence of
agency and tax theory to link of quantitative optimal tax work to the largely theoretical agency literature is
Prendergast (2013), albeit in the more classical context of the Vickrey insurance-incentives trade-off.
19For example, a friend of one of the authors who works at an investment bank reports that, “I spend
one-third of my time creating profits for the firm, one-third of my time ensuring I get credit for those profits and
one-third of my time ensuring that I get paid for the profits I got credit for.” Whatever the actual proportions,
presumably optimal compensation structure is highly sensitive to these proportions.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Estimation Details
A.1.1 Sequential Two-Step GMM Estimator
Let Zit denote a vector of observed variables that correspond to observation i at period t.
This vector may include lagged variables. Denote by ζ the vector of structural parameters
that we want to estimate. In our model, the parameter vector ζ corresponds to (δ, θ, σ, c1, c2).
Specifically, we use ξ to summarize the vector of wage-related housing demand parameters,
(δ, θ, σ), and γ to denote the vector of housing supply parameters (c1, c2).
We split the vector of moment functions provided by the model into a subvector that
depends only on the wage-related structural parameters ξ, f (Zit; ξ), and the remaining
subvector of moment functions that depends both on ξ and γ, v(Zit; ξ,γ). Therefore, using
the set of moment functions f (·), we can obtain GMM estimates of ξ that do not depend on
the value of γ, ξˆSEQ. Using the vector of moment functions v(·) and our estimates of ξ, we
then estimate γ in our second step, γˆSEQ. These estimates of γ will depend on the values
estimated for ξ in the first step.
We estimate ξˆSEQ by minimizing the objective function:
Q̂2(ξ) =
[
(NT)−1
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
f (Zit; ξ)
]′
Ŵ f f
[
(NT)−1
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
f (Zit; ξ)
]
.
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The weighting matrix Ŵ f f is defined as
Ŵ f f =
[
(NT)−1
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
f (Zit; ξˆ1) · f (Zit; ξˆ1)′
]−1
,
and ξˆ1 minimizes the first stage objective function
Q̂1(ξ) =
[
(NT)−1
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
f (Zit; ξ)
]′
I
[
(NT)−1
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
f (Zit; ξ)
]′
,
where I denotes the identity matrix. Given that this estimate ξˆSEQ does not depend on the
value of γ, we compute its asymptotic variance as
Var(ξˆSEQ) =
(
F̂′ξŴ
−1
f f F̂ξ
)−1
,
where Ŵ f f is defined above and F̂ξ is
F̂ξ = (NT)−1
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
∂
∂ξ
f (Zit; ξ).
Using this initial estimate of ξ, we compute an estimate of γ by minimizing the following
objective function:
Q̂2(γ; ξˆSEQ) =
[
(NT)−1
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
v(Zit;γ, ξˆ
SEQ)
]′
Ŵvv(ξˆSEQ)
[
(NT)−1
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
v(Zit;γ, ξˆ
SEQ)
]
,
where Ŵvv(ξˆSEQ) is
Ŵvv(ξˆSEQ) =
[
(NT)−1
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
v(Zit; γˆ1, ξˆ
SEQ) · v(Zit; γˆ1, ξˆSEQ)′
]−1
and γˆ1 minimizes the first stage objective function
Q̂1(γ; ξˆSEQ) =
[
(NT)−1
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
v(Zit;γ, ξˆ
SEQ)
]′
I
[
(NT)−1
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
v(Zit;γ, ξˆ
SEQ)
]′
.
The correct formula for the asymptotic variance of γˆSEQ must account for the fact that its
distribution depends not only on the random vector {Zit; ∀i, t} but also on the additional
random vector ξˆSEQ. Newey (1984) provides the correct formula for the asymptotic variance
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of the second step estimator:
Var(γˆSEQ) =
[
V̂ ′γŴ−1vv V̂γ
]−1
+ V̂−1γ V̂ξ
[
F̂ξŴ−1f f F̂
′
ξ
]−1
V̂ ′ξV̂
−1′
γ − V̂−1γ
[
V̂ξ F̂−1ξ Ŵ f v+
Ŵv f F̂−1
′
ξ V̂ ′ξ
]
V̂−1
′
γ .
Following Newey and McFadden (1994), the sequential GMM estimators belong to
the more general family of extremum estimators. This guarantees that they are consistent,
asymptotically normal, and have the asymptotic variance described above.
A.1.2 Moment Conditions
Estimation of Housing Demand Parameters
The vectorial moment condition
E[ f (W˜ i; (δ, θ, σ))] = 0
is based on the following vector of moment functions:
f (W˜ i; (δ, θ, σ)) =

τit
τit W˜
i
t−s ∀s ≥ 3
(τit )
2 − (2θ2 − 2θ + 2)σ2e
τitτ
i
t−1 − (−θ2 + 2θ − 1)σ2e
τitτ
i
t−2 − (−θ)σ2e
,
with
τit = ∆W˜
i
t − δ∆W˜ it−1 − (1− δ)wa1 = eit + (θ − 1)eit−1 − θeit−2,
and ∆W˜ it = W˜
i
t − W˜ it−1. Intuitively, one can think of the random variable τit as close to
(but not exactly) a double-difference of the productivity measure W˜. The moment function
f (W˜ i; (δ, θ, σ)) is based on the expectation, variance, and serial correlation of this double
difference, as well as its covariance with lagged values of the productivity measure W˜.
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Estimation of Housing Supply Parameters
The vectorial moment condition
E[v(W˜ i; (δ, θ, σ))] = 0
is based on the following vector of moment functions:
v(Hi, Ni, Ii; (c1, c2)) =

νit
νit N
i
t−s ∀s ≥ 1
κit
κitN
i
t−s ∀s ≥ 0
(νit)
2 − [ (φ¯+θˆ)2
(φ¯−δˆ)2 + θˆ
2]σˆ2e
(κit)
2 − [ (1+r)2(δˆ+θˆ)2
(c1)2(φ¯−δˆ)2
]
σ2e
,
with
νit = ((H
i
t − Ĥit)− δˆ(Hit−1 − Ĥit−1) +
α(1+ r)
1+ r− φ
(
(Nit − N̂it)− δˆ(Nit−1 − N̂it−1)
)
,
κit = ((I
i
t − Îit)− δˆ(Iit−1 − Îit−1) + (1− φ)
(
(Nit − N̂it)− δˆ(Nit−1 − N̂it−1)
)
.
Intuitively, one can think of the random variables ν and κ as functions of the differences
between the current values of the observable variables (H, I, N) and their steady state
values, (Ĥ, Î, N̂). The moment function v(Hi, Ni, Ii; (c1, c2)) is based on the expectation
and variance of ν and κ, as well as their covariances with lagged values of the number of
households, N.
A.1.3 Stochastic Processes Predicted by the Model
If shocks are known as they occur, then our model implies the following ARMA(2,3) process
for housing prices
∆Hit = a
i
0 + a1∆H
i
t−1 + a2∆H
i
t−2 + b0e
i
t + b1e
i
t−1 + b2e
i
t−2 + b3e
i
t−3,
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where ai0 denotes a metropolitan area effect, and the parameter vector (a1, a2, b0, b1, b2, b3)
is restricted in the following way:
a1 = φ+ δ,
a2 = −φδ,
b0 =
φ¯+ θ
φ¯− δ ,
b1 =
δ+ r(δ+ θ)− θ(δ+ φ)− φ¯(1+ δ+ φ)
φ¯− δ ,
b2 =
φφ¯− θ(1+ r + φ(φ¯− 1)) + δ(φ¯− 1− r + θ + θφ)
φ¯− δ ,
b3 = φθ.
The model also predicts an ARMA(2,1) process for the construction of new houses:
Iit = d
i
0 + d1 I
i
t−1 + d2 I
i
t−2 + e0e
i
t−1 + e1e
i
t−2,
where di0 denotes a metropolitan area effect and the parameter vector (d1, d2, e1, e2) is
restricted in the following way:
d1 = φ+ δ,
d2 = −φδ,
e0 =
(1+ r)(δ+ θ)
c1(φ¯− δ) ,
e1 = − (1+ r)(δ+ θ)c1(φ¯− δ) .
A.2 Definitions of Trend Variables
We write the housing demand equation as
Ht − E(Ht+1)1+ r −
rC
1+ r
= x + qt + xt − αNt
and the housing supply equation as
E(Ht+1) = C + c0t + c1 It + c2Nt.
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Our third equation is the relationship between city population and construction:
Nt+1 = Nt + It.
We define Hˆt, Nˆt, and Iˆt to be the unique solutions to the non-stochastic elements of these
three equations, which are linear. They are the unique solutions to
Hˆt − Hˆt+11+ r −
rC
1+ r
= x + qt− αNˆt
Hˆt+1 = C + c0t + c1 Iˆt + c2Nˆt
Nˆt+1 = Nˆt + Iˆt
and are therefore given by
Hˆt =
c22(x + r(C + x)) + α(1+ r)(c2C− c0c1)
c2(rc2 + α(1+ r))
+
(1+ r)(αc0 + qc2)(c22 + α(1+ r)(c1 − c2))
c2(rc2 + α(1+ r))2
+
(1+ r)(αc0 + qc2)
rc2 + α(1+ r)
t;
Nˆt =
rc0c1 + (1+ r)c2x
c2(rc2 + α(1+ r))
− (1+ r)(r(c1 − c2)− c2)(αc0 + qc2)
c2(rc2 + α(1+ r))2
+
q(1+ r)− rc0
rc2 + α(1+ r)
t;
Iˆt =
q(1+ r)− rc0
rc2 + α(1+ r)
.
A.3 Proofs
A.3.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Let h = H − Hˆ, n = N − Nˆ, and i = I − Iˆ, where H, N, I constitute a solution to the key
equations. We must show that limj→∞ E(ht+j) = E(nt+j) = E(it+j) = 0. Note that because
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Hˆt is linear in t,
lim
j→∞
Hˆt+j
(1+ r)j
= 0.
Therefore, the transversality condition on H guarantees that
lim
j→∞
E(ht+j)
(1+ r)j
= 0.
The three key equations reduce to
ht − E(ht+1)1+ r = xt − αnt
E(ht+1) = c1it + c2nt
nt+1 = nt + it.
Note that because E(xt+j) = δj−1E(xt+1), limj→∞ E(xt+j) = 0. We can therefore deduce from
the first key equation that
lim
j→∞
E(nt+j)
(1+ r)j
= 0. (A.1)
By combining the three key equations, we obtain the following difference equation:
(1+ r)E(xt+1) = (1+ r)(c2 − c1)E(nt) + ((1+ r)(α+ c1) + c1 − c2)E(nt+1)− c1E(nt+2)
= −c1(φL− I)(φL− I)E(nt+2).
Here L is the lag operator, I is the identity operator, and φ < φ are the two roots to the
characteristic equation
0 = −c1y2 + ((1+ r)(α+ c1) + c1 − c2)y + (1+ r)(c2 − c1).
Because limj→∞ E(xt+j) = 0, one of the following two equations must hold:
lim
j→∞
(φL− I)E(nt+j) = 0
lim
j→∞
(φL− I)E(nt+j) = 0.
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We claim only the first holds. To prove this, we show that 0 < φ < 1 < 1+ r < φ. Recall
that α > 0 and c2 < c1. Note that
φ =
(1+ r)(α+ c1) + c1 − c2 +
√
((1+ r)(α+ c1) + c1 − c2)2 − 4(1+ r)c1(c1 − c2)
2c1
>
(1+ r)(α+ c1) + c1 − c2 +
√
((1+ r)c1 + c1 − c2)2 − 4(1+ r)c1(c1 − c2)
2c1
=
(1+ r)(α+ c1) + c1 − c2 + rc1 + c2
2c1
= 1+ r +
α(1+ r)
2c1
> 1+ r.
We also have
φ+ φ =
(1+ r)(α+ c1) + c1 − c2
c1
> 0
and
φφ = (1+ r)
(
1− c2
c1
)
∈ (0, 1+ r).
Therefore 0 < φ < 1. Because of equation (A.1) and the fact that φ > 1+ r, the limit
lim
j→∞
(φL− I)E(nt+j) = 0
cannot hold. Therefore,
lim
j→∞
(φL− I)E(nt+j) = 0
holds, and because 0 < φ < 1, this limit implies the limit limj→∞ E(nt+j) = 0. The equation
nt+1 = nt + it shows that limj→∞ E(it+j) = 0, and then the equation E(ht+1) = c1it + c2nt
shows that limj→∞ E(ht+j) = 0, concluding the proof.
A.3.2 Proof of Lemma 2
We can write the difference equation for E(nt+2) as
(1+ r)E(xt+1) = −c1(φL− I)(φI − L−1)LE(nt+2) = −c1(φL− I)(φI − L−1)nt+1
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where we have used the fact that nt+1 is known at time t. Because φ > 1+ r, the operator
φI − L−1 is invertible in the space of functions obeying the transversality condition. We can
therefore simplify the above equation to
(φL− I)nt+1 = −1+ rc1 φ
−1
(I − φ−1L−1)−1E(xt+1) = − 1+ rc1(φ− δ)E(xt+1).
Therefore
it = nt+1 − nt = −(φL− I)nt+1 − (1− φ)nt = 1+ rc1(φ− δ)E(xt+1)− (1− φ)nt,
which proves the second equation of the lemma. For the first equation of the lemma, note
that
ht = xt − αnt + E(ht+1)1+ r
= xt − αnt + c11+ r it +
c2
1+ r
nt
= xt +
E(xt+1)
φ− δ +
(
c2 − (1− φ)c1
1+ r
− α
)
nt
= xt +
E(xt+1)
φ− δ −
α(1+ r)
1+ r− φnt.
The last equality comes verifying that the equality
c2 − (1− φ)c1
1+ r
− α = − α(1+ r)
1+ r− φ
follows from the polynomial defining φ.
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A.3.3 Proof of Proposition 1
We have
E(nt+j) = φjnt +
j−1
∑
k=0
φk(E(nt+j−k)− E(nt+j−k−1))
= φjnt +
1+ r
c1(φ− δ)
j−1
∑
k=0
φkE(xt+j−k)
= φjnt +
1+ r
c1(φ− δ)E(xt+1)
j−1
∑
k=0
φkδj−1−k
= φjnt +
1+ r
c1(φ− δ)
φj − δj
φ− δ E(xt+1).
Note that Nˆt+j − Nˆt = j Iˆ. Therefore
E(Nt+j − Nt) = j Iˆ + 1+ rc1(φ− δ)
φj − δj
φ− δ E(xt+1)− (1− φ
j)nt.
Next, we have
E(It+j) = E(Nt+j+1)− E(Nt+j)
= Iˆ +
1+ r
c1(φ− δ)
(
δj(1− δ)− φj(1− φ)
φ− δ
)
E(xt+1)− φj(1− φ)nt.
Finally,
E(Ht+j − Ht) = Hˆt+j − Hˆt + E(ht+j)− ht
= Hˆt+j − Hˆt + c1E(it+j−1) + c2E(nt+j)− ht,
and substituting in the previous two results, as well as the formula from Lemma 2, gives
the desired equation.
A.3.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Given the hypotheses, we have xt = et > 0 and E(xt+1) = δxt + θet = (δ+ θ)et > 0. (The
proof is symmetric when et < 0.) We also have nt = 0. Therefore, from Lemma 2, prices
and construction are both above trend levels at time t. Because c2 = 0, to show that prices
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and construction fall below trend at t + j for large j, we must by Proposition 1 show that
δj(1− δ)− φj(1− φ)
φ− δ = δ
j 1− δ− (1− φ)(φ/δ)j
φ− δ
is negative for large j. If φ > δ, then the numerator is negative for large j, while the
denominator is positive. The opposite occurs when φ < δ. In either case, the fraction is
negative for large j, which is what we wanted to show.
A.3.5 Proof of Proposition 3
From Lemma 2, we have
I0 = Iˆ +
1+ r
c1(φ− δ)δe0.
Therefore
N1 = Nˆ1 +
1+ r
c1(φ− δ)δe0.
It follows again from Lemma 2 that
I1 = Iˆ +
1+ r
c1(φ− δ)δ(e1 + δe0)− (1− φ)
1+ r
c1(φ− δ)δe0.
Recall that
Iˆ =
q(1+ r)− rc0
rc2 + α(1+ r)
.
Therefore
Cov(I0, I1) =
(
1+ r
rc2 + α(1+ r)
)2
Var(q) +
(
δ(1+ r)
c1(φ− δ)
)2
(δ+ φ− 1)Var(e0),
which is positive as long as
Var(q)
Var(e0)
> (1− δ− φ)
(
δ(rc2 + α(1+ r))
c1(φ− δ)
)2
.
Because δ > 1− φ by assumption, this inequality must hold.
We now turn to price growth. From Lemma 2, we have
H0 = Hˆ0 +
φ
φ− δe0.
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We also have
H1 = Hˆ0 +
φ
φ− δe1 +
(
φ
φ− δ −
α(1+ r)
1+ r− φ
1+ r
c1(φ− δ)
)
δe0.
To obtain H2, we first note that
N2 = N1 + I1 = Nˆ2 +
δ(1+ r)
c1(φ− δ) (e1 + (δ+ φ− 1)e0).
Therefore
H2 = Hˆ2 +
φ
φ− δe2 +
(
φ
φ− δ −
α(1+ r)
1+ r− φ
1+ r
c1(φ− δ)
)
δe1
+
(
δφ
φ− δ −
α(1+ r)
1+ r− φ
(1+ r)(φ+ δ)
c1(φ− δ)
)
δe0.
Recall that
Hˆt+1 − Hˆt = (1+ r)(αc0 + qc2)rc2 + α(1+ r) .
Much algebra produces
Cov(H2 − H1, H1 − H0) =
(
(1+ r)c2
rc2 + α(1+ r)
)2
Var(q)− Ω(
c1(φ− δ)
)2 Var(e),
where Var(e) is the common variance of e0 and e1, and Ω is given by
Ω =
(
α(1+ r)2δ
1+ r− φ + c1(1− δ)φ
)(
(1− δ− φ)α(1− r)2δ
1+ r− φ + c1(1− δ+ δ
2)φ
)
.
This expression is negative as long as
Var(q)
Var(e)
< Ω
(
rc2 + α(1+ r)
(1+ r)c1c2(φ− δ)
)2
,
which is the bound mentioned in the proposition.
A.4 Calculation of Volatilities in Table 1.1
We showed above that
(φL− I)nt+1 = − 1+ rc1(φ− δ)E(xt+1).
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It follows from decomposing nt into a linear combination of the e terms that
Std(nt) =
(1+ r)(θ + δ)
c1(φ− δ)
∞
∑
j=1
φj − δj
φ− δ σe.
This expression allows us to compute the congestion externality volatility, as it is a constant
times this expression.
The other volatility is of a sum of xt and E(xt+1), which can be written as a sum of xt
and et. The variance of x is obtained from taking the recursive equation
xt = δxt−1 + et + θet−1
and then computing the variance of both sides. The result is
σ2x =
1+ 2δθ + θ2
1− δ2 σ
2
e .
The covariance of xt and et is just σ2e . Therefore, we can readily compute the volatility of
the direct wage term, using the standard formula for the variance of a sum of correlated
variables.
A.5 BEA Income Data Tables
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Table A.1: Estimated Demand and Supply Parameters: BEA Income Data, 1980-2003
Coastal Sunbelt Interior
δ 0.80 0.90 0.73
(0.11) (0.08) (0.07)
θ 0.16 -0.01 -0.06
(0.13) (0.16) (0.13)
σe $1,200 $1,000 $800
(200) (100) (80)
Supply
c1 6.08 1.00 2.03
(1.21) (0.09) (0.35)
c2 1.88 0.20 0.48
(0.40) (0.03) (0.12)
Notes: δ, θ, and σe are the autocorrelation parameter, moving average parameter and residual variance of
an ARMA(1,1) estimated for the component of wages that is not explained by a linear time trend and a
metropolitan area-specific constant. c1 denotes the derivative of expected future housing prices with respect
to current investment in housing construction; and c2 denote the derivative of the physical capital cost of
building a home with respect to the stock of houses. The standard errors for the demand parameters are efficient
two-step GMM standard errors. The ones for the supply parameters account for error coming from the demand
estimates.
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Table A.2: Volatility and Serial Correlation in House Prices and Construction: BEA Income Data, 1980-2003
Coastal Sunbelt Interior
Horizon Model Data Model Data Model Data
Volatility of House Price Changes ($)
1 year 5,600 12,650 3,400 2,600 2,300 3,800
3 year 8,800 32,300 5,000 6,500 3,200 9,200
5 year 10,100 44,100 5,600 9,200 3,500 12,600
Serial Correlation of House Price Changes
1 year -0.09 0.75 -0.16 0.60 -0.20 0.66
3 year -0.27 0.09 -0.32 0.21 -0.37 0.17
5 year -0.36 -0.57 -0.39 -0.24 -0.45 -0.31
Volatility of Construction (units)
1 year 800 2,600 2,800 5,300 700 2,100
3 year 1,900 6,700 6,700 14,000 1,600 5,100
5 year 2,600 9,800 9,500 19,600 2,200 6,800
Serial Correlation of Construction
1 year 0.49 0.75 0.56 0.79 0.44 0.73
3 year 0.12 0.27 0.26 0.37 0.05 0.22
5 year -0.12 -0.27 -0.04 -0.20 -0.29 -0.24
Notes: The moments computed from the data allows the mean of housing price changes and construction to
vary across metropolitan areas. The moments generated from the model use the estimates in Table 1.2.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Micro-foundation of owner-occupancy utility
We present a moral hazard framework in which ownership utility matches the specification
of (2.2). Our framework follows the spirit of Henderson and Ioannides (1983)’s treatment of
tenure choice, in which maintenance frictions lead some residents to own instead of rent.
Residents derive utility from the particular way their house is “customized”: e.g. the
color of the walls, the way the lawn is maintained, et cetera. The set of possible customiza-
tions is K. Resident i’s utility from housing is v(∑k∈K ai,khk), where ai,k > 0 is his preference
for k and hk is the quantity of housing customized that way. Individual customization
choices are not contractible, but the right to customize one’s house is. If a landlord retains
the customization rights, then the tenant cannot customize the house, and the null cus-
tomization k = 0 occurs for which ai,0 = 1 for all residents i. If the tenant holds these rights,
he may choose any k ∈ K \ {0}.
Moral hazard arises due to a doomsday customization k = d. This customization incurs
a cost η(hd) to the owner of the house. All residents prefer this customization to all others:
d = arg maxk∈K ai,k. However, the costs of d outweigh the benefits: for all i and h,
v(ai,dh) < η(h).
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The doomsday customization represents the proclivity of residents to damage a house when
they do not bear the costs of doing so.
This inequality prevents landlords from ever selling customization rights to tenants.
Suppose the landlord sells the rights. Then the tenant chooses his preferred customization,
without taking into account the resultant costs, which the landlord bears. The tenant there-
fore chooses k = d. Knowing this, the landlord demands at least η(h) for the customization
rights. But the most the tenant is willing to pay is v(ai,dh)− v(h), which is less than η(h).
Therefore they agree not to trade. The landlord keeps the rights, and k = 0. The utility from
renting is v(h) because ai,0 = 1.
An owner-occupant chooses the customization, but also bears the costs if he chooses k =
d. Let k(i) denote the solution to his optimization problem maxk∈K\{0} v(ai,kh)− η(h)1k=d.
Due to the costliness of the doomsday customization, the resident never chooses it: k(i) 6= d.
Indeed, if k′ is any other customization, then v(ai,k′h) > v(ai,dh)− η(h) due to the above
inequality. We define ai ≡ ai,k(i). The utility from owning is v(aih). This form corresponds
exactly to (2.2).
B.2 Proofs
B.2.1 Proof of Lemma 3
First we prove that construction occurs in each period. Construction occurs at time 0 because
the housing stock starts at 0, and the housing demand equation (2.9) is positive. For a
contradiction, let t1 > 0 denote the first period in which construction does not occur. Let
t2 > t1 denote the next time construction occurs (t2 may be infinite).
We now claim that rht > r
h
t1−1 for t1 ≤ t < t2. Along the trend growth path, x = 0, so
no uncertainty exists and by (2.7), a resident rents if and only if ai < 1. Because Fa has full
support on R+, some residents must rent. Landlords hence exist in equilibrium, and their
arbitrage equation pht = r
h
t + βp
h
t+1 holds. Aggregate housing demand resulting from the
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first-order condition (2.6) is
Dht (r
h
t ) = Nt
(∫ 1
0
(v′)−1(rht )dFa +
∫ ∞
1
(v′)−1(rht /ai)/aidFa
)
. (B.1)
By assumption, the housing stock and hence housing demand is the same for t1− 1 ≤ t < t2.
Equation (B.1) decreases in rht because v
′′ < 0. Because x = 0 and g > 0, Nt increases with
t. The left side of (B.1) stays constant for t1 − 1 ≤ t < t2 while Nt increases. Therefore, rt
increases for t1 − 1 ≤ t < t2.
Because construction occurs at t1 − 1, we have pht1−1 = plt1−1 + K, which results from
zero homebuilder profits. Zero construction at t1 can only occur when pht1 ≤ plt1 + K, from
homebuilder profit maximization. The landlord and landowner arbitrage equations at
t1 − 1 deliver rht1−1 ≥ rlt1−1 + (1− β)K. The quantity of undeveloped land stays constant for
t1 − 1 ≤ t < t2 and hence rlt does as well, because firm land demand Dl does not change
over time. Therefore rht > r
l
t + (1− β)K for t1 ≤ t < t2. Then
pht1 = ∑
t1≤t<t2
βt−t1rht + βt2−t1 pht2
> ∑
t1≤t<t2
βt−t1(rlt + (1− β)K) + βt2−t1(plt2 + K)
= plt + K,
which contradicts the zero construction inequality pht1 ≤ plt + K. This contradiction proves
that construction occurs at all times t.
We now show that rents rht increase over time. Because construction occurs at all t,
pht = p
l
t + K for all t. Undeveloped land must always exist because perpetual construction
occurs. Therefore, landowners are indifferent between holding land until tomorrow or
selling it, so plt = r
l
t + βp
l
t+1. Together with the landlord arbitrage equation, this equation
gives rht = p
h
t − βpht+1 = plt + K − β(plt+1 + K) = rlt + (1 − β)K. Equilibrium rents are
determined by S− Dl(rht − (1− β)K) = Dht (rht ), where housing demand comes from (B.1).
The left side increases in rht , whereas the right side deceases. Nt increases over time, which
shifts up Dht . Therefore r
h
t increases as well.
146
Finally, we can show directly that the supply elasticity decreases over time. The elasticity
by definition is
eSt =
rht (D
l)′(rht − (1− β)K)
S− Dl(rht − (1− β)K)
=
rht
rht − (1− β)K
Dl(rht )
Dht (r
h
t )
rlt(D
l)′(rlt)
Dl(rlt)
=
rht
rht − (1− β)K
(
S
Ht
− 1
)
el ,
which coincides with (2.4). We have shown directly that Ht and rht increase over time.
Therefore, when el is constant, eSt decreases over time.
B.2.2 Proof of Proposition 5
We use (2.5) to write ph0 = r
h
0 + βE˜p
h
1. Let ∂/∂x denote the partial derivative in which N0
stays constant. Then ∂ph0/∂x = ∂r
h
0/∂x + ∂βE˜p
h
1/∂x. We calculate ∂r
h
0/∂x by differentiating
(2.8) at x = 0. Let d(·) = (v′)−1(·), and let bi = 1+ β(E˜ph1 − Ei ph1)/rh0 . Note that when x = 0,
bi = 1 for all i. Then
− (Dl)′ ∂r
h
0
∂x
= N0
∫
M
∫ 1
0
d′(rh0)
∂rh0
∂x
dFadFµ + N0
∫
M
d(rh0)
∂bi
∂x
dFµ
+ N0
∫
M
∫ ∞
1
a−2i d
′(rh0/ai)
(
∂rh0
∂x
+
∂βE˜ph1
∂x
− ∂βEi p
h
1
∂x
)
dFadFµ − N0
∫
M
d(rh0)
∂bi
∂x
dFµ.
The extensive margins terms for the rental and owner-occupied populations cancel. We
simplify this equation to
∂rh0
∂x
= −
N0
∫
M
∫ ∞
1 a
−2
i d
′(r0/ai)
(
∂βE˜ph1/∂x− ∂βEi ph1/∂x
)
dFadFµ
(Dl)′ + N0
∫
M
∫ 1
0 d
′(rh0)dFadFµ + N0
∫
M
∫ ∞
1 a
−2
i d
′(rh0/ai)dFadFµ
.
The proposition assumes a constant elasticity of housing demand eD. This property
occurs when individual demand d(·) displays the same constant elasticity. Indeed, from
(B.1), the elasticity of housing demand when x = 0 is
eD = −
∫ 1
0 rd
′(r)dFa +
∫ ∞
1 ra
−2
i d
′(r/ai)dFa∫ 1
0 d(r)dFa +
∫ ∞
1 a
−1
i d(r/ai)dFa
,
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which holds when rd′(r)/d(r) = −eD for all r. We can therefore rewrite ∂rh0/∂x as
∂rh0
∂x
= −
eD N0
∫
M
∫ ∞
1 a
−1
i d(r
h
0/ai)
(
∂βE˜ph1/∂x− ∂βEi ph1/∂x
)
dFadFµ
rh0(Dl)′ + eD N0
∫
M
∫ 1
0 d(r
h
0)dFadFµ + eD N0
∫
M
∫ ∞
1 a
−1
i d(r
h
0/ai)dFadFµ
.
Because Fa and Fµ are independent, we can write∫
M
∫ ∞
1
a−1i d(r
h
0/ai)Ei p
h
1dFadFµ =
∫ ∞
1
a−1i d(r
h
0/ai)dFa
∫
M
Ei ph1dFµ
=
∫ ∞
1
a−1i d(r
h
0/ai)dFaEp
h
1,
where Eph1 ≡
∫
M Ei p
h
1dFµ is the average belief about p
h
1. Recall from (B.1) that (h
rent
i,0 )
∗ =
d(rh0) if ai < 1 (and 0 otherwise) and (h
own
i,0 )
∗ = d(rh0/ai)/ai if ai ≥ 1 (and 0 otherwise).
The share of housing that is owner-occupied is χ =
∫ ∞
1 a
−1
i d(r
h
0/ai)dFa/(
∫ 1
0 d(r
h
0)dFa +∫ ∞
1 a
−1
i d(r
h
0/ai)dFa). We can therefore divide through the equation for ∂r
h
0/∂x by the total
housing stock to get
∂rh0
∂x
= −
eDχ
(
∂βE˜ph1/∂x− ∂βEph1/∂x
)
eS0 + e
D
.
Substituting into ∂ph0/∂x = ∂r
h
0/∂x + ∂βE˜p
h
1/∂x yields (2.10) of the proposition.
B.2.3 Proof of Proposition 6
We will calculate the effect of the shock zt on rht by differentiating the equation S− Dl(rht −
(1− β)K) = Dht (rht ) with respect to x at x = 0, where Dht (rht ) is given by (B.1). This derivative
is valid if and only if this equilibrium condition holds for x around 0. The condition holds
as long as construction occurs at t. Our first task is thus proving the existence of an open
set I ∈ R such that 0 ∈ I and for x ∈ I, construction occurs for all t.
As in the proof of Lemma 3, we can prove that construction must occur at t1 if, conditional
on the absence of construction at t1, rt > rht1−1 for t1 ≤ t < t2 where t2 is the next time
construction occurs. The key step in that proof was that Nt increases with t. We define
an open set I1 containing 0 such that Nt still increases in t for x ∈ I1. Because M is
uniformly bounded, there exist µmin and µmax such that µmin ≤ µ′ ≤ µmax for all µ′ that
are coordinates of vectors in M. Recall that Nt+1/Nt = eg+(µt+1−µt)x. Because g > 0, the set
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I1 =
(−g/(µmax − µmin), g/(µmax − µmin)) is open. For any x ∈ I1, Nt+1/Nt > 1. With this
result, the proof of this increasing rent condition matches verbatim the proof given in the
proof of Lemma 3 when t1 > 1. When t1 = 1, Dht1−1 is no longer given by (B.1) but instead
by (2.9).
The only new fact we must show therefore is that if construction fails to occur at t = 1,
then rh0 < r
h
1 . To do this, we first show that E˜p
h
1 − Ei ph1 = O(x) as x → 0 for all i. We
have ph1 = ∑
∞
t=1 β
t−1rht . All residents agree on H0 and N0 because they are observable
at t = 0. Let t2 be the next time construction occurs given H0. Once it occurs it will
occur afterward forever due to the arguments in the proof of Lemma 3. In principle
residents could disagree about t2, but we will now show that for x small enough they
do not. While construction does not occur, rents are determined by H0 = NtDht (r
h
t ) and
S − H0 = Dl(rlt). Because Nt increases over time, rht must as well. When construction
occurs next period but not today at t, pht < p
l
t + K while p
h
t+1 = p
l
t+1 + K, so using the
landlord and landowner arbitrage equations defined in the proof of Lemma 3, we find
that (Dht )
−1(H0/Nt) < (Dl)−1(S− H0) + (1− β)K while construction fails to occur. The
first time construction does occur, t = t2, is defined as the lowest value of t for which this
inequality fails to hold. Because we are in discrete time, and because the relationships
Nt = N0egt+(µt−1)x and µmin ≤ µt ≤ µmax hold, there exists an open I2 3 0 such that when
x ∈ I2, t2 is the same for all realizations of µ ∈ M. For 1 ≤ t < t2, rht is the solution to
H0 = NtDht (r
h
t ), and for t ≥ t2, rht solves S− Dl(rht − (1− β)K) = NtDht (rht ). In each case,
because Nt = N0egt+(µt−1)x, the resulting rht is a differentiable function of x for any value of
µt and is the same at x = 0 for any value of µt. Therefore, E˜rht − Eirht = O(x) as x → 0 for
all i, and the same then holds for ph1.
We now return to showing that if construction fails to occur at t = 1, then rh0 < r
h
1 .
Using (2.9), we write Dh0(r
h
0) = N0 f0(r
h
0), and using (B.1), we write D
h
1(r
h
1) = N1 f1(r
h
1).
Without construction at t = 1, we have N0 f0(rh0) = N1 f1(r
h
1). Note from (2.9) and (B.1) that
f0 = f1 +O(x) as x → 0; this fact follows because E˜ph1 − Ei ph1 = O(x) as x → 0 for all i.
Using N1 = N0eg+(µ1−1)x, we can conclude that eg+(µ1−1)x f1(rh1) = f1(r
h
0) +O(x) as x → 0.
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Because eg+(µ1−1)x > 1 as x → 0 and f1 is decreasing, there exists an open I3 3 0 such that
for x ∈ I3, rh1 > r01. This inequality is what we needed to show to prove that construction
occurs at time 1, which is all that remained to prove that construction always occurs. We set
I = I1 ∩ I2 ∩ I3.
All of that proved that for t > 0, the effect of the shock zt on rht results from differentiating
the equation S− Dl(rht − (1− β)K) = Dht (rht ) with respect to x at x = 0. Doing so yields
−(Dl)′drht /dx = µtDht + (Dht )′drht /dx, from which it follows that drht /dx = −µtDht /((Dl)′ +
(Dht )
′) = µtrht /(eSt + eD). Similarly, the partial effect of the shock on current rents rh0 , holding
beliefs constant and letting N0 change, is ∂rh0/∂x = r
h
0/(e
S
0 + e
D). Putting together this
partial effect with the one in Proposition 5 yields
dph0
dx
=
rh0
eS0 + e
D
+
∞
∑
t=1
(
eS0 + (1− χ)eD
eS0 + e
D
µ˜t +
χeS
eS0 + e
S
µt
)
βtrht
eSt + e
S
,
where µ˜t is the most optimistic belief of µt and µt is the average belief of µt. Because all
residents agree that µ0 = 1, we may rewrite this expression as
dph0
dx
=
∞
∑
t=0
(
eS0 + (1− χ)eD
eS0 + e
D
µ˜t +
χeS
eS0 + e
S
µt
)
βtrht
eSt + e
S
.
The text defines the mean persistence of a persistence vector µ′ to be µ′ = ∑∞t=0 µtβtrht (eSt +
eD)−1/∑∞t=0 βtrht (eSt + eD)−1. We use this definition, and divide through by p0 = ∑
∞
i=0 β
trht ,
which holds at x = 0, to derive
d log ph0
dx
=
(
∞
∑
t=0
βtrht
)−1 ∞
∑
t=0
(
eS0 + (1− χ)eD
eS0 + e
D
µ˜+
χeS
eS0 + e
S
µ
)
βtrht
eSt + e
S
=
(
eS0 + (1− χ)eD
eS0 + e
D
µ˜+
χeS
eS0 + e
S
µ
)
1
e˜S + eD
,
where we have used the definition of the long-run supply elasticity e˜S given in the text. This
equation for d log ph0/dx matches (2.12) in Proposition 6.
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B.2.4 Proof of Implication 7
We demonstrate a limiting case in which eS0 = ∞ while e˜
S < ∞. Let Dl(r) = br−el for
some constant b > 0. Consider the limit as b → 0. We know that rht ≥ (1− β)K because
rht = r
l
t + (1− β)K and rlt ≥ 0. Define N∗ to be the value of Nt that solves the equation
S = Dht ((1− β)K), where Dht is given by (B.1). For Nt < N∗, housing demand fails to exceed
available land at the minimum rent, and there is no demand for land in the limit, so the
market clearing rent must be rht = (1− β)K while Ht < S. By (2.4), eSt = ∞ in this case. But
for Nt > N∗, demand exceeds supply at the minimum rent, so rht > (1− β)K and Ht > 0,
leading to a finite elasticity. Since Nt grows at a constant rate g, for any Nt < N∗ we have
eS0 = ∞ but e˜
S < ∞.
B.2.5 Proof of Implication 8
Disagreement amplification ∆ equals
∆ =
eS0 + (1− χ)eD
eS0 + e
D
µ˜− µ
e˜S + eD
.
We calculate this difference from subtracting from (2.12) the counterfactual in which we
substitute µ for µ˜. Define N∗0(χ) to be the value of development (which determines the
supply elasticities; see above) that maximizes ∆. When χ = 1, ∆ is 0 in the limits as N0 → 0
and N0 → ∞, because e˜S = 0 in the first case and eS0 = 0 in the second. But ∆ > 0 for χ = 1,
so 0 < N∗0(1) < ∞ by continuity. But N
∗
0(χ) is continuous in χ as long as it exists and is
finite, so there must exist χ∗ < 1 such that for χ∗ ≤ χ ≤ 1, N∗0(χ) exists and is finite.
B.2.6 Proof of Implication 9
When χ = 1, the limit as N0 → ∞ of d log ph0/dx is µ/eD. For any 0 < N0 < ∞, we can
choose µ˜ to be large enough so that the price change given by (2.12) is larger than µ/eD,
because this price change becomes arbitrarily large with µ˜. By continuity, we can do the
same for some χ < 1.
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B.3 Construction equation
By the definition of supply elasticity, the change in the log housing stock is eS0 d log r
h
0/dx. The
total effect of the shock on rents combines the effect in the end of the proof of Proposition
5 and the direct effect of the shock on N0 derived in the proof of Proposition 6. It is
drh0/dx = r
h
0/(e
S
0 + e
D)− χeD(∂βE˜ph1∂x − ∂βEph1/∂x)/(eS0 + eD). We substitute in for the
beliefs from the Proof of Proposition 6 and divide through by rh0 , and then multiply by e
S
0 to
get
d log H0
dx
=
eS0
eS0 + e
D
(
1− χe
D
e˜S + eD
ρ(µ˜− µ)
)
, (B.2)
where ρ ≡ ph0/rh0 is the price-rent ratio of the city before the shock at x = 0.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Alternative Finance Calibration
The one profession for which our approach to estimation worked poorly was Finance
because of the large discrepancies between the Harvard and IRS data. In this appendix we
maintain the same estimates of shares in different professions of the previous appendix, but
fit the Finance-conditional distribution of income to fit only the Harvard data and disregard
the IRS data as a robustness check on our conclusions.
Figure C.1 shows the results of this alternative calibration. The left shows the conditional
profession distribution including the “Unskilled” category. An important thing to note is
that the fraction of individuals captured by our professions falls at lower incomes. For
example, at $250k we now only account for about 70%. However, it is now monotonically
increasing. The reason is that our alternative estimation lends Finance a much thicker upper
tail (as this is what fits the Harvard data) and thus shifts many financiers from modestly
wealthy income levels where there are a reasonable number of individuals in our original
estimation to very high incomes that were much thinner.
The effects of this change on the professional distribution conditional on being among
our professions is shown more clearly in the right panel of the figure. There we see that
the new estimation makes only a modest difference in depressing Finance’s share at the
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Figure C.1: Income Distributions Under Alternative Finance Calibrations
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Notes: Conditional profession distribution by income for skilled individuals with (left) and without (right) the
inclusion of “unskilled” professions under the alternative, Harvard-matching estimation of the Finance income
distribution.
“thicker” incomes below $1m. However, Finance’s share dramatically blows up at higher
incomes, coming to dominate incomes above about $2m overwhelmingly.
Figure C.2 shows the impact this has on ATEM and MTEM optimal taxes. The results
are very close to those in the text on which we focus qualitatively, except that now under
both literature calibration rates rise monotonically at higher incomes and there is a much
smaller difference between the pro mgmt calibration and the anti mgmt calibration. Rates at
very high incomes are somewhat higher under all calibrations other than Tea Party.
We omit the reference distributions by ability levels, as these are essentially the same
except that Finance is now more unequal and thus at very high incomes overtakes Man-
agement as the most lucrative occupation. Optimal marginal tax rates under our baseline
structural model (as in Subsection 3.5.2) also hardly change, except that pro mgmt comes
to resemble anti mgmt even more closely. More revealing is the difference in the impact
of externalities as compared to intensive margin labor supply elasticities on the structure
and level of optimal marginal tax rates, as in Subsection 3.5.3. This analysis is shown in
Figure C.3. Compared to Figure 3.8, our results here show that rates are much more clearly
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Figure C.2: ATEM and MTEM Policies Under Alternate Finance Calibration
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Figure C.3: “Horserace” Under Alternate Finance Calibration
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progressive under all but the Tea Party calibrations and much more extremely regressive
under the Tea Party calibration. Overall levels of rates move only slightly, both for the
externality-varying calibrations and the elasticity-varying calibrations. However, now, under
the elasticity-varying calibrations the extent of regressivity is now more-or-less constant
across values of the elasticity. This alternative calibration thus makes even stronger our
claim that externalities have a stronger effect on the structure of optimal taxes than does the
intensive elasticity of labor supply.
Our results on quantitative welfare gains (as in Subsection 3.5.4) are quite similar, except
that they are somewhat (roughly 25%) larger, especially under the Occupy calibration. More
interesting is the impact of the new calibration on the effect of the Reagan tax reforms. All
impacts on the allocation of talent are in the same direction but a bit (10-20%) larger. The
impacts of the reforms on social welfare and GDP are more negative, and more consistent
between the two literature calibrations. However the largest change is on the impact of the
reforms on inequality. This doubles as a result of the new calibration, so that now the Reagan
reforms account for 42% of the 1979-1993 and 30% of the 1979-1997 change in the share of
income earned by talented individuals in the top 1%.
C.2 Externality Share Calibration
In this appendix we discuss in greater detail our strategy for calibrating the externality
shares of various professions based on the literature.
C.2.1 Law and Computers/Engineering
Murphy et al. (1991) calculate the direct spillovers of both lawyers and engineers using
cross-country regressions. We use their preferred estimates that are restricted to the 55
countries in which more than 10,000 students are in college. Their result is that a 1% point
increase in the share of students studying law lowers real per capita GDP growth rates by
0.078% points, and that a 1% point increase in the share of students studying engineering
increases real per capita GDP growth rates by 0.054% points.
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We convert these estimates to per-dollar externalities using our estimates of the income
distributions in law and engineering, as well as OECD data on the share of students studying
each field in the United States. We interpret the spillovers of these professions on GDP
growth as a one-time, static reduction (or improvement) to GDP. This interpretation is
consistent with our static model that does not consider economic growth.1 All of the
following data comes from 2005.
The OECD data tell us that 2.4% of students study law (51,000 out of 2,100,000). US GDP
in 2005 was $12.4 trillion. The total externality from lawyers is therefore
−0.078︸ ︷︷ ︸
MSV estimate
·0.024 · $12.4 trillion = −$23 billion.
To compute the externality share ep for law, we divide this figure by the aggregate
income for law. We focus just on the aggregate income of the “talented” individuals for
which we calibrated income distributions in Section 3.3.1. We attribute all of the spillovers
calculated by MSV to this group of lawyers. According to our calibrated income distribution,
the mean income of these lawyers is $337,000 and there are 325,000 of them. Their total
income is therefore $110 billion, and the per-dollar externality from law is then
eLaw = − $23 billion$110 billion = −0.21.
Analogous calculations yield our estimate for the externality share of engineering. The
OECD data tell us that 10.7% of students study engineering (230,000 out of 2,100,000). The
total externality from engineers is therefore
0.054︸ ︷︷ ︸
MSV estimate
·0.107 · $12.4 trillion = $72 billion.
We again attribute all of the spillovers calculated by MSV to the “talented” engineers whose
income distributions we estimated in Section 3.1. According to that distribution, the mean
1An alternate approach is to interpret the spillovers as permanent shocks to GDP, which affect welfare in
current and all future years. We would then compute the present value of these spillovers. This methodology is
more appropriate in many ways but our static model is ill-suited to analyze it.
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income of these engineers is $172,000 and there are 560,000 of them. Their total income is
therefore $96 billion, and the per-dollar externality from engineering is then
eEngineering =
$72 billion
$96 billion
= 0.75.
C.2.2 Management
The externality share for management largely determines top tax rates because management
is the most heavily represented occupation at top tax rates. Two strands in the literature
offer competing views on the externalities of management. We calculate optimal tax rates
using management externalities calibrated from each strand of the literature. Our paper
offers a framework for analyzing how the conclusions from that literature quantitatively
affect optimal tax rates.
The first half of the literature argues that executive compensation reflects a good deal
of rent seeking. According to this story, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation
shifts resources from shareholders to managers in ways that do not actually reflect the
CEO’s marginal product. Papers that try to document such behavior include Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2001) and Malmendier and Tate (2009). Piketty et al. (2014) argue that 60% of
the CEO earnings elasticity with respect to taxes represents this rent seeking behavior. The
other 40% is genuine labor supply. This literature therefore gives the estimate
eManagement = −0.6.
The other half of the literature argues that the increases in CEO compensation over the
last 30 years are due not to rent seeking but to fundamental labor market factors, such as
increasing firm size (Gabaix and Landier, 2008). Furthermore, the compensation patterns
highlighted by the aforementioned papers as evidence of rent seeking can be rationalized
as efficient dynamic contracts. Edmans and Gabaix (2009) offer a survey of this literature.
The conclusion from this perspective is that CEO pay reflects the marginal product of these
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managers, and that therefore
eManagement = 0.
We assume all management has the same externality share as CEOs.
C.2.3 Academia/Science
We estimate that the aggregate income for talented workers in Academia and Science is
$67 billion ($107,000 per worker times 626,000 workers). Aggregate income is therefore $67
billion.2
Murphy and Topel (2006) estimate that the gains of medical research from 1970 to 2000
were $3.2 trillion annually. This spillover is likely the largest externality from academia and
science, but note that this estimate is still conservative in assuming no gains accrue from
any activity in academia other than medical research. The resulting externality share for all
of this occupation is then
eAcademia/Science =
$3.2 trillion
$67 billion
≈ 48.
An alternative benchmark for the value of scientific research is much narrower and
focuses only on the spillovers of universities to profits made by geographically proximate
firms, thus neglecting other profit and consumer welfare spillovers. This narrower measure
is studied by Jaffe (1989). His model allows university research to have a direct effect on
commercial patents as well as an indirect effect through influencing industrial R&D. His
preferred estimate is that the total elasticity of patents with respect to university research is
.6. The direct elasticity of industrial R&D on patents ins .94 and industrial R&D expenditures
are 6 times larger than university research expenditures. Therefore a marginal dollar in
university research is equivalent to 6·.6.94 = 3.83 dollars spent on industrial R&D in terms of
resulting patents.
According to the National Science Foundation, $45 billion was spent on university R&D
2According to http://www.researchamerica.org/uploads/healthdollar12.pdf, total spending
on medical research was $80 billion in 2001. So the prior number is the right order of magnitude.
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in 2005. Using the estimate from Jaffe, we conclude that the total spillover from this activity
was $172.35 billion. Dividing this by our $67 billion of salary yields a much lower 2.6
externality share.
The largest difference between these measures is how broadly they attempt to measure
the spillovers from academic research. While we are more sympathetic to the Murphy and
Topel accounting, using 48 as the externality share of Academia/Science would cause every
other factor to be swamped by the need to get more individuals into this field. Perhaps this
is appropriate, but we felt that, given the smaller Jaffe numbers, a reasonable compromise
was to use 5, twice the Jaffe number but still an order of magnitude smaller than that from
Murphy and Topel.
C.2.4 Consulting
A body of work has demonstrated that better management practices increase firm produc-
tivity. We interpret the marginal product of consulting as teaching firms these management
practices. Some examples in which management practices increase productivity are in
adopting new technologies (Bloom et al., 2012), decreasing mortality in cardiac care centers
(Bloom et al., 2011; McConnell et al., 2013), and teaching and research output in universities
(McCormack et al., Forthcoming).
Given these wide-ranging examples where management quality increases productivity,
our prior is that consulting fully captures this marginal product with the fees they charge
for their services. Some direct evidence on the relationship between consulting fees and
increased productivity comes from Bloom et al. (2013). The authors randomly assign
consultants to plants in India. The market fees for the consultants’ time (which they did
not actually charge) was on average $300,000 per plant, and they increased the productivity
of each plant on average by $250,000. We interpret these numbers as in line with our prior
from the larger field of research that consultants’ fees match their marginal product, and
thus set
eConsulting = 0.
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C.2.5 Teaching
Chetty et al. (2013a,b) measure the extent to which higher quality elementary and middle
school teachers raise the eventual earnings of their students. Their main result is that a 1
standard deviation increase in teacher quality raises eventual student earnings by 1.34%.
We use their results to estimate the surplus social benefit of the entry of talented individuals
into the teaching profession.
Chetty et al. measure teacher quality with student test scores. For our purposes, we thus
need an estimate of the extent to which talented workers would raise student test scores.
Teach For America is a program in which college graduates from selective colleges teach for
one or two years. Clark et al. (2013) estimate that Teach For America teachers raise math
test scores by 0.07 standard deviations. They compare 136 Teach For America teachers to
teachers teaching in similar classrooms at the same schools.
Most of the teachers in the Clark et al. (2013) study are in middle schools, so we use
the middle school numbers from Chetty et al.. Chetty et al. (2013a) find that 1 standard
deviation in middle school math teaching quality corresponds to a 0.134 standard deviation
increase in student test scores (Table 2 of that paper). We conclude that talented workers
(represented here by TFA members) are 0.52 = 0.07/0.134 standard deviations of teacher
quality better than the average teacher.3
Chetty et al. (2013b) calculate that the present value of future earnings for a middle
school student is $468,000 in 2005 dollars.4 They also calculate that the average number of
students in a class is 28.2. The surplus social value of the entry of a talented worker into
teaching is
0.0134 · 0.52 · 28.2 · $468,000 = $92,000.
3We are assuming that the average treatment effect on student earnings of a teacher whose students have
higher test scores is the same for all teachers as it is for Teach For America teachers. It is possible that TFA
teachers raise test scores via a different channel then other teachers, in which case the treatment affect would
not be the same. Similar assumptions are made in extrapolation to earnings.
4They use a 5% discount rate and assume that earnings grow 2% annually.
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Our calibrated income distribution for “talented” teachers implies that the mean income
for such teachers is $83,000. According to Chetty et al. (2013b), the average income for
teachers is $50,000. We interpret this figure to represent the marginal social product of
the average teacher. The average teacher’s externality share is 0 under this assumption. A
talented teacher’s total social product is therefore $50,000 + $92,000 = $142,000, and the
resulting externality share is
eTeaching =
$142,000
$83,000
− 1 = 0.71.
C.2.6 Arts/Entertainment
Several quantitative studies (Florida and Mellander, 2010; Hellmanzik, 2010) and much
qualitative work (Jacobs, 1961) indicates that artists have important spillovers to the value
of property in urban areas. It seems plausible that cultural production has other positive
externalities such as social cohesion (Lazear, 1999) and un-captured consumer surplus in
a manner similar to technological innovations. However these effects have proven much
harder to measure (Hausman, 2012) and we saw no way to use those that have been done to
generate a number. Furthermore, unless this number is quite large it has little affect on our
results, except to somewhat dampen the subsidy on entering the middle class in Subsection
3.3.3, because so few individuals enter Arts/Entertainment. We thus reluctantly used a 0
externality share.
C.3 General Ability Model
First we discuss an analytical result for the case when N = 2 under the general ability
assumption, but without further restrictions on functional forms for distributions.
Proposition 9. Suppose that G1 first-order stochastically dominates G2. If e1 < e2 then beginning
from ATEM, there is a first-order welfare gain from raising the marginal tax rate at each wage level w
in the support of the wage distribution for which ∂Θ(w) includes individuals switching either from
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or to a wage level including individuals from both professions. On the other hand, if e1 > e2 then
beginning from ATEM, there is a strictly positive first-order welfare gain from lowering the marginal
tax rate at each wage level w in the support of the wage distribution for which ∂Θ(w) includes
individuals switching either from or to a wage level including individuals from both professions.
Proof. Suppose that T(w) = T0 − E
[
ep? |Θ(w)
]
w. Consider any w meeting the description
in the proposition statement. Partition ∂Θ(w) into two sets: ∂˜Θ(w) and ∂Θ(w) where
∂˜Θ(w) includes only types switching between wage levels at least one of which includes
a positive density of individuals of each profession and ∂Θ(w) includes only individuals
switching between wage levels occupied each by a sole profession. By assumption, ∂˜Θ(w)
is non-empty; let
λ(w) ≡
∫
∂˜Θ(w) f (θ)dθ∫
∂˜Θ(w) f (θ)dθ+
∫
∂Θ(w) f (θ)dθ
.
Then
E [∆T + ∆E|∂Θ(w)] = λ(w)E
[
T
(
wip
)
+ eipwip − T
(
wiq
)− eiqwiq|∂˜Θ(w)]+
[1− λ(w)] E
[
T
(
wip
)
+ eipwip − T
(
wiq
)− eiqwiq|∂Θ(w)] .
Note that the second term is 0 by the argument in the proof of Proposition 8. On the first
term, note the for any type in ∂˜Θ(w) we have
T
(
wip
)
+ eipwip − T
(
wiq
)− eiqwiq =
−E [ep? |Θ (wip)]wip + eipwip + E [eq? |Θ (wiq)]wiq − eiqwiq < (>)0
if e1 < (>)e2 as p = 1 and q = 2 always because no individual has a higher income in
profession 2 than 1 by the general income assumption and first-order stochastic dominance.
While this result does not directly imply that marginal rates are higher (lower) at every
point when the high-paying profession has more negative (positive) externalities than would
be the case under Proposition 8, they are strongly suggestive in this direction. Furthermore
the result applies only when there are two professions. Thus to verify whether in a realistic
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model with many professions externalities do end up making a greater impact on optimal
tax rates than under ATEM requires an empirical calibration.
In particular, we adapt our general model to a logit discrete choice framework to
describe agents’ career selection conditional on ability level. There are N professions,
indexed p = 1, . . . , N, and a unit mass of individuals, indexed by i. Each individual i is
characterized by general ability ai ∈ (0, 1) and a vector of psychic incomes across professions,
ψi =
{
ψip
}N
p=1. Each profession has wage “reference distribution” Gp(·) mapping ability
to marginal product. Utility is quasilinear in consumption and psychic income, and the
marginal utility of consumption is normalized to one. In our basic model, labor supply is
fixed at one, so that i’s income in profession p, denoted yip, is simply Gp(ai). The retention
function R(·) maps pretax income to consumption.
Psychic income consists of two components, a profession-specific mean (independent of
ability) ψˆp, and an individual-specific residual eip. Individual i selects the profession p?(i)
that maximizes utility:
p?(i) = arg max
p
{
R(yip) + ψip
}
= arg max
p
{
R(Gp(ai)) + ψˆp + eip
}
. (C.1)
(Under quasilinear utility, externalities imposed by other agents do not change the relative
attractiveness of professions and so can be ignored.) Let eip = eˆipβ(ai), where eˆip is iid
across professions, drawn from a standard Gumbel (extreme value) distribution, and β(ai)
scales eˆip so that it is expressible in dollars (and thus is additive in utility). Then Equation
C.1 can be written as
p?(i) = arg max
p
{
β(ai)−1
(
R(Gp(ai)) + ψˆp
)
+ eˆip
}
. (C.2)
The logit model implies that the probability that i selects a particular profession p′ has a
closed form expression:
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Pr(p′ = p?(i)) =
exp
[
β(ai)−1
(
R(Gp′(ai)) + ψˆp′
)]
∑Np=1 exp
[
β(ai)−1
(
R(Gp(ai)) + ψˆp
)] . (C.3)
Equivalently, this expression gives the share of agents with i’s ability level who select
profession p′. If psychic incomes ψˆ =
{
ψˆp
}N
p=1 and reference distributions Gp(·) are known,
we can calculate the share of agents at each ability level selecting each profession given
any counterfactual wages; in particular, we can calculate the counterfactual distribution of
professions given any tax function. The function β(a) controls the sensitivity of agents with
ability a to differences in incomes—higher β(a) indicates less willingness to switch careers
in the face of a given income spread.
C.4 Estimation
To estimate the model, we must estimate the function β(a), the vector ψˆ, and the reference
distributions Gp(·). To make this task tractable, we make a key parametric assumption:
we assume the standard deviation of utility from profession p across agents with ability
a, which is β(a)
√
pi/6, is proportional to the average marginal product across professions
at that ability level.5 That is, β(a) = β ·E[Gp(a)], for some constant β. This assumption
implies that lower earners are more sensitive to income differences across professions than
high earners. In practice our results are not highly sensitive to this assumption—even using
a constant value for β(a) yields qualitatively similar results. We further assume that all
professions have positive support across the ability distribution, and that the reference
distributions Gp(·) have range (0,∞) for all professions.
Estimating β
To estimate β, we assume the distribution of ability among Harvard graduates is sufficiently
narrow to be considered constant, denoted aH . We estimate β(aH) using data about Harvard
5The standard Gumbel distribution has a variance of pi/6.
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graduates and changes in financial salaries, from which we can back out the value of the
constant β.
The derivative of (C.3) with respect to R(y f in(aH)), simplified, is
∂sp(aH)
∂R(y f in(aH))
= β(aH)−1
(
sp(aH)− sp(aH)2
)
, (C.4)
implying that we can calculate β(aH) using three figures: the change in post-tax salaries in
finance, relative to other professions, over a given period (∂R(y f in(a))), the change in the
share of Harvard graduates entering finance over the same period (∂sp(aH)), and the mean
share of Harvard graduates entering finance during this period (sp(aH)).
According to Goldin et al. (2013), from 1970 to 1990, the share of male Harvard graduates
entering finance rose from 5% to 16%, so we use ∂R(y f in(a)) = 0.11 and sp(aH) = 0.105.
To compute ∂R(y f in(a)), we use Philippon and Reshef (2012) time series estimates of
finance wages. They present several data series, which control for education and alternate
occupational choice in different ways. We use the wage in finance relative to other industries
(their Figure 1) for our calculations—the approximate values are listed in the first column
of Table C.1 below. From Goldin et al. (2013), we know Harvard alumni in finance who
graduated in 1988–1992 had an annual salary in 2005 of approximately $615,000. Using
Philippon and Reshef’s figures as an approximation for the real change in financial salaries,
we compute real income in finance in the second column of Table C.1. In the following
columns we convert these real values to nominal values, and use NBER’s TAXSIM to
compute nominal post-tax income in each year, then convert back to real figures in the final
column.6 This allows us to explore how the salary premium in finance varied between 1970
and 1990. If graduates in those years looked to salaries at the time of graduation when
selecting careers, then they would have seen an increase from about $225,000 to $300,000,
suggesting a value for ∂R(y f in(a)) of $75,000.
If, on the other hand, graduates correctly predicted what salaries would be, say, 15 years
6This procedure is clearly imperfect, as we do not have figures for the absolute change in financial salaries,
which would be appropriate for computing tax burdens. We use a conservative estimate and a wide range for
robustness checks to ensure our results are not sensitive to this imperfection.
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Table C.1: Real net income in finance over time
P&R Fig 1 Real Income Nom. Income Tax Burden Nom. Consump Real Consump
1970 1.05 379,853 75,971 31,260 44,711 223,553
1980 1 361,765 151,941 67,824 84,117 200,279
1985 1.1 397,941 218,868 94,634 124,234 225,879
1990 1.2 434,118 290,859 87,763 203,096 303,128
2000 1.6 578,824 509,365 195,686 313,679 356,453
2005 1.7 615,000 615,000 214,808 400,192 400,192
after they entered finance, the increase would instead be $225,000 to $400,000, suggesting
∂R(y f in(a)) = $175, 000. Predicting wages only 10 years later would instead correspond
to an increase of approximately $150,000. We select a benchmark value for ∂R(y f in(a)) of
$150,000, and we perform robustness checks using both $75k and $300k (see Appendix C.6
below). Using Equation C.4, we compute corresponding values of β(aH), and dividing by
the mean salary among Harvard graduates across all professions ($189,000 in the benchmark
case of zero labor supply elasticity) we obtain the constant β.
Estimating psychic incomes ψˆ and reference distributions Gp′(·)
Psychic incomes and reference distributions are solved jointly, using a computation that is
most easily understood using a simple example with N = 3 professions, {a, b, c}, and K = 2
discrete levels of income, {y`, yh}. In this simplified example, observable data would consist
of the population shares in each profession at each level of income, fa` fb` fc`
fah fbh fch
 , (C.5)
representing five degrees of freedom (since the shares must sum to 100%), or, in general,
NK − 1 degrees of freedom. Letting a be the reference profession, the vector of psychic
incomes in this case is ψˆ = (ψb ψc). In general, this vector will have length K − 1. The
reference distributions Gp′(·) in this case are approximated by a 1× 3 matrix Gˆ = (ga gb gc),
where for example ga represents the ability percentile below which an an individual in
profession a earns y`, and above which an individual earns yh. More generally, given
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K discrete income levels, the matrix characterizing the reference distributions will be of
dimension (K − 1)× N, representing the K − 1 percentiles partitioning the ability space
into income levels within in each profession. Note that the total number of free parameters
between ψˆ and Gˆ is (N− 1) + (K− 1)× N = NK− 1, matching the number of independent
points in the data.
The system can be solved by constructing a function s(ψˆ, Gˆ) to compute the shares fˆ
that would arise for given values of ψˆ and Gˆ, and then searching for the ψˆ and Gˆ such that
these resulting shares match the data observed in (C.5). This function can be constructed
as follows. Place the elements of Gˆ in a vector in increasing order, thereby partitioning the
ability space into (K− 1)× N + 1 groups, each specifying a vector of salaries faced across
professions. For example, if a candidate Gˆ has gb < ga < gc, the vector
gb
ga
gc

partitions the ability distribution into four groups. Individuals with ability below gb face y`
in each profession. Individuals with ability between gb and ga would earn y` in professions
a and c, but yh in profession b, and so on. This vector can be used to construct a K × N
matrix in which element (m, n) represents the salary a member of group m = 1 . . . 4 would
earn in profession n: 
y` y` y`
y` yh y`
yh yh y`
yh yh yh

. (C.6)
This matrix, along with the candidate vector of psychic incomes ψˆ and an assumed retention
function combine to characterize a matrix of utilities that an individual in each ability
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partition would realize from each profession, except for the idiosyncratic component eip:
u1a u1b u1c
u2a u2b u2c
u3a u3b u3c
u4a u4b u4c

=

R(y`) R(y`) + ψb R(y`) + ψc
R(y`) R(yh) + ψb R(y`) + ψc
R(yh) R(yh) + ψb R(y`) + ψc
R(yh) R(yh) + ψb R(yh) + ψc

. (C.7)
We have assumed that β(a′) is proportional to the average marginal product of an individual
with ability a′ across professions, so that, for example, β2 = β(y` + yh + y`)/3. We can thus
compute the logit shares of each partition that would select each profession. For example
the share of partition 2 selecting profession b is given by
s2b =
exp[(R(yh) + ψb)/β2]
exp[(R(y`))/β2] + exp[(R(yh) + ψb)/β2] + exp[(R(y`) + ψc)/β2]
.
The population share in partition 2 is ga− gb, so individuals in partition 2 selecting profession
b make up fraction s2b(ga − gb) of the total population. Since these individuals earn yh, as
specified in (C.6), they contribute to fˆbh. Members of partitions 3 and 4 also contribute to
fˆbh, therefore the total implied share of yh-earners in profession b is
fˆbh = s2b(ga − gb) + s3b(gc − ga) + s4b(1− gc).
The full matrix of implied fˆ shares is computed by weighting the logit shares arising
from (C.7) by the population fraction in each ability partition, then the resulting shares
are aggregated using the income levels in (C.6) as indices. To perform the numerical
computation, we designate Law as the reference profession, and we set K = 50. For
numerical simplicity, we use a flat tax approximating the US income tax for R(·) (results
are not sensitive to this assumption). We use the numerical solver Knitro (Byrd et al., 2006)
to solve the system, dropping one element of the shares matrix to account for the NK− 1
degrees of freedom. In practice we search over the spread between thresholds in each
profession, so that the search variables can be constrained to be nonnegative, and we impose
the linear inequality constraint that these spreads sum to less than one. We also provide the
solver with analytic gradients. Code for this optimization is available upon request.
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C.5 Solving for the optimal tax function
To find the optimal tax function, we must specify a social welfare function given the model
above. As described above, i’s utility is given by
max
p
{
R(Gp(ai)) + ψˆp + eˆipβ(ai)
}
.
Therefore a utilitarian social planner will select R(·), or equivalently, T(·), to maximize the
expectation of this expression across all agents. To do this, it is sufficient to calculate the
expected utility of all agents with a given ability a′, across all professions:
Ei,p
[
max
p
{
R(Gp(ai)) + ψˆp + eˆipβ(ai)
} ∣∣∣ai = a′] =
β(a′)Ei,p
[
max
p
{
β(a′)−1(R(Gp(a′)) + ψˆp) + eˆip
}]
. (C.8)
We cannot estimate (C.8) directly, as we cannot observe eˆip. However given our estimated
model, we can calculate β(a′)−1(R(Gp(a′)) + ψˆp) in a given profession, and by assumption
we know the distribution of eˆip. Williams (9) and Small and Rosen (1981) demonstrate that
the iid extreme value distribution of eˆip implies (C.8) is equal to
β(a′) ln
(
N
∑
p=1
exp
(
β(a′)−1(R(Gp(a′)) + ψˆp)
))
+ C, (C.9)
where C is a constant. Since we are interested in the differences in (C.9) under different tax
functions, the constant C can be ignored.
Adding a redistributive motive
The above approach assumes all agents have the same marginal utility of consumption, and
thus it is sufficient to evaluate tax functions in dollar terms. To incorporate a redistributive
motive, we assume the marginal utility of consumption is lower for agents with higher
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ability (who have higher average utility). Equivalently, we will place a lower welfare weight
on consumption for high ability agents; we will use α(a) to denote the welfare weight
assigned to ability a. To preserve the structure of the logit discrete choice framework, we
continue to assume agents of each ability level have constant marginal utility of consumption.
Nevertheless, we will allow the planner’s welfare weights to depend on expected levels
for each ability at the optimum. Letting U¯(a) denote the average utility at ability a, we
use α(a) = U¯(a)−γ, so that γ ≥ 0 governs the curvature of the social welfare function,
with the special case γ = 0 corresponding to no redistributive taste, and γ = .95 taken to
approximate logarithmic preferences over agents’ utility (our baseline redistributive case).
We use this instead of logarithmic preferences (corresponding to γ = 1) as it makes little
substantive difference and speeds computational convergence.
Adding a labor-leisure choice
So far we have assumed labor supply is inelastic with respect to the tax rate; we now relax
that assumption. Whereas we previously assumed utility was given by R(yip) + ψip, we will
now suppose utility is given by
R(yip)− h
1/σ+1
1/σ+ 1
+ ψip,
where the agent now selects the labor supply h that maximizes utility. Pre-tax earnings yip is
equal to the product of i’s supplied labor and i’s private marginal product in this profession,
wip. The optimal labor supply choice solves h1/σ = R′(y)wip = (1− τ)wip, where τ is the
marginal tax rate on earnings y. Optimal labor supply is equal to
hip = (wip(1− τ))σ
so σ is the elasticity of labor supply. We can use the equation to infer marginal product
wip from observed earnings yip. As previously noted, β(ai) is assumed to scale with the
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Figure C.4: Optimal Tax Rates Under Different Elasticity Calculation
10 25 50 100 200 500 1000
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Income in $1,000s (log scale)
M
ar
gi
na
l t
ax
 ra
te
Literature (pro mgmt)
10 25 50 100 200 500 1000
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Income in $1,000s (log scale)
M
ar
gi
na
l t
ax
 ra
te
Literature (anti mgmt)
10 25 50 100 200 500 1000
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Income in $1,000s (log scale)
M
ar
gi
na
l t
ax
 ra
te
Tea Party
10 25 50 100 200 500 1000
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Income in $1,000s (log scale)
M
ar
gi
na
l t
ax
 ra
te
Occupy Wall Street
10 25 50 100 200 500 1000
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Income in $1,000s (log scale)
M
ar
gi
na
l t
ax
 ra
te
Literature (pro mgmt)
10 25 50 100 200 500 1000
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Income in $1,000s (log scale)
M
ar
gi
na
l t
ax
 ra
te
Literature (anti mgmt)
10 25 50 100 200 500 1000
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Income in $1,000s (log scale)
M
ar
gi
na
l t
ax
 ra
te
Tea Party
10 25 50 100 200 500 1000
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Income in $1,000s (log scale)
M
ar
gi
na
l t
ax
 ra
te
Occupy Wall Street
Notes: Computational optimal piece-wise-constant marginal tax rates under robustness check where the
increase in finance salaries is assumed to be $75,000 (left) or $300,000 (right).
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mean earnings of ability ai across professions—since we do not want this parameter to be
endogenous to the tax function, in the presence of a labor-leisure choice we assume β(ai)
scales with the earnings an agent with ability ai would earn given her labor choice in each
profession under a laissez-faire tax regime.
C.6 Alternative Elasticity Value
Table C.2: Welfare Gains Under Alternate Elasticity Value
Gains from 1st best in
Social Welfare (GDP)
Gains from
2nd best
Share of potential
from 2nd best
$75k increase
Literature (pro mgmt) 35% (47%) 2.7% (1.3%) 7.7% (2.8%)
Literature (anti mgmt) 40% (52%) 5.1% (3.8%) 12% (7.2%)
Tea Party 1.7% (4.6%) .97% (3.5%) 56% (76%)
Occupy Wall Street 7.8% (9.8%) 2.9% (.95%) 37% (9.6%)
$300k increase
Literature (pro mgmt) 5.5% (14%) .62% (-.61%) 11% (-4.3%)
Literature (anti mgmt) 7.3% (18%) 1.6% (.61%) 22% (3.4%)
Tea Party .58% (3.1%) .25% (2.4%) 44% (76%)
Occupy Wall Street 1.9% (2.6%) .88% (-.38%) 45% (-14%)
Notes: Quantitative welfare gain from non-linear income taxation (2nd best), compared to optimal profession-
specific taxation (first best), relative to laissez-faire tax regime, under robustness checks where the increase in
finance salaries is assumed to be either $75,000 or $300,000.
As discussed in Appendix Section C.4 above, there is ambiguity about the appropriate
value of β, driven by uncertainty regarding the accuracy of Harvard graduates’ predictions
about the salary premium that would exist in finance years after graduation. Therefore
we rerun our analysis under the assumption that expected finance salaries for Harvard
graduates increased by, alternatively, $75,000 or $300,000 between 1970 and 1990, rather
than our benchmark assumption of $150,000. Results of this robustness check have little
impact on our results other than the quantitive welfare gains and the quantitative (but not
qualitative) impact of the Reagan tax reforms. An example is shown in Figure C.4, which
gives the optimal tax rates analogous to the baseline scenario in Subsection 3.5.2 using
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for both alternatives. The pattern of tax rates remains similar, though higher switching
elasticities tend to magnify subsidies to the middle class under the Literature specifications
and make top marginal tax rates more extreme under all specifications.
The muted sensitivity of these patterns to large changes in the switching elasticity is
unsurprising, because optimal Pigouvian taxation is unaffected by the size of elasticities;
only the quantitative benefits of imposing such taxation are impacted. The new results
for the quantitative welfare gains are shown in Table C.2. The welfare gains from optimal
taxation under the high elasticity robustness check ($75k increase) are roughly twice as large
as our benchmark specification, while the gains under the low elasticity alternative are one
third to one half as large. Thus higher elasticity values essentially scale up the importance
of the results proportionally.
C.7 Allocation of Talent in the General Ability Model
In this appendix we discuss how talent is allocated under various regimes in our structural
model developed in Section 3.5. Figure C.5 shows the allocation of talent in the absence of
taxation. Sales and Academia/Science attract a large number of individuals at the bottom
of the ability distribution. A variety of professions are represented throughout the mid-
range of the income distribution. But at the top and especially the very top Finance and
Consulting are dominant and the “middle class” professions of Doctor, Academia/Science
and Computers/Engineering largely die off.
Matters are radically different under optimal taxation for the anti mgmt literature-based
calibration, as pictured in Figure C.6. Under the first-best (left panel) nearly everyone, except
at the very top of the ability distribution, is in Academia/Science. At the very top there is
somewhat more diversity, with a significant representation especially in Management and
Consulting, but still the bulk of talented individuals are allocated to Academia/Science.
This is striking, but is driven by the very large positive externalities of Academia/Science
the literature perceives. The large gains from the first-best allocation of talent discussed in
Subsection 3.5.4 are driven by this radical reallocation.
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Figure C.5: Allocation of talent by ability quantile under laissez-faire
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Figure C.6: Allocation of Talent in Different Regimes
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Notes: Shares of individuals of various ability levels allocated to different professions under first-best, profession-
specific taxation (left) and second-best, non-discriminatory taxation (right).
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Figure C.7: Reallocation of Talent from Reagan Tax Reforms
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Notes: Shares of individuals of various ability levels allocated to different professions under before (left) and
after (right) the Reagan tax reforms.
The reallocation of talent under the second-best (right panel) is much less targeted,
resulting both in a much smaller welfare gain (as discussed in Subsection 3.5.4) and a much
more event distribution of talent across professions as shown in the right panel of Figure C.6.
The distribution across professions at low incomes is largely unaffected, but throughout the
rest of the ability distribution there is a broad heterogeneity of occupational choice. “Middle
class” professions persist high up into the ability distribution, unlike under laissez-faire.
The contrast between the allocation of talent before and after the Reagan tax reforms,
shown in Figure C.7, is a smoother and less dramatic version of the contrast between the
laissez-faire and second-best allocations. The Reagan reforms cause Management and Finance
to expand at the expense of the middle class professions especially at high ability levels, but
not nearly as dramatically as under laissez-faire.
C.8 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 8. We begin by considering the case of pure career-switching and no
intensive elasticity. First, note that the adjustment of marginal tax rates at any level must
176
leave average externalities at each income level constant as the average entrant and exiter
has the same externality as currently prevails at that income level. Second, note that the
proposed tax satisfies the necessary conditions of Proposition 7, given that there is no
intensive elasticity: for any y
E [∆T + ∆E|∂Θ(y)] = E
[
T
(
wph?p
)
+ epwph?p − T
(
wqh?q
)
− eqwqh?q |∂Θ(y)
]
,
which equals
E
[
E
[
T
(
y′′
)
+ epy′′ − T
(
y′
)− eqy′|∂Θ(y), wqh?q = y′, wph?p = y′′]∣∣∣ ∂Θ(y)] ,
which itself equals
E
[
E
[
T0 − T0 − E
[
ep? |θ(y′′)
]
y′′ + E
[
ep? |θ(y′)
]
y′ + epy′′ − eqy′
|∂Θ(y), wqh?q = y′, wph?p = y′′
]∣∣∣ ∂Θ(y)] = 0.
Next note that any other continuous tax scheme must violate these conditions. Suppose,
to the contrary, that there is another scheme Tˆ that obeys the conditions with Tˆ 6= T. Then
either Tˆ = T + k for some constant k or we can identify an open set Y ⊂ (y, y) such that
Tˆ(y)− T(y) > Tˆ(y′)− T(y′)∀y ∈ Y and y′ ∈ (y, y)\Y. We deal with each of these cases
separately:
1. Tˆ = T + k: In this case, the allocation of every type to a profession is the same, but the
tax scheme is either infeasible (if k < 0) or burns money (k > 0).
2. Tˆ differs substantively: To show that the conditions of Proposition 7 are violated it is
sufficient to show that any weighted sum of the conditions differs from 0. Because W
is open it can be written as a countable union of n (where n possibly equals ∞) open
intervals (y
1
, y1), (y2, y2), . . .. Consider
n
∑
i=1
E
[
∆T + ∆E|∂Θ
(
y
i
)]
fS
(
y
i
)
− E [∆T + ∆E|∂Θ (yi)] fS (yi)
=
n
∑
i=1
∫
∂Θ(yi)
[∆T (θ) + ∆E (θ)] f (θ) dθ−
∫
∂Θ(yi)
[∆T (θ) + ∆E (θ)] f (θ) dθ,
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which equals
n
∑
i=1
∫
∂Θ(yi)\(∂Θ(yi)∩∂Θ(yi))
[∆T (θ) + ∆E (θ)] f (θ) dθ
−
∫
∂Θ(yi)\(∂Θ(yi)∩∂Θ(yi))
[∆T (θ) + ∆E (θ)] f (θ) dθ.
Now note that ∂Θ(y
i
) ∩ ∂Θ(yi) equals{
θ ∈ Θ : ∃p, q ∈ 1, . . . N :
(
wph?p < yi < yi < wqh
?
q
)
∧(
wph?p − T
(
wph?p
)
+ φ
(
h?p; φp
)
= wqh?q − T
(
wqh?q
)
+ φ
(
h?q ; φq
))}
,
which we abbreviate by ∂Θyp<yi<yi<yq . On the other hand
∂Θ(y
i
)\
(
∂Θ(y
i
) ∩ ∂Θ(yi)
)
= ∂Θyp<yi<yq<yi
and
∂Θ(yi)\
(
∂Θ(y
i
) ∩ ∂Θ(yi)
)
= ∂Θy
i
<yp<yi<yq .
Thus all “switches” included are from incomes within Y to outside Y. Consider any
income in y ∈ (y
i
, yi) for some i (which is true for any y ∈ Y) and consider
E
[
Tˆ
(
wph?p
)
+ epwph?p − Tˆ(y)− eqy
∣∣∣wqh?q ∈ Y, θ ∈ ∂Θ (yi) ∪ ∂Θ (yi)] <
T
(
wph?p
)
− T(w) + E
[
epwph?p − eqy
∣∣∣wqh?q ∈ Y, θ ∈ ∂Θ (yi) ∪ ∂Θ (yi)] = 0,
where the inequality follows by the definition of Y and the equality by the fact that, as
above, changing the tax scheme does not change the externality properties of T as the
average externality is static as individuals switch careers. Thus
n
∑
i=1
E
[
∆T + ∆E|∂Θ
(
y
i
)]
fS
(
y
i
)
− E [∆T + ∆E|∂Θ (yi)] fS (yi) < 0
contradicting the necessary conditions and establishing sufficiency.
Second we consider the case of pure intensive margin elasticities. In this case Proposition
7 immediately implies, given that the absence of correlation between ep? and ehp? implies the
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absence of covariance, that([
E
[
ep? |Θ(y)
]
+ T′(y)
]
E
[
ehp? |Θ(y)
])
f (y)
1− T′(y) = 0 =⇒ E
[
ep? |Θ(y)
]
= −T′(y),
as f (y), E
[
ehp? |Θ(y)
]
> 0. This is also sufficient because hours decrease with taxes, estab-
lishing the necessary concavity.
179
